This project provides a data-driven analysis of democratic transitions, focusing on Tunisia’s post-Arab Spring trajectory while situating it within global patterns of democratization and reversal. Using the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT) dataset, this work quantifies the dynamics of regime change, highlights critical turning points, and compares Tunisia to other countries with democratization episodes since the 2000s.

The goal is to provide an evidence-based perspective on the fragility, resilience, and global patterns of democratization, offering insights for researchers and policymakers.

• Political science research and R and Python data analysis using tidyverse and ggplot2.
• Insights into Tunisia’s democratic trajectory, fragility, and global comparisons.
• Reproducible RMarkdown report with visualizations and narrative.

• Varieties of Democracy : V-Dem ERT Dataset v2
• Episodes of Regime Transformation ERT dataset v15: : (https://www.v-dem.net/data/ert-dataset/).
• Economic Data:
  • World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) and International Debt Statistics.
  • External Debt Stocks (% of GNI): World Bank WDI dataset
  • Total Debt Service (% of exports): World Bank WDI dataset
  • Short-term Debt (% of exports): World Bank WDI dataset
  • FDI Inflows (% of GDP): World Bank WDI dataset
  • Net ODA Received (% of GNI): World Bank WDI dataset and CEIC Data
• Socio-economic Data: The Gini index and other indicators from various institutional databases.
• Institutional Analysis:
  • V-Dem Core Dataset, Version 15: V-Dem Data Portal
  • V-Party Dataset: V-Dem V-Party Dataset

Notebooks

• 01_Political_Analysis_R.ipynb – Political analysis.
• 02-Tunisia_Economic_Democracy_Nexus.ipynb – Economic-democracy link.
• 03_Institutional_Analysis_Tunisia__.ipynb – Institutional effects.
• 04_Executive_Analysis_Tunisia__.ipynb – Executive actions.
• 05_Tunisia_Comparative_Master_Analysis.ipynb – Comparative analysis.
• 06_Tunisia_Policy_recommendations_.ipynb – Policy recommendations.

Data Includes GDP, inflation, youth unemployment, debt, FDI, ODA, democracy scores, political violence, and demonstrations (1990–2025). Key files:

• DATA set TUN Wordbank gdp 1964-2024.xls
• DATA set TUN Wordbank inflation 1984-2024.xls
• Data excel youth unemployement worldbank 1991-2024.xls
• Freedom in the World All_data_FIW_2013-2024.xlsx
• BTI_2024_Scores Tunisia party system.xlsx
• tunisia_political_violence_events_and_fatalities_by_month-year_as-of-27aug2025.xlsx

Scripts & R Files

• Democracy Score Over Time (Tunisia).R
• Democratization process.R
• The Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT) dataset.R
• Tunisia’s Fragile Democratic Rollercoaster Insights from V-Dem ERT Data.Rmd

Visualizations Includes trends, comparisons, and analysis outputs:

• Democracy score over time Tunisia.png
• economics factors affecting TUnisia democracy .png
• institutional indicators and TUN democracy.png
• final analysis COMPARATIVE .png

Other Files

• CITATION.cff, LICENSE, .Rhistory, session-info.txt, data.csv

• Make sure you have R (≥ 4.0) and the following packages installed:
• install.packages(c("ggplot2", "dplyr", "readr", "tibble", "scales"))

• Clone this repository:

git clone https://github.com/Amirabs7/Democracy-Transitions-Analysis.git

• Install the R packages listed above.

• Open the RMarkdown file in RStudio /Tunisia’s Fragile Democratic Rollercoaster Insights from V-Dem ERT Data.Rmd

• Click Knit → choose HTML, PDF, or Word.

• The knitted report will generate all plots, tables, and narrative automatically.

Source: V-Dem ERT dataset (subset for Tunisia)

Cleaning/Filtering:

• Subset Tunisia data (country_name == "Tunisia")
• Removed non-episodes (dem_ep_outcome_agg > 0) for global plots
• Created binary outcome for logistic regression (success_binary = 1 if dem_ep_outcome_agg == 4)

Reproducibility:

• R version >= 4.3
• Packages: ERT, dplyr, ggplot2, tibble

Random Seed: 42 (used for reproducible plots and simulations)

Session Info: Run sessionInfo() to reproduce exact environment

(Click any image to view full resolution)

• Since 2000, most democratization episodes failed or stagnated.Only ~17% succeeded in reaching stable democracy (V-Dem ERT, 2024).
• Partial democratization (some liberalization but not full democracy) is common.
• Democratization is the exception, not the rule. The vast majority of transitions collapse back into authoritarianism or stall in hybrid regimes. Tunisia’s failed attempt fits this broader global pattern, showing that even with international support and initial enthusiasm, structural weaknesses (economic crises, elite resistance, weak institutions) usually prevent consolidation.

• Successful democratizations since 2000 usually started in regimes that were not fully authoritarian, but had medium democracy levels (Polyarchy ~0.4–0.5).
• Few success cases came from “hard” authoritarian regimes (Polyarchy <0.2).
• Full authoritarian collapses rarely democratize successfully. Success depends on pre-existing pluralism, semi-open institutions, or organized opposition. Tunisia was an unusual case: it started from a fairly authoritarian baseline (Polyarchy ~0.25), which helps explain why consolidation failed — the institutional and economic foundations weren’t strong enough to sustain democracy.

• From 1900–mid 20th century, almost all democratization attempts failed.Late 20th century (1970s–1990s) saw more successes (e.g., Latin America, Eastern Europe, Southern Europe). Since 2000, successes are rare again, with failure/stagnation dominating.
• The global “third wave” of democracy (1970s–1990s) was historically unique. The post–2000 era has not been easy either : authoritarian resilience, resource wealth, geopolitical rivalries, and weak international pressure mean that most attempts crash.

• This graph focuses on other democratization episodes since 2000, mainly the following countries: Benin, Bolivia, Fiji, Honduras, Thailand, Zambia.
• It is worth mentioning, that as of July 2025, the date of intial publication of this project, both Zambia and Benin are not considered full democracies.
• Partial democracies sometimes struggle more to consolidate due to hybrid instability.
• Successful transitions often start from very low or intermediate institutional levels, not already “semi-free” states.

Post-2011 surge, 2014 peak, and gradual decline after 2019.

Tunisia’s Democratic Journey :

• Authoritarian Baseline (Pre-2011): Rigid autocracy with extremely low Polyarchy scores (~0.08).
• Arab Spring Breakthrough (2010-2011): Polyarchy jumped from 0.08 → 0.45 (+463%), driven by protests and Ben Ali’s ouster.
• Democratic Peak & Consolidation (2012-2014): Polyarchy reached 0.55 with free elections, press freedom, and a landmark constitution.
• Gradual Backsliding (Post-2019): Decline to ~0.35 due to presidential power grabs, institutional weakening, and socioeconomic stagnation.

Tunisia is a case study with both national and global significance:

• Provides lessons for the Arab region and transitional regimes globally.
• Demonstrates how revolutions can succeed initially but face long-term consolidation challenges.
• Highlights the fragility of democratic institutions and the importance of robust governance.

In Tunisia (2010–2024), democratic backsliding was not predicted by GDP growth or inflation but was strongly linked to changes in youth unemployment. Economic expansion alone failed to prevent declines in Democracy Score, highlighting that structural social pressures, rather than aggregate growth, drive democratic resilience. Changes in external debt, debt service, and foreign aid were strongly associated with fluctuations in democracy. While higher external debt slightly supported democratic consolidation, heavy debt service and greater reliance on Net ODA constrained democratic institutions. FDI showed a modest positive effect. These patterns suggest that financial structures play a critical role in shaping political outcomes, with economic expansion alone insufficient to guarantee democratic resilience.

Our analysis of the V-Dem data on Tunisia's institutional trends shows that the 2021 coup was primarily an institutional and political event, not a reaction to mass demonstrations or violent unrest. Key predictors for the coup included a declining polyarchy score and low popular demonstrations. Political violence was not a significant predictor.

The analysis highlights that strong political parties are the most significant positive driver of polyarchy. Weak or fragmented parties, which characterized Tunisia's system, failed to consolidate democracy. Direct elections do not guarantee stable democracy and may even correlate negatively in transitional contexts. Executive constraints help but are fragile. Tunisia’s institutions—especially parties and executive constraints—were too weak to consolidate the democratic gains of 2011.

A regression analysis using the Gini coefficient and economic diversification, comparing Tunisia to Costa Rica and South Korea, yielded a strong fit. The analysis demonstrates that rising economic inequality, particularly when combined with a lack of economic diversification, is a critical risk factor for political instability. This highlights a critical failure in the post-revolution Tunisian economic model to evolve into a developmental state that actively fosters inclusive prosperity.

Our comparative analysis shows that while Costa Rica has successfully maintained a low Gini coefficient alongside a high polyarchy score, Tunisia's democratic progress has been undermined by growing economic inequality and institutional fragility. The inability of the Tunisian state to become a "developmental state" that promotes inclusive growth contributed significantly to democratic backsliding after 2014.

Based on the comparative analysis and the statistical findings, a successful strategy for democratic consolidation requires a proactive and integrated approach that goes beyond simply addressing unemployment or inequality in isolation.

The analysis demonstrates that rising economic inequality, particularly when combined with a lack of economic diversification, is a critical risk factor for political instability.

• Targeted Investment: Launch state-led initiatives to invest heavily in modern, high-growth sectors with significant potential for job creation and high wages, such as technology, renewable energy, and advanced manufacturing.
• Regional Development Funds: Implement development funds and tax incentives to promote entrepreneurship and job creation in marginalized inland regions, directly combating the geographic and economic disparities that fuel social unrest.
• Education-to-Employment Pipeline: Restructure the national education system to better align with the needs of the new, targeted growth sectors.

The success of South Korea in consolidating stability while reducing inequality offers a powerful blueprint. The core principle is the active role of the state in guiding economic policy for inclusive growth.

• Strategic Economic Planning: Establish a centralized, non-partisan economic planning body with the authority to set long-term national economic goals and coordinate policy across ministries.
• Industrial Policy: Use a combination of subsidies, tax credits, and export promotion to nurture key industries.
• Trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Control: Implement policies to attract FDI that aligns with national development goals, prioritizing foreign investment that brings in new technology and high-value jobs.

The success of the above economic policies hinges on strong, trustworthy, and effective institutions.

• Anti-Corruption & Transparency: Enforce strict anti-corruption laws and create an independent, well-funded body to investigate and prosecute officials at all levels.
• Civil Service Reform: Implement a meritocratic civil service system to professionalize the bureaucracy and remove political cronies.
• Empowerment of Civil Society: Actively involve civil society organizations (CSOs) in the economic policy-making process to provide a crucial feedback loop and build social consensus.

A successful democratic transition requires formalizing the informal economy and modernizing government services to increase trust, efficiency, and revenue.

• Formalization and Incentivization: Create a streamlined, low-cost registration process for informal businesses and workers.
• E-Government Initiatives: Launch a national digital transformation strategy to modernize public services to reduce bureaucracy, increase transparency, and combat corruption.

Drawing inspiration from successful models of state-led development, the establishment of strategically located economic zones can act as powerful engines for growth, investment, and job creation.

• Strategic Location: Designate specific geographic areas with strategic advantages (e.g., proximity to ports, skilled labor pools) as Special Economic Zones (SEZs).
• Tax & Regulatory Incentives: Offer significant tax holidays, reduced tariffs, and simplified regulations to attract both foreign and domestic investment.
• Infrastructure Investment: Prioritize public investment in world-class infrastructure within these zones, including high-speed internet, reliable energy, and modern transportation networks.

Amira Ben Salem : 📧 besamira77@gmail.com

Disclaimer & Ethical Note:

Educational Purpose: This project was created for portfolio/educational purposes to demonstrate skills in data cleaning, exploration, and machine learning. Data Source: The analysis is based on a publicly available dataset. I do not claim to own or have collected this data. Limitations: The findings and clusters are exploratory in nature and are based on the specific methodology and assumptions detailed in the notebook. They are not definitive and should not be considered a complete representation of reality. Not Endorsement: This project is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by any mentioned companies or entities.