🛡️ Sentinel: Fix command injection vulnerability in git utils

[google-labs-jules]

🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL/HIGH] Fix command injection vulnerability in git utils

🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: child_process.exec was used to execute git commands with user-controlled input (e.g., commit hash, search query), which could allow command injection if the input contained shell metacharacters.
🎯 Impact: Attackers could potentially execute arbitrary commands on the host machine if they can influence the git operations (e.g., via a malicious branch name or search query).
🔧 Fix: Replaced exec with execFile and passed arguments as an array. This bypasses the shell and prevents the arguments from being interpreted as commands. Also fixed argument quoting for execFile compatibility.
✅ Verification: Ran pnpm test utils/__tests__/git.spec.ts. Verified that git commands are executed correctly and that tests pass with the new implementation.

---

PR created automatically by Jules for task 9115698132810581293 started by @kratos06

---

Summary by cubic

Fixes a command injection vulnerability in git utils by switching from exec to execFile and using safe argument arrays. Prevents arbitrary command execution through user-controlled inputs like commit hashes and search queries.

• Bug Fixes
  • Use execFile for all git commands with args arrays to bypass the shell.
  • Correct flag formatting (e.g., --format=) to avoid passing literal quotes.
  • Update tests to mock execFile and new promisify signatures; behavior remains the same.
  • Add Sentinel note documenting the issue and prevention.

^{Written for commit f6929ff. Summary will update on new commits.}

[google-labs-jules]

👋 Jules, reporting for duty! I'm here to lend a hand with this pull request.

When you start a review, I'll add a 👀 emoji to each comment to let you know I've read it. I'll focus on feedback directed at me and will do my best to stay out of conversations between you and other bots or reviewers to keep the noise down.

I'll push a commit with your requested changes shortly after. Please note there might be a delay between these steps, but rest assured I'm on the job!

For more direct control, you can switch me to Reactive Mode. When this mode is on, I will only act on comments where you specifically mention me with @jules. You can find this option in the Pull Request section of your global Jules UI settings. You can always switch back!

New to Jules? Learn more at jules.google/docs.

---

For security, I will only act on instructions from the user who triggered this task.

[coderabbitai]

Important

Review skipped

Bot user detected.

To trigger a single review, invoke the @coderabbitai review command.

You can disable this status message by setting the reviews.review_status to false in the CodeRabbit configuration file.

---

_{Comment @coderabbitai help to get the list of available commands and usage tips.}