A critique of German strategy towards Poland and its allies at September 1939
Passion, chance, and policy
War, as Clausewitz said, is composed of the trinity of passion, chance, and subordination to policy. In the case of Hitler’s war against Poland, the crisis came out of the fevered atmosphere in Europe after previous crises, including the one in which Germany overran the remaining Czech provinces in March 1939. Passions had been aroused in Germany (“primordial violence, hatred, and enmity”, as translated from Clausewitz, to be unleashed in their full fury by the war) by virulent German opposition to the political and military restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, and the liberal and democratic restrictions of the Weimar Republic, ramped up by Germany’s economic weakness – partly caused by reparations – and not helped by “Germany first” policies, including leaving the League of Nations, and (initially secretly) re-arming. As September 1939 drew near, German policy had already overthrown these restrictions, but revolutionary Nazi ideology continued to promote those passions. Territorial revisionism was continuing apace, from the occupation of the Rhineland, the Anschluss with Austria, the annexation of the Sudetenland as a result of the Munich Agreement, and the rest of Czechoslovakia later, not forgetting the annexation of Memel, and angry negotiations with Poland over Danzig and the Polish Corridor. Chance, or at least relatively novel, political developments played a critical part in the making of the September 1939 crisis – the Pact of Steel in May 1939 represented a quiet reversal of Mussolini’s exasperation with Hitler’s unilateralism, while the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact seemed to present an opportunity for resolution of the Polish question by force, despite the French and British guarantees to Poland in March 1939.
German Policy towards Poland in September 1939
On the face of it, German policy in the Polish crisis was similar to the approach to Czechoslovakia 6 months before. Britain and France had guaranteed both countries’ territories at and after the Munich Agreement. In both cases, Hitler took the threat of western allied intervention seriously, but by August he seems to have been convinced that the called bluff over Czechoslovakia meant the guarantee to Poland could be similarly called. The internal economic situation in Germany had also changed significantly, in that, if a war was to come, it had to come sooner rather than later, or the economy would face dire problems, owing to Germany’s foreign exchange crisis (I’m reliant on Tooze, Wages of Destruction, for this argument). The German military had grown in size and experience in the preceding year, leading to a much greater willingness to take risks within the Nazi leadership. Tank and aircraft strength had both increased markedly.
Both the western allies and Germany had been courting the Soviet Union, viewed by both as a possible arbiter of the outcome of conflict between them. However, both negotiated while holding their noses, as neither really desired a Communist ally. The deciding factor was Stalin, who could see the advantages of a settlement with Germany that would provide him with new territories in Poland and the Baltic States. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact provided for the dismemberment of Poland in its secret protocol, satifying both sides – at least for a while. So much for the policy background.
German Strategy
German military strategy proceeded from the Pact and was covered by several brief official German documents, including the Fall Weiss invasion plan developed earlier in the year, and Führer Directive 1 of 1 September 1939. The latter ordered actions against Britain (always referred to as England) and France, primarily the former, that were almost entirely defensive in nature, to cover the period during which Poland was to be overrun. Any strategic offensive action against the western allies was deliberately precluded, which suggests that Hitler at least had no expectation of an effective reaction from them in the short run, and the long run would have to await events.
Here, we can see that German strategy served the policy objective versus Poland very well. Poland was to be overrun by a three-pronged advance on Warsaw from the main German border in Silesia in the west, from East Prussia and from over the Polish Corridor in Pomerania in the north, and from Slovakia in the south west. It envisaged encircling and destroying the Polish armies to the west of Warsaw, and not encroaching on the Soviet designated areas to the east. The vast superiority of the German armies in both technology and numbers, as well as the basic indefensibility of Poland geographically against the extensive German border wrapping round their target, meant that the result was virtually a foregone conclusion.
The strategy adopted, using the traditional meaning of the word, ‘how the tactical engagements were to be sequenced’, was one of breakthroughs and encirclements, to cut off the enemy armies from their main supply bases (primarily Warsaw), break them up into smaller pieces, and destroy them with overwhelming forces attacking from several directions, including from the air. It’s worth noting that the Panzer and motorised forces were not concentrated and given an independent role of their own, but were generally used alongside the foot infantry divisions to ensure that breakthrough happened. A quick glance at the German order of battle shows that most of the Panzer formations were within corps that included foot infantry divisions, with the notable exception of Guderian’s XIX Corps. This was a major difference between the Polish campaign and later German operations and may indicate an understandable reluctance within the German High Command to go the whole hog. My own view is that German High Command (that did not include the leading Panzer advocates) saw fully independent mechanised groups as an unnecessary complication in Poland (if they were even seriously considered), where distances were short, and the opposition comparatively weak. The leaders of the Panzer arm, such as Guderian, were not yet in a position to make that change palpable. It is interesting to note that Guderian, being Guderian, managed to achieve significant independence of action for his XIX Corps during the Polish campaign, and that independence of command of Panzer forces became the norm after the Polish campaign experience had demonstrated the strength of this approach.
However, there are a few strategic caveats, prompted by the limitations of policy direction. In any war, crossing the line to actual hostilities can change the attitude of interested parties in very unexpected ways. In Fall Weiss there were a few imponderables. Some could be dismissed fairly comfortably from a German perspective. Hitler read correctly that Stalin could be trusted with his end of the bargain, so immediate hostilities between Germans and Russians could be discounted, and the German strategy did in fact discount them. However, even medium term possibilities became more risky, as after the destruction of Poland the two totalitarian states would have a common border. Was this storing up trouble for the future? Hitler’s overall policy towards the Soviet Union as stated in Mein Kampf and many other public places remained unchanged. The Pact was simply a short-term convenience, and that feeling was certainly mutual. The strategic implications of war with Britain and France while a potentially hostile Soviet Union lay immediately to the East were vast. Many German generals were very apprehensive, but events overtook them – it was not until after the campaign had started that Britain and France declared war, by which time it was too late.
Poland would be overrun, but any other small state on Germany’s borders, and even further afield, could only look askance at such naked aggression. A serious implication of the Polish action was alienation of neutrals or making further enemies, and reluctant acquiessance from current friends. Even in the US, in earlier times very serious about staying out of European entanglements, public opinion in early September was at 42% in favour of intervention if it looked like the western allies might lose, very slightly lower than the 48% against (Gallup poll). German policy under Hitler was fundamentally indifferent to these ructions, focusing on the moment rather than longer term consequences. In addition, Hitler envisaged a conflict with the US eventually, though not with the British Empire. Strategical assessment would have to await events again.
The major miscalculation in respect of policy was with the attitude of the western allies. Having met their leaders at Munich a few short months earlier, Hitler felt that he had their measure and concluded that they were all degenerate bluster – or least, the French were, and the British would not act without the French. His guards against the allies while Poland was conquered were small scale, but in practice sufficient in the short term, because there would be no effective allied land offensive; French strategy was to rely on the Maginot Line and to meet a German attack when, if, it came. The strategic implications of the miscalculation were profound. Germany lost its merchant fleet (such as it was) and eventually pretty much its entire surface fleet. It would suffer a blockade as in the First World War, though its conquests gave it greater resilence. In terms of the conquest of Poland, there was no particular problem here, but, even if France could be defeated, without a way to defeat Britain, Germany was in for a long war that she could not sustain within the bounds of Nazi ideology and the German economy. After the fall of France – unexpectedly swift to all concerned – Hitler’s regime was dependent on negotiation with Britain, a factor not perhaps entirely obvious until German failure in the Battle of Britain. With Britain supported by the US, and the latent antagonism between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia (and with quite a smattering of hindsight), it seems that the strategic nightmare of a two front war would be a distinct possibility. So, although Germany’s Polish strategy was subordinated to the initial policy objective, the major risk of war with France and Britain ought perhaps to have been more seriously considered and policy tweaked accordingly, or at least some strategic planning started. The demands of policy in the medium term – defeat of France and especially Britain, supported by the US – would seem excessive, especially as little planning for this eventuality had been done.
Strategy is critically about available means and means actually provided. For the Polish campaign, there was no particular problem with the means provided, although afterwards much of the army’s equipment required replacement and extensive maintenance during the winter of 1939. It was perhaps just as well that the western allies remained supine on land. The Polish campaign was important for the German army’s and air force’s development of technology (for example, confirmation of the gross inferiority of the Panzer I and Panzer II in real combat), command and control, particularly air-land co-ordination, and the growth in combat experience of officers and other ranks throughout. On land, and arguably in air-land combination, the Wehrmacht was very effective, though at this time it had only been measured against a relatively weak opponent.
Conclusion
In September 1939, a short term opportunistic foreign policy action, supported by wholly to be expected strategic military success, trumped a critical miscalculation with respect to the determination of the western allies and also trumped longer term policy and, by extension, escalated the strategic risks of a 2-front war and massively increased US support for the allies. Hitler decided to act on the grounds that success would breed success. Sounds like a strategic Ponzi scheme to me.
Franz Halder, July 14, 1940: “The Führer…would like an understanding with Great Britain. He knows that war with the British will be hard and bloody, and knows also that people everywhere today are averse to bloodshed.”
























Tomorrow’s world is here today!





































































