WWII Aviation Industry Part 4

This article has been more of a whopper after having had a look at French and British wartime industries (click here for France or Britain). I posted a flowchart of US aircraft manufacturers at the end of this article. I could barely fit everything on an 11x17 sheet, and I’m assuming I’m still missing some minor builders. I did not expand into engine or rocket manufacturers, so there’s no SpaceX and whatnot, except for a few involved at some point with aircraft production (fixed wing and helicopter). I added comments in the flowchart to help understand what happened to some of these companies, in 6-point type (sorry). You’ll have to zoom in to read that stuff.

The Prelude to WWII
      The US aerospace industry differed altogether from its European counterparts. There was no massive nationalization and forced mergers in the 30s and 60s like in France and Britain. Most companies started out as separate businesses in the 20s and 30s. Many were bought out and turned into divisions of large holding corporations, often keeping their brand names alive across multiple ownerships. Some got liquidated outright without a clear successor.
      Driving forces behind the US aerospace manufacturers involved a fast-growing airmail and civilian transport industry. The 1925 Kelly Act enabled the USPS to contract private carriers to fly mail across the country. Early on, the government subsidized the airmail industry, which gave a significant boost to aircraft manufacturing. The Airmail Act of 1934 targeted large holding corporations combining aircraft manufacturing and airline companies, among other services, to obtain better airmail contracts. This anti-trust measure split these corporations into independent companies (while the opposite was happening in Europe).
      The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 gave the federal government direct oversight of civil aviation, airfares, routes, and safety (ending with the famous airline deregulation circa 1978). Passenger traffic rose quickly in the 30s, spurring companies like Boeing, Curtiss-Wright, Douglas, and Lockheed. Particularly noteworthy was the 1936-era Douglas DC-3, which initially served as a passenger airliner for American Airlines and later found great use in war as the C-47 Skytrain.

The Onset of WWII
      The US only started gearing up for war in the wake of the Munich Conference in 1938. FDR’s objective was to increase the number of US-built warplanes to 10,000 in a relatively short term. Funds enabled the Army Air Corps to order 6,000 aircraft and boost its personnel to 3,200 officers and 45,000 enlisted. Unlike France and Britain, there was no concern for air bombardment, military invasion, or lack of critical resources interrupting US industrial output. In short, major airplane builders could almost hit the ground running, joined not long afterward by companies like Ford, General Motors, Chrysler, Packard, and Willys. Production shot from just over 2,000 military aircraft of all types in 1939 to more than 6,000 in 1940.

The WWII Expansion
      Government programs became crucial tools to expand industrial capacity. By 1940, they built new aircraft factories and leased them to established manufacturers in order for them to fulfil quickly ballooning contracts. Companies that benefited from these programs were, among others, Curtiss-Wright, Bell, and Douglas. The concept of government-driven industrial expansion parallels the strategy of so-called Shadow Factories in Britain, but executed at an American scale, with comparatively unlimited energy and resources. Civilian car manufacturers picked up the slack. From 1942 onward, they built no cars at all, concentrating on warplanes alone.

The Lend-Lease Act
      From March 1940 onward, aircraft manufacturers were free to sell aircraft to friendly nations, provided foreign sales did not affect US orders. Nonetheless, during the spring of 1940, France and Britain ordered more aircraft than the US government. Something I didn’t know before writing this article was that the U.K. had depleted its cash holdings and gold reserves to pay for US-built materiel, under the “cash and carry” policy required by the United States’ Neutrality Acts of the 1930s. France was in no better situation regarding payments in gold.
     The Lend-Lease Act of 1941 terminated the United States’ neutrality, right in the nick of time, further increasing deliveries outside the US until 1945. Up to 17% of the US’s total war spending, including oil, food, ships, and weapons, went to support allied nations, all free of charge and very much in line with FDR’s foreign policy goals. One of the main benefactors was Britain, which by then could hardly have afforded this support.

An Unexpected Windfall
      Britain’s precarious situation in the fall of 1940 prompted its government to carry out the Tizard Mission. It shared technology in exchange for the ability to produce classified materiel in the US, since industries in Britain were wholly involved in manufacturing urgently needed weapons. This indirectly relates to the article’s primary topic because the mission had a direct effect on US aerospace technology. The mission made key knowledge available to the US regarding radars, jet engines, and eventually, the Manhattan Project. Separately, the US and Britain shared their knowledge of codebreaking and cipher machines in 1941, which helped the electronics and computer industries emerge in the US.

Moving Along
      Reflecting the need to accelerate production, some warplanes had to be modified to fix flaws after significant numbers had been built. Some made it through despite flaws that, in some cases, could be addressed after delivery to the front lines. To help with such challenges, the Army Air Corps (before WWII started) and the USAAF (from 1941 onward) sent officers to act as liaisons between the manufacturers and the military. They focused on coordination, oversight, technical support, resolving production bottleneck issues, feedback, and improvements.
      One notorious example of post-production technical flaws is the SB2C Helldiver, otherwise known as the “Son-of-a-B**** 2nd Class” for its awful handling characteristics. It did, nonetheless, become the main dive and attack bomber of the US Navy, after all modifications were in place. Other even more famous and highly successful warplanes fit in this category for various reasons, such as the B-29 Superfortress, the P-51 Mustang, and the F4U Corsair. The P-38 Lightning could also be counted here. Such is the cost of deploying advanced technology as quickly as possible while at war.
      By 1943, more than a million people were at work manufacturing military aircraft—the largest industry in the US at the time. North American Aviation built a total of  44,000 aircraft, including the P-51 and the B-25. Meanwhile, Boeing upped the ante with 98,000 aircraft of all types. Chrysler built more than half of the 30,000 Wright R-3350 engines for the B-29, mostly out of their plant in Chicago. Throughout the war, General Motors built 75% of all Wildcats and Avengers, or a quarter of all carrier-borne warplanes. Ford’s massive plant in Detroit, Michigan, built more than 5,000 B-24 Liberators in 1944-1945. It produced 46,000 tons’ worth of airframes, more than half what Germany could manufacture and as much as Japan’s entire industry. I don’t know if they built ‘em “Ford Tough,” but they certainly built ‘em “Ford Fast.”

Global Achievements
      WWII led Americans to adopt the doctrine of air power. Designing, manufacturing, deploying, and servicing vast numbers of war machines during a global conflict—while supporting allies—remains an astounding accomplishment. One’s head spins at the thought of all those great machines: the P-40 Warhawk, P-47 Thunderbolt, P-51 Mustang, F6F Hellcat, F4U Corsair, and the B-29 Superfortress, with or without the British Merlin engines.
      None of this would have been possible without the massive participation of women in the industry for the first time. Everyone remembers the poster showing “Rosie the Riveter.” The female workforce in the aerospace industry went from 1% pre-war to 65% during. By 1945, the US could manufacture 96,000 aircraft per year and, in total, did build more than 300,000 warplanes during the entire course of the conflict. More than 150,000 remained in surplus when the smoke cleared. America had become the world leader in both civilian and military aerospace within about 6 calendar years.

Later Acquisitions and Mergers
      US manufacturers started out mostly in the 20s and 30s before conglomerates swallowed most of them in less than a hundred years: Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Textron, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, and RTX. I kept the latter out of my flowchart: RTX (known before 2023 as Raytheon Technologies, formerly United Technologies) appears a few times in my tiny-type comments as United Aircraft and Transport Corporation. Here’s its summary according to Wikipedia: “The United Aircraft and Transport Corporation was formed in 1929, when William Boeing of Boeing Airplane & Transport Corporation teamed up with Frederick Rentschler of Pratt & Whitney to form a large (…) firm, uniting business interests in all aspects of aviation—a combination of airframe and aircraft engine manufacturing and airline business, to serve all aviation markets, both civil aviation (cargo, passenger, private, air mail) and military aviation.” Woof!
      It controlled stock in companies like Boeing, Northrop, Vought, Pratt & Whitney, Sikorsky, Stearman, what would later become United Airlines, and a number of others. They got hit with an anti-trust action in the 30s, forcing the company to split up. One part became Boeing, another what would later be branded United Technologies, and United Airlines. This shows the extent of Boeing Aircraft Corporation as early as the 30s. It’s still a tentacular conglomerate today. It funneled ten companies showing in the flowchart, plus more than a dozen others at an average $4.35B cost for each (if my Google-fu fails me not). All this comes with a sprinkle of mixed issues, including war profiteering, unethical conduct, pollution, subsidy disputes, industrial espionage, quality control, safety concerns, etc.
      I did not include Stearman in the flowchart due to a lack of space and relevance. It was created in 1927 and was bought out two years later by United Aircraft and Transport Corporation.
      Another large business in the early days was AVCO (for “Aviation Company”). It also controlled more than 20 businesses, including what would later become American Airlines. It also got pulled apart in the 30s. Eventually, Textron acquired its aerospace assets in 1984 while AVCO’s financial services went to Citigroup in 2000.
      One event on this flowchart connects with British manufacturer Hawker Aircraft, which I couldn’t show due to a lack of space. In 1994, Raytheon merged its Beechcraft division with the Hawker product line it had acquired in 1993 from British Aerospace, forming the Raytheon Aircraft Company. This was a division of the Raytheon parent company, whose roots go back to 1922 as the “American Appliance Company”. It was renamed Raytheon in 1959. As of 2012, it was the fifth-largest military contractor in the world, specializing in guided missiles. It merged with United Technologies to form Raytheon Technologies in 2020. Hawker-Beechcraft was resold in 2006, went into bankruptcy in 2012, and was acquired by Textron a year later. The Hawker brand was discontinued at about this time. It’s interesting to note that Raytheon started out as an appliance supplier while Textron emerged from the textiles industry ("Tex" for "textiles" and "tron" from synthetics such as "Lustron") before expanding into aerospace.

      Have fun exploring the flowchart.

Click on this image for its full resolution (wait 10-15 seconds for the image to load).

Click here for Britain's Shadow Industries.

Click Here for France's Raging Pre-WWII  Mergers 

Click Here for France's WWII Aviation Woes

WWII Aviation Industry Part 3

Since I recently completed research on France's aviation industry (see here), I couldn't just walk away without doing the same for the U.K. It’s interesting to see what companies built WWII celebrities like the Spitfire, Hurricane, Mosquito, or the Lancaster, to name these few. Curiosity led me to investigate the origins of these manufacturers and their current status. So here we go again, to the best of my ability to make sense of it!   🙂

After WWI

       Like the French aerospace industry of the pre-World War II era, the U.K. lined up more than a dozen builders. The first round of mergers came between the end of WWI and the 1930s. During the Great Depression, two major manufacturers emerged: Vickers and Hawker. This could illustrate some ten years later the rivalry between the Spitfire built by Supermarine (a part of Vickers) and Hawker’s Hurricane as the most effective combat aircraft of the war (quality vs. quantity). So, keep calm and carry on.

Muddling Through

      One interesting story caused me to make several rounds of corrections in my flowchart until I got it right. John Davenport Siddeley, 1st Baron Kenilworth, managed Armstrong-Whitworth in 1927 before merging its heavy engineering business with Vickers to form Vickers-Armstrongs (or just “Vickers"). J. D., however, brought under his personal control Armstrong-Whitworth Aircraft, Armstrong-Whitworth’s automobile and engine maker, Armstrong-Siddeley, as well as Avro’s engine branch.

The Two Amrstrongs

      In 1934, Hawker Aircraft acquired the rest of Avro (as far as I can tell), Gloster, and Armstrong-Whitworth Aircraft to form Hawker-Siddeley. J. D. continued to operate his aircraft manufacturing business as Armstrong-Whitworth, competing with Vickers, with whom he was no longer associated. As a result, two different manufacturers simultaneously used the word “Armstrong” in their business names. Oi, steady on! Armstrong-Siddeley, the engine maker, merged in the 1960s with Bristol Aero Engines to form Bristol-Siddeley, which isn’t shown on the attached flowchart (see at the end). Rolls-Royce later acquired Bristol-Siddeley.

WWII Shadow Factories
      The British government launched a scheme to develop dozens of so-called “shadow factories” in 1935. The intent was to accelerate the production of aircraft, engines, and related equipment, along with the desire to scatter production away from industrial centers in the event of aerial bombing over Britain. It relied on technology transfer to civilian manufacturers in exchange for their factory administration expertise and trained workforce.

      Public funds covered the entire cost of building and equipping all these satellite plants. Participating businesses received government grants and substantial management fees to execute the project. Meanwhile, established manufacturers of military and civilian materials had to expand and modernize their own plants and design offices to meet the expected output once a war was underway. By 1936, the Air Ministry reorganized and focused directly on communicating with manufacturers, addressing supply bottlenecks, and procuring the right aircraft. Relying on a fast-growing network of subcontractors was key to boosting production. RAF officers, referred to as Resident Technical Officers, worked directly with manufacturers to oversee technical issues and facilitate interactions between their assigned businesses, the RAF, and the Air Ministry.

      Shadow factories used available structures such as mills, tanneries, farm barns, weaving sheds, garages, and even country mansions in Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Nine new factories were built from scratch. By 1939, 31 plants were at work or being constructed. Some were already producing complete aircraft, while others provided parts. By 1944, 175 firms were directly involved in the shadow factory plan. Jolly, good!

      In 1940, the London Aircraft Production Group originally oversaw the factory management of several companies building and running London buses. They shifted their focus to producing Handley Page Halifaxes, ammo, gun elements, armored vehicles, and spare parts. At its peak, the group involved 41 assembly areas around the London area, 660 subcontractors, and 51,000 workers. Eventually, women formed the majority of its workforce. By 1941, this single group covered 40% of the nation’s heavy bomber output, along with 200 Halifaxes per month. I say, rule Britannia!

      In hindsight, these efforts paid out. In the mid-30s, aircraft production topped out at about 200 per month, versus about 650 in 1939, 1,250 in 1940, and up to 2,500 monthly in 1944. Added to this came the US connection. Under the Lend-Lease Act, the US eventually delivered to the UK more than 2,000 heavy bombers, more than 3,000 medium bombers, more than 8,000 light bombers, and more than 13,000 fighters. Large-scale deliveries from the US started in 1942.

The Castle Bromwich Debacle

      As part of the shadow factory scheme, Morris Motors Ltd moved to establish the Castle Bromwich plant in 1936 to build 60 Spitfires by May 1940. Exactly zero were delivered as a result of mismanagement despite millions of Pounds Sterling spent by the government. Bromwich was supposed to be able to procure thousands of Spits eventually. Vickers (Supermarine’s owner) took over the whole thing in June 1940, but still had issues there as late as 1942, such as cracks in the building’s brickwork. The Treasury did not sign off on this project until 1944. Mind the gap! To be fair, the Castle Bromwich plant did indeed build more than 12,000 Spitfires (more than half the total UK production of these fighters) and hundreds of Avro Lancasters by 1945. Morris Motors Ltd eventually merged with the Austin Motor Company in 1952.

Back and Forth

      The owner of Avro, Crossley Motors, had sold Avro to Armstrong-Siddeley back in 1928. The following year, Avro’s founder, A. V. Roe, with S. E. Saunders, formed a new company called Saunders-Roe. It would go on to build hovercrafts as part of Westland. In 1964, Saunders-Roe’s hovercraft business merged with Vickers-Armstrongs (yes, them again) to form the British Hovercraft Corporation. I say, look here, mate! In 1971, Westland took back that business. GKN then bought out Westland and renamed it GKN Aerospace in 1994, later to be sold off to Finmeccanica.

Mergers, British Style

      Sorry, old chap. No time for tea time now. Due to the rapidly growing globalization of the aerospace industry, the British government forced most corporations to merge in the 1960s, forming three major groups: Hawker-Siddeley, BAC, and Westland. The consolidations continued in the 1970s and beyond, leaving nearly all the original 1910s companies to become part of such businesses as British Aerospace Systems, Rolls-Royce, Thomson CSF, Safran, Boeing, and Finmeccanica. I’m sure there are more. See the diagram below. Two did not survive: Handley Page and Miles Aircraft. 

      The next article will focus on the United States aircraft industry. Pip pip, cheerio for now.

Click this diagram for the full resolution image.

Click here for the previous article on WWII French Air Woes.

Click here for the US Aviation article.

WWII Aviation Industry Part 2

I've been toying with a what-if scenario about an alternative buildup strategy for the French air force in the 30s. One of the biggest problems with the Armée de l'Air was that much of its fighter force included MS-406 and MB-151. The first was substandard on a number of issues against the ME-109e; the latter was even worse. This resulted from France changing governments almost every year for several years, which messed up its strategy, not to mention industrial inefficiencies and interservice frictions between the army and the air force.

France ordered Curtiss H-75 Hawk fighters from the US, but production wasn't fast enough to cover the Armée de l'Air's needs. Orders also required hard currency, which was a problem given the awful state of France's economy at the time. The H-75, as a stopgap solution, was definitely better than the Morane-Saulnier and the Bloch 151. The P-40 and the Wildcat did not enter service until 1940. Those weren't an option, and we can pass on the hapless Brewster Buffaloes.
     So... Alternatives?
     Buying Hurricanes and Spitfires would have been awesome, but those weren't available, given that the RAF required their whole production. Russian fighters were not an option either for a number of reasons. So, who's left? Fokker, for one!
     The D. XXI, though obsolescent, was still better than the MS-406 and MB-151. It did surprisingly well in the hands of Dutch, Danish, and Finnish pilots who flew it in combat. Indications were that the Fokker G1 would have done well in its category. Most of the Fokker aircraft destroyed during the Netherlands' defense were those caught on the ground.
     The Dutch aircraft industry was altogether anemic and would not have been able to provide France with enough of either type. Buying those outright would have required cash, which was an issue for France. Therefore, building them under license in France might have worked better in this respect, and also because these were relatively easy to build. It would have required massive retooling of several builders, but this could have been accomplished in 1937 or 1938, leaving a very narrow window to deliver the hundreds of aircraft France needed to replace its less-performing fighters.

Arsenal VG33

I believe assembling British fighters and their Rolls-Royce engines all under license, especially the Hurricane, which was easier to build than the Spitfire, would have been another valid short-term approach until acceptable French-designed fighters became available in sufficient numbers (such as the promising Arsenal VG 33 or even an updated Dewoitine 520). Fokker might have been more willing to accept such an agreement, more so than Hawker or Supermarine. (This is entirely debatable since I don't know how the respective governments of the UK and the Netherlands might look at this.) I’m guessing that this strategy would have been hard to sell in the politically charged environment of France's government and industrial circles. It certainly would have been a painful blow to Gallic national pride as well. On the other hand, it could have kick-started several French manufacturers with firm orders for large numbers, which had been lacking throughout the 1920s and 1930s. As a result of this, French manufacturers didn’t have the financial strength to tackle major retooling and the fast-paced industrial output that the Armée de l’Air desperately needed on the blitzkrieg’s eve.
     Building foreign aircraft under license would have required a strong political will and the means to discipline French industrials who weren't always as cooperative as they could have been. There was indeed resistance to the 1936-1937 mergers that the Air Ministry imposed upon France's manufacturers, specifically to address production issues (see related article here). Production suffered from the 40-hour work week (no overtime as far as I know) and politically motivated strikes. Meanwhile, German workers toiled away 50+ hours per week. We do know that a Hurricane required about 10,000 work hours to build, vs. 12,000 for a Spitfire (correct me if I'm wrong). The Me-109e took a bit less time than this (although I haven't found confirming data). The MS-406 took at least as many, and the MB-151 even more, close to 18,000-20,000 work hours. You can see how badly the situation could develop with such numbers.
     Another aspect of the troubles that the Armée de l'Air faced was the slow pace at which France industries emerged from the global Depression (compared with the UK and Germany). A significant part of France’s industries had been lost during WWI, so all that had to be rebuilt before and during the Great Depression. The population (potential workforce) discrepancy between France and Germany + Austria + the Sudetenland gave the Axis an advantage of almost 2 to 1. Competition was a tall order seen from any angle.
     A number of other issues plagued the French military buildup of the 30s. The lack of consistency with design and production strategies from the French government (I do repeat it) was one of the leading problems. France’s Air Ministry issued some really bad design directives in the mid-30s, mostly as cost-saving measures. This resulted in a carnival of notoriously ugly and instantly obsolete machines (especially for bombers and recon aircraft), as well as a lot of wasted time and money. The lack of coordination among the aviation industry saw hundreds of aircraft getting built, but missing key components, like their armament, radios, and other cockpit equipment. French engine manufacturers could hardly keep up with the accelerated production of airframes in 1939-1940. Poor planning also led front-line units to use their own pilots to fly their older aircraft back to factories and exchange them for newer types. Why not use the thousands of available Polish pilots eager to be involved? They could have easily handled these deliveries at the very least. Most of them eventually ended up in the UK. 

Incidentally, I found information I didn't know. Under France's Third Republic (1870-1940), the head of state (President of the Republic) wasn't elected by universal suffrage but by the parliament (Senate and Chamber). The president appointed a prime minister to head the government. Technically, the prime minister wielded more power than the president. However, the Chamber could force the prime minister to resign with a vote of no confidence. With a heavily divided parliament (sounds familiar?), such as France's before WWII, this resulted in prime ministers lasting about six months, thus the political instability of the country. A profound rivalry between socialists and conservatives (sounds familiar?) was rooted in the Depression's economic problems (1929-1939) that had provoked widespread poverty and unemployment in France, especially during the second half of the 1930s. Added to this, French demography suffered from about half of its population between the ages of 20-25 being missing due to the 1.4 million KIAs in WWI and about six million casualties overall, a disaster for France's demography 20 years later. I'd call this a perfect storm...

     Despite France's mountain of challenges and failures, the Armée de l'Air and the RAF (respectively 600 serviceable fighter aircraft out of 2,900, and 360 for the RAF deployed in France vs. 850 Me-109e) were involved in inflicting on the Luftwaffe nearly 1,500 aircraft losses plus 488 damaged, about 28% of its front-line strength or 36% overall. French fighters accounted for 600-1,000 of the Luftwaffe's losses. I could not find stats on German losses attributed to the Hurricanes or the number of Me-109s shot down. The RAF had deployed about 260 Hurricanes to France and lost 119 of those during the invasion. Spitfires were not sent to France. It is a tribute to the valor of the Allied combat crews, given that they lacked any combat experience at the onset. This affected the Luftwaffe's chances of prevailing during the ensuing Battle of Britain.
     All of the issues described in this article led France to falter catastrophically after emerging from WWI as a world leader in aerospace. France could have done better. Bad governance in the face of a crisis dooms nations. Folks facing the same today, with glaring incompetence and criminal hubris to boot, ought to heed this tale. Anyway... This was a pie-in-the-sky idea. Let the Flak do its worst.

Click here for the previous article on WWII Mergers

Click here for the next article on British Aviation in WWII.

WWII Aviation Industry Part 1

French aviation of the 30s always puzzled me as regards its industrial basis and organization. I decided to look this up. Here's what I found. This is a departure from my usual D&D-related focus. Wargamers amongst you may find this interesting.

Mergers & Nationalizations

Reading about post-WWII French aircraft manufacturing can be confusing because of the acronyms used in the late 40s and 50s. After some frustration, I seized the bull by the horns and drafted a diagram showing the most important manufacturers after WWI. Those wargamers among you will recognize many in the diagram’s top row. These manufacturers did not possess the industrial capacity to provide modern aircraft as quickly as the French Armée de l’Air needed them to face the growing Nazi threat in the mid-30s. Many were financially strapped due to the global economic depression at that time. In desperation, the French government nationalized almost all of these manufacturers. The plan was to reorganize the entire industry to increase production output and relocate as many manufacturing centers away from Paris, which was deemed too vulnerable to an invasion. The government also saw an urgent need to improve coordination between its military and thus-far-private corporations.

        There wasn’t a good way to cobble together fifteen or more disparate companies with workshops spread all over the country, not to mention handling disgruntled workers' unions. The reorganization was more or less based (as far as I can tell) on the location of factories, resulting in six industrial groups positioned geographically: Center (Paris), North (roughly northwest of Paris), West (Atlantic coast), Southwest (Bordeaux), Meridional (Toulouse), and Southeast (Marseille). This approximated the original intent. The acronyms roughly translate as National Air Works of (…region). In truth, those areas overlap. Most of these companies had their HQs in one Parisian suburb or another. This was hardly avoidable since the capital city is the nation’s nerve center. Several companies’ assets ended up being split among different industrial groups. For example: Potez (Southeast & North), Lioré & Olivier (Southwest & Southeast), and Breguet (Southeast, North, plus one part that escaped nationalization and kept operating independently under its brand name). One company isn’t shown on the diagram: Avions Voisin. They converted their business to build automobiles after government orders for combat aircraft dried up at the end of WWI.

        After WWII, France’s aerospace industry was in tatters, since most of its assets had been taken away by German occupiers or wiped out during Allied bombing raids. Over the following sixty years, much of all this was rebuilt and eventually combined to form Aérospatiale (the folks working with the Brits to build the Concorde). Finally, Aérospatiale became the foremost part of establishing the multinational corporation called Airbus, now competing directly with Boeing. Much of the latter’s assembly work is completed in Toulouse.

        The exact status of these nationalized businesses isn’t all that clear (to me). Some managed to continue operating under their brand names after WWII (such as Potez). Most were swallowed entirely and ceased to exist as separate business entities. Marcel Bloch was the primary owner and administrator of Bloch Aircraft. The government bought him out but put him in charge of SNCASE (Southeast Aviation). He left in 1941 after disagreements with the Vichy government. He had been sent to a concentration camp during WWII, survived, and resumed control of his company after the war under his new name: Marcel Dassault. His new business lived on to produce the famous French Mirage fighters. One final corporation escaped nationalization altogether: Latécoère. It was best known for its transatlantic seaplanes. It still operates to this day, a world-spanning business specializing in airplane parts (fuselage sections, doors, electrical equipment, and so forth).

Engine Manufacturers

        Oddly, these companies weren’t nationalized in the 30s, despite a dire need for modern aircraft engines at that time. Salmson (Société des Moteurs Salmson, SMS) exited the aerospace business after WWI and began building automobiles. It ceased operations in 1962; its brand name ended then, and the remaining assets were bought out by other businesses. Renault was another source until 1936, when it spun off its Caudron subsidiary and other aircraft engine divisions to focus on its core automotive business. Lorraine-Dietrich provided engines until 1935, when financial failure enabled Amiot and Bloch to acquire its aircraft engines business. Gnome et Rhône bought out the remainder of Lorraine-Dietrich in 1941. Another small engine manufacturer of WWI, Société Clerget-Blin et Cie., was eventually acquired by SNECMA in 1947 and ceased to operate under its brand name.

        Hispano-Suiza was an important source of aircraft engines in WWI. France’s branch, known as Société Française Hispano-Suiza, was established in 1923 and cut ties with its Spanish parent company at the French government’s behest. It designed aircraft engines and cannons up until WWII, especially for the MS-406, Dewoitine 520, and Arsenal VG33. It later built foreign manufacturers’ engines under license. SNECMA bought the French division in 1970 and renamed it Safran Transmission Systems in 2016. The division continued since then to build aircraft engines, thrust reversers, and other equipment. The original Spanish company, still under its Hispano-Suiza brand, survives to this day, specializing among other things in gnarly-looking concept and sports cars.

        Gnome et Rhône built aircraft engines, especially during WWI. Much of its business fell victim to WWII. They built engines for M4 Sherman tanks for a short period, but to salvage what was left of the company, it was nationalized in 1945 and rebranded as Société Nationale d'Etude et de Construction de Moteurs d'Aviation, otherwise known as SNECMA. The latter went on to build the Atar jet engine powering Dassault Mirages, and the Concorde’s Olympus 593. In 1974, the company established a joint venture with General Electric called CFM International to build the highly successful CFM-56 engines used on Boeing and Airbus aircraft. It changed its brand name to Safran in 2016 and now operates as a world supplier of commercial and military jet and turboprop engines, as well as the propulsion system for the space-bound Ariane 5 Vulcain rocket.

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Click here for the article on the woes of French wartime aviation
and why they took place.