🛡️ Sentinel: Fix command injection in git utils

[google-labs-jules]

🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL/HIGH] Fix command injection vulnerability in git utils

🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: Command Injection in src/utils/git.ts. The functions searchCommits and getCommitInfo were using child_process.exec with interpolated strings containing user input (query, hash). This allowed arbitrary command execution if a malicious string was provided (e.g. via a manipulated search query).
🎯 Impact: An attacker could execute arbitrary commands on the victim's machine by tricking them into searching for a malicious string or viewing a crafted commit hash.
🔧 Fix: Replaced exec (which spawns a shell) with execFile (which executes the binary directly). Arguments are now passed as an array, preventing shell interpretation of special characters.
✅ Verification: Created a reproduction script that confirmed the injection was possible with the old code. Updated unit tests (src/utils/__tests__/git.spec.ts) to verify that execFile is called with the correct array arguments and ran them successfully.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 14733649975977161046 started by @kratos06

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Summary by cubic

Fixes a critical command injection in git utils by switching from exec to execFile and passing safe argument arrays. Prevents shell interpretation of user input in commit search and info commands.

• Bug Fixes
  • Replaced child_process.exec with execFile in checkGitInstalled, checkGitRepo, searchCommits, getCommitInfo, and getWorkingState.
  • Passed all git args as arrays (e.g., --format=…, --grep=…), removing string interpolation.
  • Updated tests to mock execFile and verify correct arguments, including cases for missing git and non-repo paths.

^{Written for commit 85c51dd. Summary will update on new commits.}

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