🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix command injection in git utils

[kratos06]

🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: Command Injection in Git Utilities
🎯 Impact: Malicious user input (e.g., search queries, commit hashes) could potentially execute arbitrary code on the user's machine if interpolated directly into a shell command via child_process.exec.
🔧 Fix: Replaced exec with execFile in src/utils/git.ts. This bypasses the shell and treats arguments as data, neutralizing injection attacks. Updated tests to mock execFile and verify proper argument passing.
✅ Verification: Ran pnpm test utils/__tests__/git.spec.ts and the full test suite. All tests passed.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 17479870610862795502 started by @kratos06

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Summary by cubic

Fixes a high-severity command injection in git utils by switching from child_process.exec to execFile and passing arguments safely. This prevents user input from invoking the shell during Git operations.

• Bug Fixes
  • Replaced exec with execFile in src/utils/git.ts to bypass the shell.
  • Passed all Git params as args arrays for: rev-parse, log, show, status, diff, and version checks.
  • Updated tests to mock execFile and verify correct argument passing.

^{Written for commit f41a503. Summary will update on new commits.}

Summary by CodeRabbit

Release Notes

Bug Fixes

• Resolved a command injection vulnerability in Git operations that could allow unauthorized command execution through specially crafted commit queries or hashes
• Implemented safer process execution to prevent shell interpretation of user input

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[google-labs-jules]

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[coderabbitai]

📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

The changes replace the insecure child_process.exec with child_process.execFile in the Git utilities module to prevent command injection vulnerabilities. Type declarations and test cases are updated accordingly, with new documentation added to explain the vulnerability and mitigation strategy.

Changes

Cohort / File(s)	Summary
Security Documentation .jules/sentinel.md	New documentation file detailing command injection vulnerability in Git utilities and prescribing execFile as the mitigation strategy.
Implementation and Tests src/utils/git.ts, src/utils/__tests__/git.spec.ts	Updated Git utility to use execFile with separate argument arrays instead of exec with command strings. Type declarations added for ExecFileFunction and PromisifiedExecFile. All git command invocations converted from string-based to argument array format. Test cases and mocks updated to reflect new call signatures.

Estimated code review effort

🎯 3 (Moderate) | ⏱️ ~20 minutes

Poem

🐰 With execFile we hop so secure,
No injection tricks will endure,
Args separated, clean and bright,
Git commands execute just right,
A security patch, pure delight! 🔐

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 1 | ❌ 2

❌ Failed checks (1 warning, 1 inconclusive)

Check name	Status	Explanation	Resolution
Docstring Coverage	⚠️ Warning	Docstring coverage is 20.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%.	Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.
Description check	❓ Inconclusive	The description provides clear details about the vulnerability, the fix implemented, and verification steps, but is missing the required 'Related GitHub Issue' section and 'Pre-Submission Checklist'.	Add the 'Related GitHub Issue' section with the issue number and complete the Pre-Submission Checklist to fully align with the repository's PR template.

✅ Passed checks (1 passed)

Check name	Status	Explanation
Title check	✅ Passed	The title clearly and specifically summarizes the main change: fixing a command injection vulnerability in git utilities by replacing exec with execFile.

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✨ Finishing touches

• 📝 Generate docstrings

🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)

• Create PR with unit tests
• Post copyable unit tests in a comment
• Commit unit tests in branch sentinel/fix-git-command-injection-17479870610862795502

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[cubic-dev-ai]

No issues found across 3 files