Introduction

Welcome to Tim Harding’s blog of writings and talks about logic, rationality, philosophy and skepticism. There are also some reblogs of some of Tim’s favourite posts by other writers, plus some of his favourite quotations and videos This blog has a Facebook connection at The Logical Place.

There are over 2,900 posts here about all sorts of topics – please have a good look around before leaving. Some of the more recent posts have been prepared with the assistance of AI.

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What is logic?

The word ‘logic‘ is not easy to define, because it has slightly different meanings in various applications ranging from philosophy, to mathematics to computer science. In philosophy, logic determines the principles of correct reasoning. It’s a systematic method of evaluating arguments and reasoning, aiming to distinguish good (valid and sound) reasoning from bad (invalid or unsound) reasoning.

The essential difference between informal logic and formal logic is that informal logic uses natural language, whereas formal logic (also known as symbolic logic) is more complex and uses mathematical symbols to overcome the frequent ambiguity or imprecision of natural language. Reason is the application of logic to actual premises, with a view to drawing valid or sound conclusions. Logic is the rules to be followed, independently of particular premises, or in other words using abstract premises designated by letters such as P and Q.

So what is an argument? In everyday life, we use the word ‘argument’ to mean a verbal dispute or disagreement (which is actually a clash between two or more arguments put forward by different people). This is not the way this word is usually used in philosophical logic, where arguments are those statements a person makes in the attempt to convince someone of something, or present reasons for accepting a given conclusion. In this sense, an argument consist of statements or propositions, called its premises, from which a conclusion is claimed to follow (in the case of a deductive argument) or be inferred (in the case of an inductive argument). Deductive conclusions usually begin with a word like ‘therefore’, ‘thus’, ‘so’ or ‘it follows that’.

A good argument is one that has two virtues: good form and all true premises. Arguments can be either deductiveinductive  or abductive. A deductive argument with valid form and true premises is said to be sound. An inductive argument based on strong evidence is said to be cogent. The term ‘good argument’ covers all three of these types of arguments.

Deductive arguments

A valid argument is a deductive argument where the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, because of the logical structure of the argument. That is, if the premises are true, then the conclusion must also be true. Conversely, an invalid argument is one where the conclusion does not logically follow from the premises. However, the validity or invalidity of arguments must be clearly distinguished from the truth or falsity of its premises. It is possible for the conclusion of a valid argument to be true, even though one or more of its premises are false. For example, consider the following argument:

Premise 1: Napoleon was German
Premise 2: All Germans are Europeans
Conclusion: Therefore, Napoleon was European

The conclusion that Napoleon was European is true, even though Premise 1 is false. This argument is valid because of its logical structure, not because its premises and conclusion are all true (which they are not). Even if the premises and conclusion were all true, it wouldn’t necessarily mean that the argument was valid. If an argument has true premises and its form is valid, then its conclusion must be true.

Deductive logic is essentially about consistency. The rules of logic are not arbitrary, like the rules for a game of chess. They exist to avoid internal contradictions within an argument. For example, if we have an argument with the following premises:

Premise 1: Napoleon was either German or French
Premise 2: Napoleon was not German

The conclusion cannot logically be “Therefore, Napoleon was German” because that would directly contradict Premise 2. So the logical conclusion can only be: “Therefore, Napoleon was French”, not because we know that it happens to be true, but because it is the only possible conclusion if both the premises are true. This is admittedly a simple and self-evident example, but similar reasoning applies to more complex arguments where the rules of logic are not so self-evident. In summary, the rules of logic exist because breaking the rules would entail internal contradictions within the argument.

Inductive arguments

An inductive argument is one where the premises seek to supply strong evidence for (not absolute proof of) the truth of the conclusion. While the conclusion of a sound deductive argument is supposed to be certain, the conclusion of a cogent inductive argument is supposed to be probable, based upon the evidence given. Here’s a classic example of an inductive argument:

  1. Premise: Every time you’ve eaten peanuts, you’ve had an allergic reaction.
  2. Conclusion: You are likely allergic to peanuts.

In this example, the specific observations are instances of eating peanuts and having allergic reactions. From these observations, you generalize that you are probably allergic to peanuts. The conclusion is not certain, but if the premise is true (i.e., every time you’ve eaten peanuts, you’ve had an allergic reaction), then the conclusion is likely to be true as well.

Whilst an inductive argument based on strong evidence can be cogent, there is some dispute amongst philosophers as to the reliability of induction as a scientific method. For example, by the problem of induction, no number of confirming observations can verify a universal generalization, such as ‘All swans are white’, yet it is logically possible to falsify it by observing a single black swan.

Abductive arguments

Abduction may be described as an “inference to the best explanation”, and whilst not as reliable as deduction or induction, it can still be a useful form of reasoning. For example, a typical abductive reasoning process used by doctors in diagnosis might be: “this set of symptoms could be caused by illnesses X, Y or Z. If I ask some more questions or conduct some tests I can rule out X and Y, so it must be Z.

Incidentally, the doctor is the one who is doing the abduction here, not the patient. By accepting the doctor’s diagnosis, the patient is using inductive reasoning that the doctor has a sufficiently high probability of being right that it is rational to accept the diagnosis. This is actually an acceptable form of the Argument from Authority (only the deductive form is fallacious).

References:

Hodges, W. (1977) Logic – an introduction to elementary logic (2nd ed. 2001) Penguin, London.
Lemmon, E.J. (1987) Beginning Logic. Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis.

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Reasoning

Rationality may be defined as as the quality of being consistent with or using reason, which is further defined as the mental ability to draw inferences or conclusions from premises (the ‘if – then’ connection). The application of reason is known as reasoning; the main categories of which are deductive and inductive reasoning. A deductive argument with valid form and true premises is said to be sound. An inductive argument based on strong evidence is said to be cogent. It is rational to accept the conclusions of arguments that are sound or cogent, unless and until they are effectively refuted.

A fallacy is an error of reasoning resulting in a misconception or false conclusion. A fallacious argument can be deductively invalid or one that has insufficient inductive strength. A deductively invalid argument is one where the conclusion does not logically follow from the premises. That is , the conclusion can be false even if the premises are true. An example of an inductively invalid argument is a conclusion that smoking does not cause cancer based on the anecdotal evidence of only one healthy smoker.

By accident or design, fallacies may exploit emotional triggers in the listener (e.g. appeal to emotion), or take advantage of social relationships between people (e.g. argument from authority). By definition, a belief arising from a logical fallacy is contrary to reason and is therefore irrational, even though a small number of such beliefs might possibly be true by coincidence.

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Being there

It is sometimes claimed that one cannot form a legitimate opinion about a countries such as those in the Middle East without first visiting them. This claim is mistaken. In most cases, direct personal experience is not necessary for forming a reasonable and informed judgment.

First, much of our knowledge about the world depends on reliable testimony and evidence rather than personal observation. No one expects a person to visit every place in order to have an opinion about it. Historians write about ancient civilizations they have never seen; scientists study distant galaxies they will never visit; experts evaluate foreign governments based on documented facts and credible reports. Human knowledge would be almost impossible if direct experience were the only valid basis for judgment.

Second, moral judgments about political systems often rely on well-established principles rather than personal travel. For example, a person could reasonably oppose apartheid in South Africa without ever having been there. The system of apartheid was widely documented: laws that enforced racial segregation, restricted where people could live, whom they could marry, and whether they could vote. Once these facts were known, it was entirely rational to condemn the system on moral grounds. Visiting the country would not change the basic ethical evaluation of those laws.

Third, the requirement that one must personally visit a place before criticizing it creates an impossible standard. By that logic, people could not condemn slavery in the past, the Soviet gulag system, or genocide in other countries unless they had personally travelled there. This would silence moral judgment precisely where it is most needed.

Finally, what matters is not physical presence but the quality of the evidence on which a judgment is based. A poorly informed traveller who spends a week in a country may know less than someone who has carefully studied its history, laws, and social conditions.

For these reasons, visiting a country is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for forming a reasonable opinion about it. What matters is access to reliable information, careful reasoning, and sound moral principles—not the possession of a passport stamp.

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The United Nations and Democracies

What percentage of UN member countries are democracies?

Estimates vary depending on how “democracy” is defined, but most major datasets give a broadly similar picture.

Approximate global figures

There are 193 member states in the United Nations.

Using widely cited democracy indices:

  • Freedom House (2024–2025 classifications)
    • About 84 countries are rated “Free” (generally considered liberal democracies).
    • That is roughly 43–44% of UN member states.
  • Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index
    • Full democracies: about 24 countries
    • Flawed democracies: about 48 countries
    • Total democracies: about 72 countries
    • That equals roughly 37% of UN member states.
  • V-Dem Institute (electoral + liberal democracies)
    • Roughly 70–80 countries qualify as democracies depending on the threshold.
    • That is about 36–41% of UN members.

Simple takeaway

Across the main measures:

  • About 35%–45% of UN member countries are democracies.

So less than half of the world’s states are democratic, though democracies tend to contain a somewhat larger share of the world’s population than the number of countries might suggest.

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Electric kettles in the US vs AU

In the USA does having a power voltage of only 110V restrict the appliances that can be used, such as electric kettles?

Yes — the 110–120 V system used in the United States does place some limits on appliance power, and the classic example is indeed the electric kettle.

Why voltage matters

Electrical power is given by the formula:P=V×IP=V×I

where

  • P = power (watts)
  • V = voltage
  • I = current (amps)

Because US outlets provide roughly 120 V, appliances must draw more current to produce the same power as an appliance running on 230–240 V (like in Australia).

But household circuits have current limits (usually 15 A or 20 A), so the maximum practical power from a standard US outlet is about:

  • 15 A × 120 V ≈ 1800 W

In practice most appliances stay 1500 W or below.

Electric kettle example

In Australia (230–240 V)

  • A typical kettle: 2000–2400 W

In the USA (120 V)

  • Typical kettle: 1200–1500 W

So US kettles work fine, but they heat water more slowly.

Example:

  • Australian 2400 W kettle → boils ~1 L in about 2–3 minutes
  • US 1500 W kettle → about 4–6 minutes

Other appliances affected

High-power heating devices are the main ones affected:

ApplianceAustralia (240 V)USA (120 V)
Electric kettle2000–2400 W1200–1500 W
Toaster1800–2200 W1200–1500 W
Hair dryer2000 W1200–1875 W

They exist in the US but are less powerful.

Work-around used in the US

For appliances needing more power, Americans often use 240 V circuits, the same voltage Australia uses. These are installed for:

  • electric ovens and cooktops
  • clothes dryers
  • large air conditioners
  • EV chargers

But standard wall outlets remain 120 V.

A cultural consequence

Many Americans don’t use electric kettles much, partly because they boil water on the stove or in the microwave. Visitors from 230 V countries often notice that US kettles seem slow.

✅ So the short answer:
No appliances are really impossible, but 120 V limits the maximum power of plug-in devices, making things like kettles and heaters less powerful and slower than their 240 V equivalents.

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Consciousness vs Self-consciousness

Is there any difference in meaning between consciousness and self-consciousness?

Yes — there is a clear difference, although in casual speech people sometimes blur the two.

1. Consciousness

Consciousness is the basic state of awareness.

It means that a being is aware of:

  • the external world (sights, sounds, sensations), and/or
  • internal states (thoughts, feelings, pain, memories).

Examples:

  • A person who is awake rather than asleep or unconscious is conscious.
  • Animals are generally considered conscious because they perceive and respond to their environment.

In philosophy and cognitive science it often means subjective experience — the fact that there is something it is like to be that organism.

2. Self-Consciousness

Self-consciousness is a higher level of awareness: awareness of oneself as the subject of experience.

It involves recognising:

  • I am the one perceiving this.
  • These thoughts belong to me.
  • I exist as an individual self.

Examples:

  • Recognising yourself in a mirror.
  • Thinking about your own beliefs, motives, or reputation.
  • Reflecting: Why did I think that?

In everyday language it also has a secondary meaning:

  • feeling awkward or embarrassed because you are aware of yourself being observed (“I felt self-conscious giving the speech”).

3. Philosophical distinction

Many philosophers distinguish the two like this:

LevelMeaning
ConsciousnessAwareness of the world
Self-consciousnessAwareness of oneself as the experiencer

So a creature might be conscious without being self-conscious.

For example, many philosophers think:

  • dogs and cats are conscious,
  • but humans possess a more developed self-consciousness.

4. A short way to state the difference

Consciousness: experience occurs.
Self-consciousness: the experiencer recognises themselves as the experiencer.

Given your interest in Aristotelian realism and philosophy of mind, you might also find it interesting that Aristotle treats awareness of perception (sometimes called reflexive awareness) as something built into perception itself rather than a completely separate faculty.

If you like, I can also show you how philosophers such as Aristotle, Locke, and modern cognitive scientists distinguish these concepts, which is quite revealing.

Ok

Philosophers have treated the distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness in quite different ways. Here are three influential approaches.


1. Aristotle

For Aristotle, perception already contains a kind of implicit self-awareness.

His idea is roughly this:

  • When you see, you are not only aware of the object seen.
  • You are also aware that you are seeing.

In De Anima he suggests that perception includes an awareness of the act of perceiving itself. This means:

  • Self-awareness is not a separate higher faculty.
  • It is built into conscious experience.

So for Aristotle:

ConceptMeaning
ConsciousnessAwareness through perception
Self-consciousnessAwareness that one is perceiving

The difference is therefore not a sharp division, but a reflexive feature of perception.


2. John Locke

John Locke made a much sharper distinction.

He defined consciousness as:

the perception of what passes in a man’s own mind.

But Locke also linked self-consciousness to personal identity. A person is the same person over time because they can be conscious of themselves as the same thinking being.

So for Locke:

ConceptMeaning
ConsciousnessAwareness of thoughts and perceptions
Self-consciousnessAwareness of oneself as the thinker

This makes reflection on oneself central to personhood.


3. Modern cognitive science

Modern researchers often treat self-consciousness as a higher cognitive level.

They distinguish:

LevelDescription
Phenomenal consciousnessRaw subjective experience
Self-consciousnessRepresentation of oneself as a subject

Evidence used in these debates includes the mirror self-recognition test, which some animals pass:

  • chimpanzees
  • dolphins
  • elephants
  • magpies

The argument is that these animals show at least a minimal form of self-awareness, though not the reflective self-consciousness humans possess.


4. A helpful way to frame the distinction

Philosophers sometimes summarise it like this:

  • Consciousness: There is experience.
  • Self-consciousness: The subject recognises that the experience is theirs.

Or even more simply:

Consciousness is awareness.
Self-consciousness is awareness of oneself as aware.

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Awareness of surroundings

Why do some older people block doorways and sidewalks talking to each other? Are they being selfish or just oblivious to their surroundings? 

It is usually not deliberate selfishness, though it can feel that way when you are the person trying to get past. Several factors tend to combine.

1. Reduced situational awareness

As people age, peripheral attention and reaction time often decline slightly. Two people talking can become absorbed in the conversation and simply fail to monitor the space around them. Cognitive psychologists sometimes call this inattentional blindness—people don’t notice things outside the focus of attention.

2. Slower mobility

Older people often move more slowly or feel less steady. When they stop to talk, they may choose a wide, stable spot, which unfortunately might be the middle of the path. Moving aside quickly can feel physically awkward.

3. Social norms from earlier decades

In many communities, particularly before dense urban pedestrian traffic became common, sidewalks were not treated as fast-moving corridors. They were social spaces where stopping to talk was normal. That habit persists.

4. Conversational immersion

When two people meet unexpectedly—especially if they have not seen each other for a while—the conversation becomes the priority. The environment becomes secondary, just as people sometimes block supermarket aisles while chatting.

5. Group geometry

Two people naturally stand face-to-face, which spreads them sideways. Add walking frames, shopping bags, or dogs and the blockage becomes complete without them consciously intending it.

So are they selfish?

Most of the time it is mild obliviousness rather than selfishness. They usually move immediately if someone says “excuse me.” They would be embarrassed to be considered selfish.

Interestingly, this behaviour isn’t unique to older people. Younger people do similar things in shopping centres, train station exits, and escalator landings—anywhere conversation overrides spatial awareness.


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Western Leftists and the Iranian Dictatorship

Why do some Western Leftists support the oppressive authoritarian misogynistic dictatorship in Iran? 

The short answer is: most Western leftists do not actually support the Iranian regime. However, some do appear sympathetic to it, or at least reluctant to condemn it strongly. When this happens, it usually comes from a few recurring ideological patterns rather than admiration for Iran’s theocratic system itself.

Here are the main explanations analysts and historians give.


1. Anti-imperialism (the biggest factor)

Many strands of the Western Left see global politics primarily through the lens of Western imperialism vs. countries resisting it.

  • Iran has been in conflict with the United States and its allies since the 1979 revolution.
  • It also opposes Israel and Western military presence in the Middle East.

Because of this, some activists treat Iran as a counter-weight to Western power, even if they dislike the regime internally. Some commentators note that parts of the Left view the Islamic Republic as a “bulwark against Western imperialism”, sometimes downplaying its domestic repression as secondary. 

In that worldview:

  • The main enemy = Western hegemony.
  • Therefore countries opposing it are sometimes treated more leniently.

2. Fear of repeating Iraq-style regime-change wars

Another reason is suspicion of Western intervention.

After Iraq (2003), Libya (2011), and Afghanistan, many people on the Left believe:

  • Western attempts to overthrow regimes often make things worse.
  • Calls to oppose Iran’s government might be used to justify war.

Some commentators note that many left-leaning observers hesitate to support regime change because it could encourage another Middle East conflict

So their stance becomes:

  • Condemn the regime’s repression
  • But oppose Western action against it

That position can look like “support” from the outside.


3. Moral relativism / cultural sensitivity

A third factor is reluctance to criticize non-Western cultures or religions.

Some progressive circles worry that criticizing Islamic governments might:

  • fuel anti-Muslim prejudice
  • strengthen right-wing narratives in Western politics

This can lead to softer criticism of Islamist regimes than of Western ones, which critics describe as a form of moral inconsistency.


4. Focus on Israel-Palestine politics

For some activists, the Middle East is viewed mainly through the Israel–Palestine conflict.

Since Iran strongly opposes Israel, it can sometimes be perceived (incorrectly) as part of the “resistance” side of that conflict. Critics argue this leads some Western activists to overlook the regime’s internal repression.


5. Historical habit on parts of the Left

There is also a historical pattern.

During the 1979 Iranian Revolution, many left-wing groups initially supported Ayatollah Khomeini because he opposed the Western-backed Shah. Later the Islamist government suppressed those same leftists

Some scholars see echoes of that earlier mistake in today’s debates.


✅ Important nuance:
Large parts of the Western Left strongly support Iranian protesters, especially women’s movements against compulsory hijab and theocracy. The idea that all leftists support the regime is a political exaggeration.


✔️ In summary

When sympathy appears, it usually comes from:

  1. Anti-imperialist worldview
  2. Fear of Western military intervention
  3. Cultural sensitivity toward Islam
  4. Israel-focused geopolitics
  5. Historical ideological habits

Not from approval of oppression, misogyny, or authoritarian rule.


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AntiSemitic slogans banned

The Queensland State Parliament has recently banned two specific antiSemitic slogans, when used to menace or offend someone. The slogan “Globalise the Intifada” has already been explained here.

The slogan “From the river to the sea” refers to the geographic area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. This stretch of land includes Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. The full slogan commonly used is:

“From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free.”

What supporters mean by it

Among many pro-Palestinian activists, the slogan expresses the idea that Palestinians should have freedom and rights across the entire territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.

However, supporters do not all mean the same thing. Some interpret it as:

  • single democratic state in the whole territory with equal rights for everyone
  • an end to Israeli control over Palestinian territories
  • a symbolic expression of Palestinian national aspiration

Why it is controversial

Many Israelis and Jewish organisations interpret the slogan differently. They argue that:

  • Because the phrase refers to the entire territory, it implies the elimination of Israel as a Jewish state.
  • Historically, the slogan was used by some militant groups such as Hamas, which openly called for Israel’s destruction.

For that reason, critics say the slogan can be understood as advocating the replacement of Israel with a Palestinian state across the whole land.

Legal and political status

Because of these conflicting interpretations:

  • Some governments and institutions treat the slogan as antisemitic or extremist.
  • Others argue it is political speech about Palestinian self-determination.

Different countries, universities, and organisations therefore handle it differently.

In short

The slogan refers to the entire land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expresses a demand that Palestine be “free” across that whole territory.

The controversy arises because some people hear it as a call for equal rights in one state, while others hear it as a call for the elimination of Israel.

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Celebrities and Politics

Why Celebrity Opinions About Politics Often Sound Naive

Modern societies give an extraordinary amount of attention to the political opinions of actors, musicians, and other celebrities. When a well-known performer speaks about international conflicts, economic policy, or constitutional law, their remarks are widely reported and debated. Yet these interventions often appear strikingly simplistic. The phenomenon raises an interesting question: why do people who are clearly talented and successful in their own field so often sound naive when discussing politics?

The most obvious explanation is that success in one domain does not automatically translate into expertise in another. Acting, for example, is an extremely demanding craft. It requires emotional intelligence, discipline, memory, physical control, and the ability to inhabit fictional characters convincingly. These are real skills. But they are not the same skills required to understand political institutions, economic trade-offs, diplomatic strategy, or military realities. Politics is a domain shaped by history, law, incentives, and unintended consequences. Mastery requires years of study and experience.

Nevertheless, fame tends to produce a misleading sense of authority. Psychologists often describe this as the “halo effect”: once someone is admired for one ability, audiences unconsciously assume they must also be insightful about many other matters. The celebrity themselves may gradually absorb the same assumption. Applause can be a powerful teacher. If millions of people cheer your performances, it becomes easy to believe that your opinions on unrelated subjects must also carry weight.

Another factor is the social environment in which celebrities live. Famous people often move within relatively narrow professional and social circles—other performers, agents, journalists, and cultural figures. These communities frequently share similar political assumptions. Over time, this can produce a form of intellectual echo chamber in which certain views feel not merely popular but self-evidently correct. When dissenting perspectives are rarely encountered, complex political debates can come to seem far simpler than they really are.

Political expression within celebrity culture also tends to function as a form of moral signalling. Public declarations of support for particular causes help demonstrate solidarity, compassion, or ideological loyalty to one’s peers and audience. In this setting, the goal is often not to analyse policy in detail but to display one’s values publicly. Slogans and emotionally compelling narratives therefore replace careful reasoning about consequences.

A further reason for apparent naivety is distance from practical responsibility. People who actually govern—politicians, civil servants, military planners, and policy advisers—must constantly weigh competing priorities. Every policy choice involves trade-offs, unintended side effects, and limited resources. The real world imposes constraints that cannot be wished away. Those outside decision-making structures are less exposed to these constraints and may therefore underestimate the complexity of political problems.

The media environment reinforces these tendencies. Journalists frequently solicit political remarks from celebrities precisely because they generate headlines and social media attention. Award-show speeches, interviews, and online posts favour brevity and emotional impact rather than thoughtful argument. The result is a style of political discourse that rewards dramatic simplicity.

There is also a deeper cultural shift involved. In earlier periods, societies tended to associate authority with knowledge, experience, or institutional position. Today, however, fame itself often functions as a kind of authority. A person widely recognised on screens or stages acquires a public platform that can easily be mistaken for expertise. The distinction between visibility and wisdom becomes blurred.

None of this means that actors or musicians are incapable of serious political understanding. Many individuals from artistic backgrounds have developed thoughtful political views through study and experience. The problem is not that celebrities speak about politics, but that their fame magnifies their voices regardless of the depth of their knowledge.

Politics is a difficult field precisely because it deals with human societies in all their complexity. Good political judgment requires historical awareness, economic understanding, and a sober appreciation of trade-offs. These forms of practical wisdom do not arise automatically from talent, popularity, or artistic success.

In the end, the puzzle is not why celebrities sometimes sound naive about politics. The real puzzle is why modern societies are so eager to treat fame as if it were a substitute for knowledge.

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AI and Productivity

Will Artificial Intelligence Increase Productivity?

The short answer is yes — almost certainly.
The longer answer is more nuanced: yes, but unevenly, gradually, and not automatically.

To understand why, we need to return to the economic meaning of productivity.

What Economists Mean by Productivity

In economics, productivity is typically defined as:

Output per unit of input.

Most commonly, this is measured as labour productivity — output per hour worked. When productivity rises, an economy can produce more goods and services without increasing the number of hours worked. Over the long term, productivity growth is the primary driver of rising living standards.

Historically, sustained increases in prosperity — from the Industrial Revolution onward — have been powered not by people working longer hours, but by improvements in how efficiently labour and capital are used.

The key question, then, is whether artificial intelligence represents the kind of technological shift that can raise this ratio.

AI as a General-Purpose Technology

Economists sometimes refer to certain innovations as “general-purpose technologies” — foundational technologies that transform multiple sectors of the economy. The steam engine, electricity, and the computer all fall into this category.

AI appears to belong in the same class.

It has broad application across:

  • Information processing
  • Administrative work
  • Coding and software development
  • Legal drafting
  • Financial analysis
  • Customer service
  • Research and data interpretation

In many of these areas, AI reduces the time required to complete tasks. If the same employee can produce more output in the same number of hours, measured productivity rises.

Why Productivity Gains May Be Delayed

However, history cautions against expecting immediate statistical breakthroughs.

In the late 20th century, despite the rapid spread of computers, productivity growth initially remained sluggish. Economist Robert Solow famously remarked that the computer age was visible everywhere except in the productivity statistics.

The explanation was institutional lag. New technologies require complementary changes:

  • Organisational restructuring
  • New management practices
  • Worker retraining
  • Regulatory adjustment
  • Business model innovation

Only once these adaptations occur do productivity gains appear at scale.

AI is likely to follow a similar trajectory. The technology may advance quickly, but its full economic impact depends on how effectively firms and institutions reorganise around it.

Uneven Effects Across Sectors

Productivity gains will not be uniform.

AI is most effective in tasks that are:

  • Information-intensive
  • Pattern-based
  • Repetitive or rule-structured
  • Symbolic rather than physical

Knowledge-based industries — finance, law, consulting, media, education, software — are likely to experience larger productivity effects than sectors dependent on physical labour or face-to-face services.

This uneven distribution may have important implications for wages, employment patterns, and sectoral growth.

Output Growth vs Measured Productivity

There is also a measurement challenge.

If AI dramatically lowers the cost of producing digital content or services, output may expand rapidly — but traditional productivity metrics may struggle to capture improvements in quality, speed, or accessibility.

Conversely, if AI floods markets with low-value output, aggregate production may rise without a proportional increase in economic welfare.

In short, productivity statistics measure efficiency, not necessarily value.

The Long-Term Outlook

Over a 10–20 year horizon, it is highly plausible that AI will contribute to:

  • Higher labour productivity
  • Lower production costs in knowledge sectors
  • New forms of economic activity
  • Increased capital intensity in white-collar work

Whether this translates into broad-based prosperity will depend on complementary policy, education systems, labour market flexibility, and the distribution of gains.

Technological capability alone does not guarantee shared economic benefit. But if history is a guide, artificial intelligence has the structural characteristics of a productivity-enhancing technology of significant magnitude.

The real question is not whether AI can raise productivity. It is how economies adapt in order to realise its gains.

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Iran must not have nuclear weapons

Why preventing Iran from gaining nuclear weapons must be a higher priority than international law

The world’s modern legal order, embodied in treaties, norms, and institutions, exists to protect states and peoples from the ravages of war and the abuse of power. Yet there are moments in history when legalism — obeying the letter of the law — becomes a barrier to preventing greater catastrophes. One such moment is the potential for the Islamic Republic of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. There are compelling strategic, moral, and security reasons why stopping Iran from obtaining an atomic arsenal should be viewed as an overriding necessity — even where this clashes with international legal strictures.

1. The Existential Threat of a Nuclear-Armed Iran

Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would not be a remote geopolitical development; it would be a fundamental alteration of the global security landscape. A nuclear-armed Iran would have — or appear to have — the ability to launch a nuclear strike against Israel, the Gulf States, Europe, or even the United States. Iran’s leaders have repeatedly made belligerent statements about Israel’s destruction, and its support for militant proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis is well documented. An Iranian nuclear capability, even if never actually used, would embolden these proxies by placing them under a nuclear umbrella — effectively freeing them to act with greater impunity. It would likely trigger a Middle Eastern nuclear arms race, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt feeling compelled to develop their own weapons to avoid strategic marginalisation. The result would be a far more unstable and dangerous region than exists today.

2. The Practical Limitations of International Law

International law — including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) — is designed to restrain the spread of nuclear weapons by obligating non-nuclear states not to acquire them. Iran is formally bound by the NPT, and numerous United Nations Security Council resolutions have called on Tehran to suspend enrichment activities and allow inspections. Yet the legal framework depends on compliance and verification; it lacks robust enforcement mechanisms unless major powers unite behind coercive measures. The inherent weakness of legal restraints is visible in the fact that without enforcement, Iran developed significant enrichment capabilities that bring it closer to a “breakout” capacity — the point where it could produce a weapon within months rather than years.

International law also restricts pre-emptive defensive action. Under the UN Charter, the use of force is permitted only in self-defence against an actual armed attack or when authorised by the Security Council. This creates a legal barrier to preventive military measures, even when credible intelligence indicates that a state is on the verge of acquiring a weapon of mass destruction. In some cases, strict adherence to such legal norms has permitted dangerous programs to advance unchecked because the law treats future or potential threats as less significant than present ones. Allowing Iran to gain nuclear weapons for the sake of international law is incredibly naive and muddle headed. International law is useless when everybody is dead.

3. When Prevention Is More Humane Than Legal Formalism

Rigid legalism may provide procedural order, but it cannot protect populations from the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear use. The use of even a single atomic weapon in a regional conflict would cause hundreds of thousands of immediate deaths, untold radiation injuries, and long-term ecological devastation. To allow Iran to acquire such weapons and then rely on legal denunciations leaves the world powerless to prevent exactly the outcome international law purports to avert.

History shows that diplomatic compliance by a regime bent on weaponisation is often superficial. Temporary agreements or inspections may delay but not dissolve underlying ambitions. Without credible deterrence — including the implicit or explicit threat of military prevention — Iran would have powerful incentives to continue enriching uranium covertly, exploiting legal processes as cover and leaving other nations vulnerable. The moral choice, therefore, is to prevent the creation of a nuclear weapon at all costs rather than trust in legal mechanisms that may prove too weak to stop its emergence.

4. The Utility of Force as a Last Resort

Recognising the primacy of security does not demand casual resort to violence. Diplomatic negotiation, sanctions, and multilateral pressure are indispensable tools. But these must be backed by credible deterrent threats. If diplomacy operates without the option of force, it loses leverage; a regime like Iran’s, which has shown a willingness to flout legal obligations, may calculate that it can wait out sanctions and inspections until legal pressure collapses. True deterrence — the possibility that a breach of limits will result in decisive consequences — is necessary to make legal instruments meaningful in practice.

5. A Legal Order That Cannot Prevent Nuclear Proliferation Is Not Worth Preserving

International law does not exist for its own sake; it exists to secure peace and stability. When legal norms become a shield for the spread of existential threats, their value must be reassessed. Allowing Iran to obtain nuclear weapons with only legal protest would signal that international law lacks teeth and that the proliferation regime — the cornerstone of post-war security architecture — is collapsing. The result would not be a more lawful world, but a more dangerous one.


Conclusion

The avoidance of war and respect for international law are noble goals. Yet they are not absolutes that apply without regard to consequences. When the choice is between legal purity and the prevention of nuclear proliferation in one of the most volatile regions on Earth, the prevention of nuclear armament — and thus the protection of human lives and global stability — must take precedence. In such critical circumstances, legal norms should guide action but not fetter the indispensable imperative of ensuring that nuclear weapons do not spread to states whose strategic behaviour and ideological commitments make their possession a profound threat to humanity.

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