

Large Language Models as Configuration Validators

Xinyu Lian*, Yinfang Chen*, Runxiang Cheng, Jie Huang, Parth Thakkar†, Minjia Zhang, Tianyin Xu

University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801, USA

†Meta Platforms, Inc., Menlo Park, CA 94025, USA

{lian7, yinfang3, rcheng12, jeffhj, minjiaz, tyxu}@illinois.edu, parthdt@meta.com

Abstract—Misconfigurations are major causes of software failures. Existing practices rely on developer-written rules or test cases to validate configuration values, which are expensive. Machine learning (ML) for configuration validation is considered a promising direction, but has been facing challenges such as the need of large-scale field data and system-specific models. Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) show promise in addressing some of the long-lasting limitations of ML-based configuration validation. We present the first analysis on the feasibility and effectiveness of using LLMs for configuration validation. We empirically evaluate LLMs as configuration validators by developing a generic LLM-based configuration validation framework, named Ciri. Ciri employs effective prompt engineering with few-shot learning based on both valid configuration and misconfiguration data. Ciri checks outputs from LLMs when producing results, addressing hallucination and nondeterminism of LLMs. We evaluate Ciri’s validation effectiveness on eight popular LLMs using configuration data of ten widely deployed open-source systems. Our analysis (1) confirms the potential of using LLMs for configuration validation, (2) explores design space of LLM-based validators like Ciri, and (3) reveals open challenges such as ineffectiveness in detecting certain types of misconfigurations and biases towards popular configuration parameters.

I. INTRODUCTION

Modern software systems undertake hundreds to thousands of configuration changes on a daily basis [1]–[7]. For example, at Meta/Facebook, thousands of configuration file “diffs” are committed daily, outpacing the frequency of code changes [1], [2]. Other systems such as at Google and Microsoft also frequently deploy configuration changes [3], [5], [6]. Such velocity of configuration changes inevitably leads to misconfigurations. Today, misconfigurations are among the dominating causes of production incidents [2], [3], [7]–[13].

To detect misconfigurations, today’s configuration management systems employ the “configuration-as-code” paradigm and enforce continuous configuration validation, ranging from static validation, to configuration testing, and to manual review and approval [1]. The configuration is first checked by validation code (aka *validators*) based on predefined correctness rules [1], [14]–[20]; in practice, validators are written by engineers [1], [14], [15]. After passing validators, configuration changes are then tested with code to check program behavior [21]–[23]. Lastly, configuration changes, commonly in the form of a configuration file “diff”, is reviewed before deployment.

The aforementioned pipeline either relies on manual inspection to spot misconfigurations in the configuration file diffs, or requires significant engineering efforts to implement

and maintain validators or test cases. However, these efforts are known to be costly and incomprehensive. For example, despite that mature projects all include extensive configuration validators, recent work [24]–[30] repeatedly shows that existing validators are insufficient. The reasons are twofold. First, with large-scale systems exposing hundreds to thousands of configuration parameters [31], implementing validators for every parameter becomes a significant overhead. Recent studies [1], [24] report that many parameters are uncovered by existing validators, even in mature software projects. Second, it is non-trivial to validate a parameter, which could have many different correctness properties, such as type, range, semantic meaning, dependencies with other parameters, etc.; encoding all of them into validators is laborious and error-prone, not to mention the maintenance cost [32], [33].

Recently, using machine learning (ML) and natural language processing (NLP) to detect misconfigurations has been considered as a promising approach to addressing the above challenges. Compared to manually written static validators, ML or NLP-based approaches are automatic, easy to scale to a large number of parameters, and applicable to different projects. Several ML/NLP-based misconfiguration detection techniques were proposed [34]–[41]. The key idea is to first learn correctness rules from field configuration data [34]–[37], [39], [41]–[44] or from documents [38], [40], and then use the learned rules to detect misconfigurations in new configuration files. ML/NLP-based approaches have achieved good success. For example, Microsoft adopted PeerPressure [36], [45] as a part of Microsoft Product Support Services (PSS) toolkits. It collects configuration data in Windows Registry from a large number of Windows users to learn statistical “golden states” of system configurations.

However, ML/NLP-based misconfiguration detection is also significantly limited. First, the need for large volumes of system-specific configuration data makes it hard to apply those techniques outside corporations that collect user configurations (e.g., Windows Registry [41]) or maintain a knowledge base [40]. For example, in cloud systems where the *same* set of configurations is maintained by a small DevOps team [1], [4], there is often not enough information for learning [25]. Moreover, prior ML/NLP-based detection techniques all target specific projects, and rely on predefined features [39], templates [35], or models [40], making them hard to generalize.

Recent advances on Large Language Models (LLMs), such as GPT [46] and Codex [47], show promises to address some of the long-lasting limitations of traditional ML/NLP-based

*Co-primary authors.

misconfiguration detection techniques. Specifically, LLMs are trained on massive amounts of public data, including configuration data—configuration files in software repositories, configuration documents, knowledge-based articles, Q&A websites for resolving configuration issues, etc. Hence, LLMs encode extensive knowledge of both *common* and *project-specific* configuration. Such knowledge can be utilized for configuration validation without the need for manual rule engineering. Furthermore, LLMs show the capability of *generalization* and *reasoning* [48], [49] and can potentially “understand” configuration semantics. For example, they can not only understand that values of a port must be in the range of [0, 65535], but also reason that a specific configuration value represents a port (e.g., based on the name and description) and thus has to be within the range.

Certainly, LLMs have limitations. They are known for hallucination and non-determinism [50], [51]. Additionally, LLMs have limited input context, which can pose challenges when encoding extensive contexts like configuration file and related code. Moreover, they are reported to be biased to popular content in the training dataset. Fortunately, active efforts [52]–[56] are made to address these limitations.

In this paper, we present the first analysis on the feasibility and effectiveness of using LLMs such as GPT and Claude for configuration validation. As a first step, we empirically evaluate LLMs in the role of configuration validators, without additional fine-tuning or code generation. We focus on basic misconfigurations (those violating explicit correctness constraints) which are common misconfigurations encountered in the field [9]. We do not target environment-specific misconfigurations or bugs triggered by configuration (discussed in §VII).

To do so, we develop Ciri, an LLM-empowered configuration validation framework. Ciri takes a configuration file or a file diff as the input; it outputs detected misconfigurations along with the reasons that explain them. Ciri integrates different LLMs such as GPT-4, Claude-3, and CodeLlama. Ciri devises effective prompt engineering with few-shot learning based on existing configuration data. Ciri also validates the outputs of LLMs to generate validation results, coping with the hallucination and non-determinism of LLMs. A key design principle of Ciri is separation of policy and mechanism. Ciri can serve as an open framework for experimenting with different models, prompt engineering, training datasets, and validation methods.

We study Ciri’s validation effectiveness using eight popular LLMs including remote models (GPT-4, GPT-3.5, Claude-3-Opus, and Claude-3-Sonnet), and locally housed models (CodeLlama-7B/13B/34B and DeepSeek). We evaluate ten widely deployed open-source systems with diverse types. Our study confirms the potential of using LLMs for configuration validation, e.g., Ciri with Claude-3-Opus detects 45 out of 51 real-world misconfigurations, outperforming recent configuration validation techniques. Our study also helps understand the design space of LLM-based validators like Ciri, especially in terms of prompt engineering with few-shot learning and voting. We find that using configuration data as shots can enhance validation effectiveness. Specifically, few-shot learning

using both valid configuration and misconfiguration data achieves the highest effectiveness. Our results also reveal open challenges: within the scope of target configurations, Ciri struggles with certain types of misconfigurations such as dependency violations and version-specific misconfigurations. It is also biased to the popularity of configuration parameters, causing both false positives and false negatives.

In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:

- A new direction of configuration validation using pre-trained large language models (LLMs);
- Ciri, an LLM-empowered configuration validation framework and an open platform for configuration research;
- An empirical analysis on the effectiveness of LLM-based configuration validation, and its design space;
- Ciri is released at <https://github.com/xlab-uiuc/ciri>.

II. EXPLORATORY EXAMPLES

We explore using LLMs to validate configuration out of the box. We show that vanilla LLMs can detect misconfigurations. However, they are prone to both false negatives and false positives that require careful handling. Figure 1 presents four examples, two of which the LLM successfully detects misconfigurations, and two of which the LLM misses the misconfiguration or reports a false alarm. These examples were generated using the GPT-3.5-Turbo LLM [57].

Detecting violation of configuration dependency. Validating dependencies between configuration parameters has been a challenging task in highly-configurable systems [10], [58]. LLMs can infer relations between entities from text at the level of human experts [59], which allows LLMs to infer dependencies between parameters in a given configuration file based on their names and descriptions. Figure 1 (Example 1) presents a case where values of two dependent parameters were changed (i.e., “*buffer.size*” and “*bytes.per.checksum*”). After understanding the value relationship dependency between these two parameters, the model determines that the change in “*bytes.per.checksum*” has violated the enforced dependency, and provides the correct reason for the misconfiguration.

Detecting violation with domain knowledge. A state-of-the-art LLM is trained on a massive amount of textual data and possesses basic knowledge across a wide range of professional domains. An LLM thus could be capable of understanding the definition of a configuration parameter and reasoning with its semantics. When the LLM encounters a configuration parameter such as IP address, permissions, and masks, it invokes the domain knowledge specific to the properties of those parameters. Figure 1 (Example 2) presents a case where an HTTP address has been misconfigured to a semantically invalid value. The model detects the misconfiguration, reasons that its value is out of range, and further suggests a potential fix.

Missed misconfiguration and false alarm. LLMs as configuration validators are not without errors. Examples 3 and 4 in Figure 1 show two cases where the LLM make mistakes.

In Example 3, the configuration file has provided a description of the changed parameter “*hostname.verifier*” and explicitly

	Example 1: LLM catches a dependency violation	Example 2: LLM catches an invalid port value	Example 3: LLM misses an invalid option	Example 4: LLM reports a false alarm
Config.	<pre> <name>io.file.buffer.size</name> <value>4096</value> <description>The size of buffer for use in sequence files during read and write operations.</description> <name>io.bytes.per.checksum</name> <value>4097</value> <description>The number of bytes per checksum. Must not be larger than io.file.buffer.size.</description> ... </pre>	<pre> <name>dfs.journalnode.httpaddress </name> <value>0.0.0.0:80800</value> <description> The address and port the JournalNode HTTP server listens on. </description> ... </pre>	<pre> <name>hadoop.ssl.hostname.verifier </name> <value>STRICT_I8</value> <description> The hostname verifier to provide for HttpsURLConnections. Valid values are DEFAULT,STRICT, STRICT_I6, DEFAULT_AND_LOCALHOST and ALLOW_ALL </description> ... </pre>	<pre> <name>io.mapfile.bloom.error.rate</name> <value>0.01</value> <description> The rate of false positives in BloomFilter-s used in BloomMapFile. As this value decreases, the size of BloomFilter-s increases exponentially. This value is the probability of encountering false positives (default is 0.5%). </description> ... </pre>
Q:	Any mistakes in the above configuration file?	Any mistakes in the above configuration file?	Any mistakes in the above configuration file?	Any mistakes in the above configuration file?
A:	The value of io.bytes.per.checksum should be less than or equal to io.file.buffer.size.	The port number is too big. The port number should be less than 65535.	The value of the property hadoop.security.crypto.cipher.suite is wrong.	The value of the property io.mapfile.bloom.error.rate is 0.01, which is too low.

Fig. 1: Examples 1 and 2 show the LLM correctly catches and reasons the misconfigurations. Examples 3 and 4 show the LLM misses the misconfiguration or reports a valid configuration as erroneous.

listed the valid value options of the parameter. However, the model fails to realize that the parameter is misconfigured to an invalid, non-existent option (STRICT_I8). In Example 4, the description suggests that the parameter “*bloom.error.rate*” ranges from 0 to 100 (percentage), whereas the actual scale is 0 to 1 (fraction). This inconsistency supposedly confuses the model making it mark 0.01 (a valid value) as invalid.

Both examples show that directly using off-the-shelf LLMs as configuration validators would result in false negatives and false positives. The incorrect validation results can be attributed to hallucination [60]. A simple explanation is that LLMs are exposed to potentially contradictory data during training, which causes confusion to the model at the inference time.

III. CIRI: AN LLM-EMPOWERED CONFIGURATION VALIDATION FRAMEWORK

We develop Ciri, an LLM-empowered configuration validation framework. Ciri takes a configuration file or a file diff as the input, and outputs a list of detected misconfigurations along with the reasons to explain the misconfigurations. If no misconfiguration is detected, Ciri outputs an empty list. Ciri supports different LLMs such as GPT, Claude, CodeLlama, and DeepSeek [60], [61].¹

Figure 2 gives an overview of Ciri. Ciri turns a configuration validation request into a prompt to the LLMs (§III-A). The prompt includes (1) the target configuration file or diff, (2) a few examples (aka *shots*) to demonstrate the task of configuration validation, (3) code snippets automatically extracted from the code base, and (4) directive question and metadata. To generate shots, Ciri uses its database that contains labeled configuration data, including both valid configurations and misconfigurations. Ciri sends the same query to the LLMs multiple times and aggregates responses into the final validation result (§III-B).

Ciri applies to any software project, even if it has no labeled configuration data of that project in its database, regardless their file format or complexity. Ciri exhibits transferability (using data from one project and applying it to others), the ability to transfer configuration-related knowledge across projects when using configurations from different projects as shots (Finding 4). Ciri’s configuration validation effectiveness can also be further




Fig. 2: System overview of Ciri.

improved by generating quality shots (Finding 3) and code snippets (Finding 5).

A. Prompt Engineering

1) *Prompt structure*: Ciri generates a prompt that includes four elements: (1) the content of input configuration file or file diff, (2) the shots as valid configurations or misconfigurations with questions and ground truth responses for few-shot learning, (3) code snippets automatically extracted from available codebase, and (4) a directive question for LLM to respond in formatted output. Figure 3 shows an illustrative example of the prompt generated by Ciri. It contains N shots, the content of to-be-validated configuration file, and the code snippet enclosed within (Usage) followed by the directive question.

Ciri phrases the prompting question as “*Are there any mistakes in the above configuration for [PROJECT] version [VERSION]? Respond in a JSON format similar to the following: ...*”. The [PROJECT] and [VERSION] are required inputs of Ciri because the validity of configuration can change by project and project version [32], [33]. This prompt format enforces the LLM to respond in a unified JSON format for result aggregation (§III-B). However, responses from LLMs sometimes may still deviate from the anticipated format [50], [51]. In such cases, Ciri retries a new query to the LLM.

2) *Few-shot learning*: Ciri leverages the LLM’s ability to learn from examples at inference time (aka few-shot learning) to improve configuration validation effectiveness. To do so, Ciri simply inserts shots at the beginning of each prompt. Each shot

¹Adding a new LLM in Ciri takes a few lines to add the query APIs.




Fig. 3: An example prompt generated by Ciri.

contains a configuration snippet, the prompting question, and its corresponding ground truth. Figure 3 shows an example, where there are N shots. “Configuration File Shot #1” is the first shot, in which the parameter “yarn.resourcemanager.hostname” is misconfigured. This shot also contains the prompting question (orange box) and the ground truth (blue box).

3) *Shot generation*: Ciri maintains a database of labeled valid configurations and misconfigurations for generating valid configuration shots (referred to as *ValidConfig*) and misconfiguration shots (referred to as *Misconfig*). The database can be easily customized or extended, e.g., new configuration data can be added for projects that do not have built-in shot files. A *ValidConfig* shot specifies a set of configuration parameters and their valid values. A valid value of a parameter can be its default value, or other valid values used in practice. A *Misconfig* shot specifies a set of parameters and their values, where only one of the parameter values is invalid.

For a given configuration of a specific project, Ciri by default generates shots using configuration data of the same project. If Ciri’s database does not contain configuration data for the target project, Ciri will use data from other projects to generate shots. As shown in Finding 4, LLMs possess transferrable knowledge in configuration across different projects.

Ciri supports multiple methods for selecting data to generate shots, including randomized selection, category-based selection, and similarity-based selection (selecting data from configuration with the highest cosine similarity). We did not observe major differences when using different selection methods. So, Ciri uses randomized selection by default.

4) *Augmenting with code*: Recent work shows that retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) can enhance LLMs by incorporating additional information [62], [63]. In the context of configuration, each configuration parameter has corresponding

program context, such as data type, semantics, and usage. In Figure 3, the code snippet enclosed within `<Usage>` is automatically extracted from the source code, which uncovers semantics that the parameter value is expected to include a “:” symbol, with the split segment representing a port.

Ciri uses a simple but effective code retrieval strategy: To retrieve the most effective code snippet, Ciri employs the following strategy: (1) searching codebase with parameter names and retrieving relevant snippets; (2) prioritizing code over comments and documents; (3) selecting the longest snippet if multiple options are available, as longer snippets tend to be more comprehensive with details, and (4) deduplicating retrieved snippets. The retrieved code snippet is cached for efficiency. The retrieval performs text search and analysis on local source-code files, which typically takes less than a few seconds. The code retrieval strategy is effective in improving the effectiveness of configuration validation (Finding 5).

5) *Addressing token limits*: LLMs limit input size per query by the number of input tokens. For example, the token limits for GPT-3.5-Turbo are 16,385. To navigate these constraints, Ciri compresses the prompt if its size exceeds the limit. Ciri first tries to put the target configuration and the directive question in the prompt, then maximizes three *Misconfig* shots with one *ValidConfig* shot (Finding 3) to fit into the remaining space. If the configuration cannot fit into the token limit, Ciri transforms it into a more compact format, e.g., transforming an XML file into INI format. If the compressed input still cannot fit, Ciri aborts and returns errors. In practice, configuration files and diffs are small [1], [31] and can easily fit existing limits. For example, prior study inspects configuration files collected from Docker, where each file contains 1 to 18 parameters, with eight on average [64]. For very large configurations, Ciri can split them into multiple snippets and validate them separately.

B. Result Generation

The JSON response from LLMs contains three primary fields: (1) “*hasError*”: a boolean value indicating whether misconfigurations are detected, (2) “*errParameter*”: a list of misconfigured parameters, and (3) “*reason*”: a list of explanations of the detected misconfiguration, corresponding to “*errParameter*”. The LLM’s ability of explaining the reasoning is crucial to its usability [65], [66] and is a key advantage of LLM-empowered detection over traditional approaches.

1) *Validation against hallucination*: We employ a few rules to address the hallucination of LLMs. For example, if *hasError* is false, both *errParameter* and *reason* must be empty. Similarly, if *hasError* returns true, *errParameter* and *reason* must be non-empty with the same size. The answer to “*errParameter*” must not contain repeated values. If a response fails these rules, Ciri retries until the LLM returns a valid response.

2) *Voting against inconsistency*: LLMs can produce inconsistent outputs in conversation [67], explanation [68], and knowledge extraction [69]. To mitigate inconsistency, Ciri uses a multi-query strategy—querying the LLM multiple times using the same prompt and aggregating responses towards a result that is both representative of the model’s understanding and

more consistent than a single query. Ciri uses a frequency-based voting strategy: the output that recurs most often among the responses is selected as the final output [54]. In our evaluation, 5% of responses were rejected by the validation.

Note that the “*reason*” field is not considered during voting due to the diverse nature of the response. After voting, Ciri collects reasons from all responses associated with the selected *errParameter*. The reason field is important as it provides users with insights into the misconfiguration, which is different from the traditional ML approaches that only provide a binary answer with a confidence score. Ciri clusters the reasons based on TF-IDF similarity [70], and picks a reason from the dominant cluster. We find that this mechanism is robust to hallucination—hallucinated reasons were often filtered out as they tended to be very different from each other.

C. Ciri Configuration

Ciri is customizable, with a key principle of separating policy and mechanism. Users can customize Ciri via its own configurations. Table I shows several important Ciri configurations and default values. The default values are chosen by pilot studies using a subset of our dataset (§IV).

TABLE I: Configuration of Ciri and its default values.

Parameter	Description	Default Value
Model	Backend LLM. Also allows users to add other LLMs.	GPT-4
Temperature	Tradeoff between creativity and determinism.	0.2
# Shots	The number of shots included in a prompt.	Dynamic
# Queries	The number of queries with the same prompt.	3

IV. BENCHMARKS AND METRICS

Our study evaluates ten mature and widely deployed open-source projects: Alluxio, Django, EtcD, HBase, Hadoop Common, HDFS, PostgreSQL, Redis, YARN, ZooKeeper, which are implemented in a variety of programming languages (Java, Python, Go, and C). They also use different configuration formats (XML and INI) with a large number of configuration parameters. Table II lists the version (SHA) and the number of parameters at that version.

We evaluate Ciri on the aforementioned projects with eight LLMs: GPT-4-Turbo, GPT-3.5-Turbo, Claude-3-Opus, Claude-3-Sonnet, CodeLlama-7B/13B/34B, and DeepSeek-6.7B, which differ in model sizes and capabilities. All of these models have also been trained with a large amount of code data, where prior work has demonstrated their promising capability in handling a number of software engineering tasks.

A. Configuration Dataset

Our study uses two types of datasets: real-world misconfiguration datasets and synthesized misconfiguration datasets.

1) *Real-world misconfiguration*: To our knowledge, the Ctest dataset [64] is the only public dataset of real-world misconfigurations; it is used by prior work [21], [34], [71], [72]. The dataset contains 64 real-world configuration-induced failures of five open-source projects, among which 51 are misconfigurations, and 13 are bugs. We discuss the results of Ciri on real-world misconfigurations in Finding 2.

TABLE II: Evaluated projects and the configuration datasets (ValidConfig and Misconfig) for shot pool and evaluation.

Project	Version (SHA)	# Params	ValidConfig		Misconfig	
			# Shot	# Eval	# Shot	# Eval
Alluxio	76569bc	494	13	54	13	54
Django	67d0c46	140	6	18	6	18
EtcD	946a5a6	41	8	32	8	32
HBase	0fc18a9	221	12	50	12	50
HCommon	aa96f18	395	16	64	16	64
HDFS	aa96f18	566	16	64	16	64
PostgreSQL	29be998	315	8	31	8	31
Redis	d375595	94	12	44	12	44
YARN	aa96f18	525	10	40	10	40
ZooKeeper	e3704b3	32	8	32	8	32

2) *Synthesized misconfiguration*: Since real-world configuration dataset (§IV-A1) is too small, to systematically evaluate configuration validation effectiveness, we create new synthetic datasets for each evaluated project. First, we collect default configuration values from the default configuration file of each project, and real-world configuration files from the Ctest dataset (collected from Docker images [64], [73]) for those projects included in Ctest. We then generate misconfigurations of different types. The generation rules are from prior studies on misconfigurations [24], [26]–[28], which violates the constraints of configuration parameters (Table III). Notably, prior studies show that the generation rules can cover 96.5% of 1,582 parameters across four projects [26].

For each project, we build two distinct configuration sets. First, we build a configuration dataset with no misconfiguration (denoted as ValidConfig) to measure true negatives and false positives (Table IV). We also build a configuration dataset (denoted as Misconfig) in which each configuration file has one misconfiguration, to measure true positives and false negatives (Table IV). Note that a misconfiguration can be a dependency violation between multiple parameter values. Table II shows the size for ValidConfig and Misconfig datasets for each project.

To create the Misconfig data for each project, we first check if its configuration parameters fit any subcategory in Table III, and, if so, we apply rules from all matched subcategories to generate misconfigurations for that parameter. For example, an IP-address parameter fits both “Syntax: IP Address” and “Range: IP Address”. We do so for all parameters in the project. Then, we randomly sample at most five parameters in each subcategory that has matched parameters, and generate invalid value(s) per sampled parameter. For each subcategory, we further randomly select one parameter from the five sampled ones. We use the selected parameter to create a faulty configuration as a Misconfig shot (§III) for that subcategory and add it to the project’s shot pool. For the other four parameters, we use them to create four faulty configurations for that subcategory, and use them for evaluation. For Django, certain subcategories have fewer than five matched parameters, resulting in the ratio of #Eval to #Shot less than 4:1. We separate the evaluation set and shot pool to follow the practice that the training set does not overlap with the testing set [59]. We create the ValidConfig dataset for each project using the

TABLE III: Misconfiguration generation (we use generation rules from prior work [21], [26]–[28], which reflects real-world misconfigurations). “Subcategory” lists rules to generate different misconfigurations for the same configuration parameter.

Category	Subcategory	Specification	Generation Rules
Syntax	Data type	Value set = {Integer, Float, Long...} Numbers with units	Generate a value that does not belong to the value set Generate an invalid unit (e.g., “nunit”)
	Path	$\wedge (\backslash [^ \backslash /] *) + \backslash / ? \$$	Generate a value that violates the pattern (e.g., /hello//world)
	URL	$[a-z] + : // . *$	Generate a value that violates the pattern (e.g., file//)
	IP address	$[\backslash d] \{1, 3\} (. [\backslash d] \{1, 3\}) \{3\}$	Generate a value that violates the pattern (e.g., 127.x0.0.1)
	Port	Data type, value set = {Octet}	Generate a value that does not belong to the value set
	Permission	Data type, value set = {Octet}	Generate a value that does not belong to the value set
Range	Basic numeric	Valid Range constrained by data type	Generate values outside the valid range (e.g., Integer.MAX_VALUE+1)
	Bool	Options, value set = {true, false}	Generate a value that does not belong to the value set
	Enum	Options, value set = {“enum1”, “enum2”, ...}	Generate a value that doesn’t belong to set
	IP address	Range for each octet = [0, 255]	Generate a value outside the valid range (e.g., 256.123.45.6)
	Port	Range = [0, 65535]	Generate a value outside the valid range
	Permission	Range = [000, 777]	Generate a value outside the valid range
Dependency	Control	$(P_1, V, \diamond) \mapsto P_2, \diamond \in \{>, \geq, =, \neq, <, \leq\}$	Generate invalid control condition $(P_1, V, \neg \diamond)$
	Value Relationship	$(P_1, P_2, \diamond), \diamond \in \{>, \geq, =, \neq, <, \leq\}$	Generate invalid value relationship $(P_1, P_2, \neg \diamond)$
Version	Parameter change	$(V_1, Pset_1) \mapsto (V_2, Pset_2), Pset_1 \neq Pset_2$	Generate a removed parameter in V_2 or use an added parameter in V_1

aforementioned methodology for the Misconfig dataset, except that we generate valid values.

B. Metrics

We evaluate Ciri’s effectiveness at both configuration *file* and *parameter* levels: (1) at the file level, we check if Ciri can determine if a configuration file contains misconfigurations; (2) at the parameter level, we check if Ciri can determine if each parameter in the configuration file is valid or not. Table IV describes our confusion matrix. We compute the precision ($TP/(TP+FP)$), recall ($TP/(TP+FN)$), and F1-score at both file and parameter levels. If not specified, we default to macro averaging since each project is regarded equally. We prioritize parameter-level effectiveness for fine-grained measurements and discuss parameter-level metrics by default in the evaluation.

TABLE IV: Definitions for confusion matrix.

Level	Metric	Definition
File	TP	A misconfigured file correctly identified
	FP	A correct file wrongly flagged as misconfigured
	TN	A correct file rightly identified as valid
	FN	A misconfigured file overlooked or deemed correct
Param.	TP	A misconfigured parameter correctly identified
	FP	A correct parameter wrongly flagged as misconfigured
	TN	A correct parameter rightly identified as valid
	FN	A misconfigured parameter overlooked or deemed correct

V. EVALUATION AND FINDINGS

We present empirical evaluation results on the effectiveness of LLMs as configuration validators with Ciri (§V-A). We analyze how validation effectiveness changes with regard to design choices of Ciri (§V-B). We also present our understanding of when Ciri produces wrongful results (§V-C) and biases (§V-D).

A. Effectiveness of Configuration Validation

Finding 1. *Ciri shows effectiveness of using state-of-the-art LLMs as configuration validators. It achieves file- and parameter-level F1-scores up to 0.79 and 0.65, respectively.*

Ciri exhibits remarkable capability in configuration validation. Table V shows the F1-score, precision, and recall for each project using LLMs with three Misconfig and one ValidConfig shots (Finding 3). The results show that Ciri not only can effectively identify configuration files with misconfiguration (with an average F1-score of 0.72 across 8 LLMs), but also pinpoint misconfigured parameters with explanations (with an average F1-score of 0.56 across 8 LLMs). Certainly, the parameter-level F1-scores are about 15% lower than file-level F1-scores, i.e., pinpointing fine-grained misconfigured parameters is a more challenging task for LLMs compared to classifying the entire file as a whole.

The average F1-score of 0.56 at the parameter level may not seem high. The reason is that certain types of misconfigurations (e.g., dependency and version violations) are hard to be detected by Ciri (see Finding 7). On the other hand, Ciri effectively detects misconfigurations of Syntax and Range violations, with average an F1-score of 0.83 and 0.79 (Table IX). This effectiveness is noteworthy given that prior research has identified Syntax and Range violations as common types of misconfigurations in the field [9]. Therefore, we believe that Ciri is already useful in practice.

Finding 2. *Ciri detects 45 out of 51 real-world misconfigurations, outperforming recent configuration validation techniques, including learning-based [34] and configuration testing [21].*

We conduct experiments to evaluate how Ciri compares with existing validation techniques on a real-world dataset. For this evaluation, we choose the top five LLMs ranked by F1-score at the parameter-level based on the results from Table V. The real-world dataset [64] contains 51 misconfigurations in total (§IV), among which Ciri can detect 33–45 misconfigurations, as shown in Table VI. Ciri successfully detected 45 using Claude-3-Opus. The six undetected misconfigurations include three due to parameter dependency violations (discussed further in §V-C), and the other three are environment-related issues that are beyond Ciri’s current capability. Notably, Ciri seldom

TABLE V: F1-score, precision, and recall of Ciri evaluated on ten projects with eight LLMs as configuration validators.

Models	F1-score																						Precision		Recall	
	File-Level (F.L.)											Parameter-Level (P.L.)											F.L.	P.L.	F.L.	P.L.
	AL.	DJ.	ET.	HB.	HC.	HD.	PO.	RD.	YA.	ZK.	Avg	AL.	DJ.	ET.	HB.	HC.	HD.	PO.	RD.	YA.	ZK.	Avg	Avg	Avg	Avg	Avg
GPT-4-Turbo	0.69	0.86	0.67	0.73	0.75	0.70	0.72	0.75	0.74	0.70	0.73	0.52	0.82	0.59	0.49	0.51	0.53	0.43	0.57	0.62	0.53	0.56	0.62	0.44	0.89	0.81
GPT-3.5-Turbo	0.68	0.71	0.73	0.77	0.78	0.68	0.65	0.71	0.72	0.74	0.72	0.48	0.55	0.60	0.55	0.58	0.55	0.36	0.54	0.61	0.66	0.55	0.62	0.43	0.89	0.77
Claude-3-Opus	0.71	0.81	0.70	0.70	0.79	0.74	0.75	0.82	0.77	0.78	0.76	0.51	0.62	0.53	0.54	0.65	0.60	0.53	0.62	0.60	0.60	0.58	0.65	0.45	0.91	0.83
Claude-3-Sonnet	0.74	0.77	0.79	0.80	0.81	0.76	0.82	0.84	0.79	0.78	0.79	0.53	0.65	0.69	0.73	0.69	0.73	0.53	0.64	0.71	0.59	0.65	0.75	0.57	0.85	0.79
CodeLlama-34B	0.69	0.87	0.80	0.64	0.70	0.67	0.79	0.78	0.66	0.83	0.74	0.61	0.85	0.76	0.35	0.45	0.35	0.59	0.65	0.46	0.79	0.59	0.65	0.51	0.89	0.70
CodeLlama-13B	0.71	0.67	0.67	0.71	0.66	0.70	0.71	0.76	0.69	0.77	0.70	0.54	0.59	0.61	0.48	0.37	0.37	0.50	0.69	0.51	0.73	0.54	0.61	0.45	0.85	0.68
CodeLlama-7B	0.67	0.80	0.74	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.63	0.73	0.67	0.76	0.70	0.53	0.67	0.66	0.27	0.28	0.23	0.51	0.68	0.43	0.72	0.50	0.56	0.40	0.96	0.67
DeepSeek-6.7B	0.72	0.72	0.81	0.52	0.47	0.46	0.70	0.67	0.59	0.84	0.65	0.58	0.56	0.75	0.48	0.40	0.37	0.44	0.44	0.55	0.73	0.53	0.76	0.60	0.66	0.55

TABLE VI: A comparison of Ciri, ConfMiner, and Ctest in detecting real-world misconfigurations. N.R.: “not reported.”

Technique	# Correct Detection	# Incorrect Detection	# Missed	Runtime
Ciri (Claude-3-Opus)	45 (88.2%)	1	5	20-60 sec
Ciri (GPT-4-Turbo)	41 (80.4%)	2	8	15-40 sec
Ciri (CodeLlama-34B)	39 (76.5%)	1	11	30-70 sec
Ciri (GPT-3-Turbo)	37 (72.5%)	3	11	10-25 sec
Ciri (Claude-3-Sonnet)	33 (67.7%)	1	17	10-30 sec
ConfMiner	27 (52.3%)	N.R.	N.R.	N.R.
Ctest	41 (80.4%)	N.R.	N.R.	20-230 min

reports incorrect detection. Note that the real-world dataset only contains misconfigurations without valid configuration, preventing the calculation of F1-score as defined in methodology due to the absence of negative cases.

We compare Ciri’s results with a recent learning-based validation technique, ConfMiner [34], which was evaluated on the same dataset. ConfMiner utilizes the file content and commit history to identify patterns in configuration to detect misconfigurations. ConfMiner can detect 27 out of 51 misconfigurations, which is 40% less than Ciri. Unlike LLMs that are trained on extensive text data and can comprehend the context of configurations, ConfMiner relies on regular expressions to identify patterns. This approach limits its ability in complex scenarios, such as identifying valid values for enumeration parameters and understanding the relationships between different parameters.

We also compare Ciri with a recent configuration testing technique, namely Ctest [21], [71], [72]. Ctest detected 41 of the real-world misconfigurations without rewriting test code; Ciri outperforms Ctest by 8.9%. The reasons are twofold. First, testing relies on adequacy of the test cases. We find that existing test suites do not always have a high coverage of configuration parameters. On the other hand, LLMs can validate any parameter. Second, LLMs detected “silent misconfigurations” [9] that are not manifested via crashes or captured by assertions (e.g., several injected misconfigurations silently fell back to default values and passed the test; LLMs detected them likely because they violated documented specifications).

Certainly, Ctest can detect a broader range of misconfigurations such as the environment-related issues that Ciri cannot. We do not intend to replace configuration testing with LLMs. Instead, our work shows that LLMs can provide much quicker feedback for common types of misconfigurations, so tools like Ciri can be used in an early phase (e.g., configuration

TABLE VII: Effectiveness of LLMs without using shots.

Models	F1-score		Precision		Recall	
	F.L.	P.L.	F.L.	P.L.	F.L.	P.L.
GPT-4-Turbo	0.70 (0.03↓)	0.34 (0.22↓)	0.57	0.23	0.93	0.82
GPT-3.5-Turbo	0.67 (0.05↓)	0.20 (0.35↓)	0.50	0.12	0.99	0.77
Claude-3-Opus	0.69 (0.07↓)	0.37 (0.21↓)	0.64	0.28	0.82	0.69
Claude-3-Sonnet	0.67 (0.12↓)	0.28 (0.37↓)	0.55	0.20	0.89	0.66
CodeLlama-34B	0.66 (0.08↓)	0.12 (0.47↓)	0.50	0.07	0.96	0.52
CodeLlama-13B	0.59 (0.11↓)	0.12 (0.42↓)	0.53	0.07	0.76	0.52
CodeLlama-7B	0.65 (0.05↓)	0.11 (0.39↓)	0.51	0.08	0.91	0.23
DeepSeek-6.7B	0.11 (0.54↓)	0.06 (0.47↓)	0.99	0.50	0.06	0.04

authoring) before running expensive configuration testing. As shown in Table VI, for a configuration file in the real-world dataset, Ctest takes 20 to 230 minutes to finish [21], while Ciri only takes 10 to 70 seconds.

In summary, our results show that LLMs like GPT, Claude-3, and CodeLlama-34B can effectively validate configurations and detect misconfigurations with a sensibly designed framework like Ciri. Ciri can provide prompt feedback, complementing other techniques like configuration testing.

B. Impacts of Design Choices

Ciri plays a critical role in LLMs’ effectiveness of configuration validation. We explore its design choices and impacts.

Finding 3. *Using configuration data as shots can effectively improve LLMs’ effectiveness of configuration validation. Shots including both valid configuration and misconfiguration achieve the highest effectiveness.*

Using validation examples as shots can effectively improve the effectiveness of LLMs. Table VII shows the results of LLMs when the validation query does not include shots. In particular, comparing Table VII to Table V, as indicated by the numbered arrows in Table VII, the average F1-score of the LLMs has decreased by 0.03–0.54 at the file level, and decreased by 0.21–0.47 at the parameter level.

We also study Ciri’s effectiveness with different shot combinations. We evaluate six N -shot learning settings, where N ranges from 0 to 5. For example, to evaluate Ciri with a two-shot setting, three experiments will be performed: (1) two ValidConfig shots; (2) one ValidConfig shot plus one Misconfig shot; (3) two Misconfig shots. In total, we experiment with 21 shot combinations. Due to cost, we only run experiments




Fig. 4: F1-scores under different shot combinations.

on GPT-3.5-Turbo to HCommon. We find that only using ValidConfig shots leads to a decrease in precision, while only using Misconfig shots reduces recall. Clearly, text distribution in the query affects LLMs [74]. LLMs can be biased; if the shots are all misconfigurations, LLMs will be overly sensitive to the specific patterns in the shots, known as overfitting, which causes LLMs miss other types of misconfigurations; if the shots are all ValidConfig, LLMs face challenges in accurately identifying incorrect parameters within the file, leading to false alarms. As shown in Figure 4, using both Misconfig and ValidConfig in few-shot learning mitigates the biases and achieves the highest effectiveness, and including three Misconfig shots and one ValidConfig shot in the prompt achieves the highest F1-score at both the file and parameter levels.

Finding 4. Using configuration data from the same project as shots often leads to high validation F1 score. However, even without access to configuration data from the target project, using configuration data from a different project can lead to a improved validation score than zero-shot.

In situations where configuration data is unavailable (e.g., due to confidentiality), we evaluate whether using configuration data from other systems as shots can improve configuration validation effectiveness on the target system. Table VIII shows the results of using data from other projects as shots for configuration validation on HCommon. By comparing 4-shot HCommon with other columns in Table VIII, we see that using shots from other projects is not as effective as using shots from the target system. However, the average F1-score is still higher than zero-shot, indicating that using shots from other projects can improve the effectiveness over zero-shot. Our observations highlight that Ciri with LLMs can transfer configuration-related knowledge across different projects for effective configuration validation compared to traditional approaches.

Finding 5. Ciri’s code augmentation approach can help LLMs to better understand the context of the configuration and improve the validation effectiveness.

We compare the results of GPT-3.5-Turbo with and without code augmentation with four shots. The results show an improvement in F1 scores by 0.03 at both the file and parameter levels. Figure 5 exemplifies code snippets retrieved from the

TABLE VIII: F1-score on HCommon (HC.) using shots from different systems, e.g., HB. refers to using HBase shots. 4-S and 0-S means using four shots and no shots respectively.

Models	File-Level (F.L.)					Parameter-Level (P.L.)				
	HC.	4-S	0-S	Dj.	ET.	HB.	Avg	HC.	4-S	0-S
GPT-3.5-Turbo	0.78	0.67		0.78	0.68	0.74	0.74	0.58	0.20	0.44
Claude-3-Sonnet	0.81	0.67		0.74	0.74	0.78	0.75	0.69	0.28	0.54

```

Ex1: conf.setInt("tfile.fs.input.buffer.size", fsInputBufferSize);
Ex2: conf.setBoolean("fs.automatic.close", false);
Ex3: port=conf.get("yarn.nodemanager.webapp.address").split(":")[1];
Ex4: "kerberos".equals(conf.get("hbase.security.authentication"));

```

Fig. 5: Code snippets retrieved by Ciri to aid LLMs.

codebase by Ciri, which could improve LLMs’ comprehension of the configuration context: (1) examples 1 and 2 delineate the parameter types as Integer and Boolean, respectively. (2) example 3 highlights that the parameter should include a “:” symbol, with the latter segment representing a port. (3) example 4 shows that “kerberos” is one valid value for the parameter.

Finding 6. Code-specialized LLMs, e.g., CodeLlama, exhibit much higher validation scores than generic LLMs, e.g., Llama-2. Moreover, further scaling up the code-specialized LLMs leads to a continuous increase in validation scores.

In Table V, we observe a notable trend within the CodeLlama model family: the 13B model demonstrates an improvement in F1-score at the parameter level, by 0.04 over the 7B model; this trend continues with the 34B model, which exhibits a further 0.05 enhancement in F1-score over the 13B model. The observed performance gains can be primarily attributed to the increased capacity for learning and representing complex semantics of configuration values as model size scales. This involves deep comprehension beyond syntax and range violations which are more common in practice [9].

We further evaluated the effectiveness of the Llama-2 model, which is identical to CodeLlama in structure but lacks code-specific training. The Llama-2-13B is not effective, with an average F1-score of 0.05 at the parameter level. This result underscores the role of code-specific training, which enhances LLM’s comprehension of configuration in the context of code.

C. Limitations and Challenges

Finding 7. With Ciri, LLMs excel at detecting misconfigurations of syntax and range violations with an average F1-score of 0.8 across subcategories. However, LLMs are limited in detecting misconfigurations of dependency and version violations with an average F1-score of 0.3 across subcategories.

Table IX shows Ciri’s validation effectiveness per misconfiguration type. The F1-score on detecting misconfigurations of syntax and range violations is consistently above 0.5 across projects, and often reaches 0.8. However, F1-score rarely exceeds 0.5 on

TABLE IX: Parameter-level F1-score by misconfiguration types from Table III. N.A. means no evaluation samples.

Category	Sub-category	GPT-4-Turbo										Avg	Claude-3-Opus										Avg	CodeLlama-34B										Avg
		AL.	DJ.	ET.	HB.	HC.	HD.	PO.	RD.	YA.	ZK.		AL.	DJ.	ET.	HB.	HC.	HD.	PO.	RD.	YA.	ZK.		AL.	DJ.	ET.	HB.	HC.	HD.	PO.	RD.	YA.	ZK.	
Syntax	Data Type	0.84	1.00	1.00	0.67	0.94	0.89	0.70	0.78	0.89	0.80	0.85	0.67	0.80	1.00	0.80	0.94	1.00	0.80	0.74	1.00	0.80	0.85	0.93	1.00	1.00	0.25	0.67	0.80	1.00	1.00	0.50	1.00	0.82
	Path	0.50	1.00	1.00	0.89	0.73	0.73	0.57	0.57	1.00	0.73	0.77	1.00	1.00	0.80	0.89	0.89	1.00	1.00	0.67	0.89	0.73	0.89	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.86	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.57	1.00	1.00	0.79
	URL	0.67	0.80	1.00	N.A.	0.80	0.80	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	0.81	1.00	0.67	0.73	N.A.	1.00	0.89	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	0.86	1.00	1.00	0.75	N.A.	1.00	0.60	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	0.87
	IP Address	0.70	N.A.	N.A.	0.73	0.94	0.89	N.A.	0.84	0.94	0.76	0.83	0.73	N.A.	N.A.	0.84	0.94	0.84	N.A.	0.80	0.94	0.84	0.85	1.00	N.A.	N.A.	0.82	0.75	0.75	N.A.	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.90
	Port	0.74	N.A.	N.A.	0.78	0.94	0.82	N.A.	0.94	N.A.	0.84	0.84	0.70	N.A.	N.A.	0.82	0.82	0.67	N.A.	0.84	N.A.	0.94	0.80	0.94	N.A.	N.A.	0.71	1.00	0.62	N.A.	0.75	N.A.	1.00	0.84
Range	Permission	0.89	N.A.	N.A.	0.80	0.78	1.00	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	0.87	0.89	N.A.	N.A.	0.80	0.82	1.00	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	0.88	0.86	N.A.	N.A.	0.50	0.50	0.40	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	0.56
	Basic Numeric	0.73	1.00	0.75	0.73	0.60	0.67	1.00	0.89	1.00	0.80	0.82	0.67	0.80	0.89	0.46	0.50	0.67	1.00	0.67	0.89	0.80	0.73	0.75	1.00	0.89	0.36	0.00	0.50	0.67	0.75	0.50	1.00	0.64
	Bool	1.00	0.75	1.00	0.80	1.00	1.00	N.A.	0.89	1.00	0.80	0.92	1.00	0.55	0.73	0.67	0.89	0.89	N.A.	0.73	1.00	0.80	0.80	1.00	0.86	1.00	0.00	0.67	0.00	N.A.	0.67	0.50	0.75	0.60
	Enum	0.36	N.A.	0.86	0.73	0.67	0.89	0.89	0.75	0.80	N.A.	0.74	0.36	N.A.	0.89	1.00	0.86	0.75	0.89	0.89	0.80	N.A.	0.80	0.86	N.A.	1.00	0.75	0.57	0.60	0.75	1.00	0.75	N.A.	0.78
	IP Address	0.70	N.A.	N.A.	0.73	0.94	0.89	N.A.	0.84	0.94	0.76	0.83	0.73	N.A.	N.A.	0.84	0.94	0.84	N.A.	0.80	0.94	0.84	0.85	1.00	N.A.	N.A.	0.82	0.75	0.75	N.A.	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.90
Dependency	Port	0.74	N.A.	N.A.	0.78	0.94	0.82	N.A.	0.94	N.A.	0.84	0.84	0.70	N.A.	N.A.	0.82	0.82	0.67	N.A.	0.84	N.A.	0.94	0.80	0.94	N.A.	N.A.	0.71	1.00	0.62	N.A.	0.75	N.A.	1.00	0.84
	Permission	0.89	N.A.	N.A.	0.80	0.78	1.00	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	0.87	0.89	N.A.	N.A.	0.80	0.82	1.00	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	0.88	0.86	N.A.	N.A.	0.50	0.50	0.40	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	0.56
Version	Control	0.50	N.A.	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.00	0.00	N.A.	0.09	0.00	N.A.	0.29	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N.A.	0.04	0.40	N.A.	0.67	0.29	0.00	0.33	0.00	0.40	0.00	N.A.	0.26
	Value Relationship	1.00	N.A.	N.A.	0.75	0.36	0.22	0.40	N.A.	0.50	N.A.	0.54	0.80	N.A.	N.A.	0.67	0.29	0.25	0.40	N.A.	0.33	N.A.	0.46	0.00	N.A.	N.A.	0.29	0.44	0.57	0.67	N.A.	0.67	N.A.	0.44
Version	Parameter Change	0.00	N.A.	0.29	0.44	0.36	0.00	0.29	0.33	0.00	N.A.	0.21	0.00	N.A.	0.75	0.00	0.75	0.00	0.00	0.80	0.57	N.A.	0.36	0.00	N.A.	0.67	0.00	0.29	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N.A.	0.12

```

<name>hbase.security.authentication</name>
<value>simple</value>
<description>Controls whether secure authentication is enabled
for HBase. Possible values are 'simple' (no authentication), and
'kerberos'.</description>
...
<name>hbase.auth.key.update.interval</name>
<value>43200000</value>
<description>The update interval for authentication tokens in
milliseconds. Used when HBase security is enabled.</description>
...

```

Fig. 6: Misconfiguration that violates control dependency that LLMs cannot detect. The update interval for authentication is set but the secure authentication is disabled.

misconfigurations of dependency and version violations. Under these two categories, LLMs achieve F1-scores of 0.44–0.54 for misconfigurations that violate value relationship, which is higher than the other two subcategories (control and parameter change); however, it is still much lower than others.

The difference can be attributed to the inherent nature of different types of misconfigurations. Misconfigurations of syntax and range violations are more common in practice [9], from which LLMs learned extensive knowledge. In such a case, domain-specific knowledge from LLMs is sufficient to detect these misconfigurations. But, misconfiguration of dependency and version violations is often project-specific, as exemplified in Figure 6. They are tied to detailed history and features of the project, and thus hard to be captured or memorized by LLMs if the LLM is not fine-tuned on project-specific data. This discrepancy between misconfiguration types exposes existing LLM’s limitation. In summary, despite our efforts to incorporate examples of configuration dependencies in few-shot learning, and utilize code augmentation to provide code snippets containing dependency information, dependency-related misconfigurations still remain a challenge.

Finding 8. Among the detected misconfigurations, LLMs correctly explained reasons for 93.9% of the misconfigurations; meanwhile, 6.1% of the reasons are misleading.

When an LLM detects a misconfiguration, Ciri also asks the LLM to explain the reason. The quality of the reasoning is crucial to the usability of LLM-empowered configuration valida-

```

Config: alluxio.underfs.gcs.default.mode=888
A1: The property 'alluxio.underfs.gcs.default.mode' has
the value '888' which is not a valid octal number.
A2: The property 'alluxio.underfs.gcs.default.mode' has
the value '888' which exceeds the range of an Integer.

```

Fig. 7: Correct and incorrect reasons returned by LLMs.

tion, as it aids debugging and fixing the misconfiguration [65], [66]. To evaluate these explanations, we randomly select one answer in which the misconfiguration is correctly detected per (subcategory, project, LLM) tuple, and collect a total of 740 answers (resulting from 2,220 queries). Upon careful manual review, we determined that 93.9% of the reasons given by the LLMs are clear and explain the misconfigurations. 3.1% of the answers contain a mix of correct and incorrect reasons across queries. Ciri filters out incorrect reasons using the voting mechanism (§III-B2) as correct reasons are dominating. Figure 7 presents an example of mixed reasons, with the second reason being an instance of hallucination.

In short, with frameworks like Ciri, LLMs can effectively validate configurations for syntax or range violations; but are less effective for the configurations that involve dependencies between parameters and software versions, showing the challenges for LLMs to reason about interactions between parameters and between configuration and code [75]. To address those misconfigurations, one can re-train or fine-tune LLMs with data related to dependency and versions.

D. Biases

Finding 9. LLMs are biased to popular parameters: Ciri is more effective in detecting misconfigurations of popular parameters, but also reports more false alarms on them.

To measure the popularity of a configuration parameter, we count the number of exact-match search results returned by Google when searching the parameter name and call it *G-hits*.

We study the correlation between a parameter’s *G-hits* and the effectiveness of LLMs in detecting the misconfigurations. For each configuration file in the Misconfig dataset, we track the frequency of LLMs detecting the parameter’s misconfigurations




Fig. 8: The G-hits distribution of the correctly detected misconfigurations (orange), and the G-hits distribution of the missed misconfigurations (blue). The bars in box plots indicate medians. CL refers to CodeLlama.




Fig. 9: Frequency of the identified parameter with i^{th} highest G-hits in a configuration file.

with the i^{th} highest G-hits in each file, where $i = 1 \dots 8$. We separate cases when the misconfigured parameter is detected versus missed. As shown in Figure 8, the median G-hits of misconfigured parameters being detected is higher than the median G-hits of misconfigured parameters being missed.

We also study the frequency of false alarms across different ranking positions of G-hits within the file. Specifically, for each configuration file in ValidConfig dataset across all ten projects we evaluated, we track the frequency of LLMs mistakenly identifying the parameter with the i^{th} highest G-hits in each file, where $i = 1 \dots 8$. We group the results by the model family as shown in Figure 9. The distributions reveal a clear skewness towards parameters with higher G-hits, indicating that LLMs are more prone to report false alarms on popular parameters.

The biases can be attributed to the training data of LLMs, which are from public domains easily accessible by search engines like Google. Topics or parameters that are popularly discussed are more likely to be memorized by the LLMs, due to more frequent presence in the training data. So, for configuration validation, LLMs can be less effective for parameters that are not commonly referenced online.

VI. THREATS TO VALIDITY

External threats. External threats come from evaluated projects, datasets, and LLMs. To mitigate threats of evaluated projects, we select ten mature, widely used projects of different types. These systems are commonly used in prior studies [21], [33], [58], [71], [72], [76], [77]. To account for bias in

the evaluated configuration data, we include many types of configuration parameters and their generation rules based on prior work [24], [26]–[28]. Our results cannot generalize to misconfigurations of different types, such as environment-related misconfigurations (discussed in §VII). Moreover, we evaluate Ciri with eight state-of-the-art LLMs to mitigate threats on evaluated models. We expect the overall trend to be general, but the precise numbers may vary with other LLMs, projects, and configuration data in the field.

Internal threats. The internal threats lie in potential bugs in the implementation of Ciri, and experimental scripts for evaluation. We have rigorously reviewed our code and multiple authors cross-validated the experiment results.

Construct threats. The threats to construct validity mainly lie in metrics (§IV-B). To reduce such threats, we use the popular F1-score, precision, and recall, and define our confusion matrices at both configuration file and parameter levels.

VII. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK

Detecting multiple misconfigurations in one file. In principle, Ciri can find multiple misconfigurations as its design (such as prompt and voting) is not specific to a single parameter. For example, the prompt asks for a list of erroneous configuration parameters instead of one parameter. Our evaluation focuses on one misconfiguration, as it is reported that 59.2%–83.0% of parameter misconfigurations can be attributed to a single parameter [9]. We further conduct an experiment where we inject multiple errors in the target configuration file, ranging from two to four. The experiment is done on HCommon (the project with the largest dataset) using Claude-3-Sonnet. The results show an F1 score of 0.72 and 0.74 when the number of misconfigurations per file is 2 and 4, respectively. Specifically, Ciri detected nearly all misconfigurations within a file when the misconfigurations were in the Syntax and Range categories.

Improving effectiveness of LLMs as validators. Despite the promising results, using LLMs directly as configuration validators like Ciri is a starting point to harness the ability of LLMs for configuration validation. Specifically, there are circumstances where LLMs show limitations and biases (§V-C, §V-D). One intricate aspect of configuration validation is understanding configuration dependencies. Integrating LLMs with configuration dependency analysis [58] could be beneficial.

We plan to investigate advanced prompting techniques, such as Chain-of-Thoughts (CoT) [48], [54], [78]. For configuration validation, CoT prompting can potentially mimic the reasoning process of a human expert. By eliciting LLMs to generate intermediate reasoning steps toward the validation results, it makes the validation more transparent and potentially more accurate. We also plan to explore extending Ciri into a multi-agent framework, where Ciri can interact with additional tools such as Ctest [21] and Cdep [58] through agent frameworks such as LangChain [79] and AutoGen [80].

Lastly, integrating user feedback loops can be valuable. With user feedback on validation results, the iterative procedure can refine LLMs over time, leading to more accurate responses.

Detecting environment-related misconfigurations. While our study primarily targets misconfigurations that are common in the field, the validity of configuration files can vary across deployment environments. For instance, a configuration parameter can specify a file path, so the file’s existence, permission, and content decide its validity. To address such configurations, LLMs can be used to generate environment-specific scripts to run in the target environment. For example, given the configuration file as input, the LLM can generate Python scripts as simple tests as follows.

```
try:
    with open("/path/to/file", "r") as f:
        data = json.loads(f.read())
        print("Valid configuration")
except:
    print("Invalid configuration")
```

Such LLM-generated scripts can help identify issues like misconfigured paths, unreachable addresses, missing packages, or invalid permissions. Notably, these scripts offer a lightweight alternative to configuration tests [22], [71].

Detecting source-code related misconfigurations. Many misconfigurations are rooted in the interactions between configuration values and the code that consumes them [21], [72], [81]. We have explored augmenting LLMs with code snippets (Finding 5), which can reveal parameter types and semantics. This approach can be further improved by integrating advanced program analysis to present both configuration and relevant source code to the LLM. Techniques like static or dynamic program slicing [20], [25], [77], [82] can help identify the relevant code. Such approach is specifically important for configurations like feature flags [19], [75], [83], [84], where bugs are often not located in changed configurations but manifested through code paths enabled by the new configurations.

Detecting domain-specific misconfigurations. We mainly explored LLM-empowered validation for common types of software configurations (see §IV). Domain-specific configurations such as access-control, security configuration [65], [85]–[87], and network configuration [88]–[91] need more domain-knowledge for reasoning and rely more on system/network states and environments, and thus are more challenging to validate. We believe that LLMs can be useful components if sufficient inputs and guidance are provided.

Fine-tuning LLMs for configuration validation. We also plan to explore fine-tuning to tackle system-specific configuration problems, which is hard to address with common-sense knowledge. Specifically, configuration related software evolution is prevalent, which introduces new parameters and changes the semantics and constraints of existing parameters [32], [33]. A promising solution is to fine-tune LLMs on new code and data, and make LLMs evolution-aware.

VIII. RELATED WORK

Prior studies developed frameworks for developers to implement validators [1], [14]–[16] and test cases [21], [22], as well as techniques to extract configuration constraints [18]–[20],

[24]. However, manually writing validators and tests requires extensive engineering efforts, and is hard to comprehensively cover various properties of different configurations [24]–[28]. ML/NLP-based configuration validation techniques have been investigated to reduce the cost. Traditional ML/NLP-based approaches learn correctness rules from configuration data [34]–[37], [39], [41], [43], [44] and documents [38], [40] and then use the learned rules to conduct validation. However, these techniques often face data challenges and rely on predefined learning features and models, making them hard to generalize to different projects and deployment scenarios. We explore using LLMs for configuration validation, which can potentially address the limitations of traditional ML/NLP-based techniques towards automatic, effective configuration validation solutions.

In addition to proactive configuration validation, misconfigurations troubleshooting is a related area and has been under active research [36], [77], [82], [92]–[99]. Traditional approaches analyze failure symptoms, runtime executions and system states to reason about root causes in configuration or program code. Recent work on LLM-empowered root cause analysis [100]–[103] shows promise in leveraging LLMs to reason about failures based on symptoms and execution traces. The high-level principle may apply to troubleshooting misconfigurations as failure root causes. A recent work has explored this direction [104].

IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS

As a first step to harvest LLMs for software configuration, we develop Ciri as an open platform to experiment with LLMs as configuration validators, and present the important design choices. Through Ciri, we analyze LLM-empowered configuration validators. Our analysis shows the potential of using LLMs for configuration validation—Ciri demonstrates the effectiveness of state-of-the-art LLMs as configuration validators for common types of misconfigurations. Despite the encouraging results, our study reveals the limitations of directly using LLMs as configuration validators: they are limited to a few types of misconfigurations they can validate, and they are ineffective in detecting misconfigurations that violate dependencies and version-related misconfigurations, meanwhile inducing biases to popular parameters. We hope that our work shed light on further research of using LLMs for software configuration research.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments. We thank Darko Marinov, Shuai Wang, Chen Wang, and Mandana Vaziri for the valuable discussion and feedback. This work was supported in part by NSF CNS-2145295, a gift from Microsoft, and a grant from the IBM-Illinois Discovery Accelerator Institute (IIDAI).

REFERENCES

- [1] C. Tang, T. Kooburat, P. Venkatachalam, A. Chander, Z. Wen, A. Narayanan, P. Dowell, and R. Karl, “Holistic Configuration Management at Facebook,” in *SOSP*, 2015.

- [2] B. Maurer, "Fail at Scale: Reliability in the Face of Rapid Change," *Communications of the ACM*, vol. 58, no. 11, 2015.
- [3] L. A. Barroso, U. Hölzle, and P. Ranganathan, *The Datacenter as a Computer: Designing Warehouse-Scale Machines*, 3rd ed. Morgan and Claypool Publishers, 2018.
- [4] A. Sherman, P. Lisiecki, A. Berkheimer, and J. Wein, "ACMS: Akamai Configuration Management System," in *NSDI*, 2005.
- [5] S. Mehta, R. Bhagwan, R. Kumar, B. Ashok, C. Bansal, C. Maddila, C. Bird, S. Asthana, and A. Kumar, "Rex: Preventing Bugs and Misconfiguration in Large Services using Correlated Change Analysis," in *NSDI*, 2020.
- [6] B. Beyer, N. R. Murphy, D. K. Rensin, K. Kawahara, and S. Thorne, *Site Reliability Workbook: Practical Ways to Implement SRE*. O'Reilly Media Inc., 2018.
- [7] M. Sayagh, N. Kerzazi, B. Adams, and F. Petrillo, "Software Configuration Engineering in Practice: Interviews, Surveys, and Systematic Literature Review," *TSE*, vol. 46, no. 6, 2018.
- [8] H. S. Gunawi, M. Hao, R. O. Suminto, A. Laksono, A. D. Satria, J. Adityatama, and K. J. Eliazar, "Why Does the Cloud Stop Computing? Lessons from Hundreds of Service Outages," in *SOCC*, 2016.
- [9] Z. Yin, X. Ma, J. Zheng, Y. Zhou, L. N. Bairavasundaram, and S. Pasupathy, "An Empirical Study on Configuration Errors in Commercial and Open Source Systems," in *SOSP*, 2011.
- [10] T. Xu and Y. Zhou, "Systems Approaches to Tackling Configuration Errors: A Survey," *ACM Computing Surveys*, vol. 47, no. 4, 2015.
- [11] D. Oppenheimer, A. Ganapathi, and D. A. Patterson, "Why Do Internet Services Fail, and What Can Be Done About It?" in *USITS*, 2003.
- [12] S. Kendrick, "What Takes Us Down?" *USENIX ;login:*, 2012.
- [13] A. Rabkin and R. Katz, "How Hadoop Clusters Break," *IEEE Software Magazine*, 2013.
- [14] M. Raab and G. Barany, "Challenges in Validating FLOSS Configuration," in *OSS*, 2017.
- [15] S. Baset, S. Suneja, N. Bila, O. Tuncer, and C. Isci, "Usable Declarative Configuration Specification and Validation for Applications, Systems, and Cloud," in *Middleware*, 2017.
- [16] P. Huang, W. J. Bolosky, A. Sigh, and Y. Zhou, "ConfValley: A Systematic Configuration Validation Framework for Cloud Services," in *EuroSys*, 2015.
- [17] L. Leuschner, M. Küttler, T. Stumpf, C. Baier, H. Härtig, and S. Klüppelholz, "Towards Automated Configuration of Systems with Non-Functional Constraints," in *HotOS-XVI*, 2017.
- [18] X. Liao, S. Zhou, S. Li, Z. Jia, X. Liu, and H. He, "Do You Really Know How to Configure Your Software? Configuration Constraints in Source Code May Help," *IEEE Transactions on Reliability*, vol. 67, no. 3, 2018.
- [19] S. Nadi, T. Berger, C. Kästner, and K. Czarnecki, "Where Do Configuration Constraints Stem From? An Extraction Approach and an Empirical Study," *TSE*, 2015.
- [20] J. Zhang, R. Piskac, E. Zhai, and T. Xu, "Static Detection of Silent Misconfigurations with Deep Interaction Analysis," in *OOPSLA*, 2021.
- [21] X. Sun, R. Cheng, J. Chen, E. Ang, O. Legunsen, and T. Xu, "Testing Configuration Changes in Context to Prevent Production Failures," in *OSDI*, 2020.
- [22] T. Xu and O. Legunsen, "Configuration Testing: Testing Configuration Values as Code and with Code," *arXiv:1905.12195*, 2019.
- [23] S. Wang, X. Lian, Q. Li, D. Marinov, and T. Xu, "Ctest4J: A Practical Configuration Testing Framework for Java," in *FSE (Demo)*, 2024.
- [24] T. Xu, J. Zhang, P. Huang, J. Zheng, T. Sheng, D. Yuan, Y. Zhou, and S. Pasupathy, "Do Not Blame Users for Misconfigurations," in *SOSP*, 2013.
- [25] T. Xu, X. Jin, P. Huang, Y. Zhou, S. Lu, L. Jin, and S. Pasupathy, "Early Detection of Configuration Errors to Reduce Failure Damage," in *OSDI*, 2016.
- [26] S. Li, W. Li, X. Liao, S. Peng, S. Zhou, Z. Jia, and T. Wang, "ConfVD: System Reactions Analysis and Evaluation Through Misconfiguration Injection," *IEEE Transactions on Reliability*, vol. 67, no. 4, 2018.
- [27] L. Keller, P. Upadhyaya, and G. Candea, "ConfErr: A Tool for Assessing Resilience to Human Configuration Errors," in *DSN*, 2008.
- [28] W. Li, Z. Jia, S. Li, Y. Zhang, T. Wang, E. Xu, J. Wang, and X. Liao, "Challenges and Opportunities: An In-Depth Empirical Study on Configuration Error Injection Testing," in *ISSTA*, 2021.
- [29] T. Wang, H. He, X. Liu, S. Li, Z. Jia, Y. Jiang, Q. Liao, and W. Li, "ConfTainter: Static Taint Analysis For Configuration Options," in *ASE*, 2023.
- [30] T. Wang, Z. Jia, S. Li, S. Zheng, Y. Yu, E. Xu, S. Peng, and X. Liao, "Understanding and Detecting On-the-Fly Configuration Bugs," in *ICSE*, 2023.
- [31] T. Xu, L. Jin, X. Fan, Y. Zhou, S. Pasupathy, and R. Talwadekar, "Hey, You Have Given Me Too Many Knobs! Understanding and Dealing with Over-Designed Configuration in System Software," in *ESEC/FSE*, 2015.
- [32] S. Zhang and M. D. Ernst, "Which Configuration Option Should I Change?" in *ICSE*, 2014.
- [33] Y. Zhang, H. He, O. Legunsen, S. Li, W. Dong, and T. Xu, "An Evolutionary Study of Configuration Design and Implementation in Cloud Systems," in *ICSE*, 2021.
- [34] R. Bhagwan, S. Mehta, A. Radhakrishna, and S. Garg, "Learning Patterns in Configuration," in *ASE*, 2021.
- [35] J. Zhang, L. Renganarayana, X. Zhang, N. Ge, V. Bala, T. Xu, and Y. Zhou, "EnCore: Exploiting System Environment and Correlation Information for Misconfiguration Detection," in *ASPLOS*, 2014.
- [36] H. J. Wang, J. C. Platt, Y. Chen, R. Zhang, and Y.-M. Wang, "Automatic Misconfiguration Troubleshooting with PeerPressure," in *OSDI*, 2004.
- [37] F. Le, S. Lee, T. Wong, H. S. Kim, and D. Newcomb, "Minerals: Using Data Mining to Detect Router Misconfigurations," Carnegie Mellon University, Tech. Rep. CMU-CyLab-06-008, 2006.
- [38] C. Xiang, H. Huang, A. Yoo, Y. Zhou, and S. Pasupathy, "PracExtractor: Extracting Configuration Good Practices from Manuals to Detect Server Misconfigurations," in *ATC*, 2020.
- [39] N. Palatin, A. Leizarowitz, A. Schuster, and R. Wolff, "Mining for Misconfigured Machines in Grid Systems," in *KDD*, 2006.
- [40] R. Potharaju, J. Chan, L. Hu, C. Nita-Rotaru, M. Wang, L. Zhang, and N. Jain, "ConfSeer: Leveraging Customer Support Knowledge Bases for Automated Misconfiguration Detection," in *Vldb*, 2015.
- [41] Y.-M. Wang, C. Verbowski, J. Dunagan, Y. Chen, H. J. Wang, C. Yuan, and Z. Zhang, "STRIDER: A Black-box, State-based Approach to Change and Configuration Management and Support," in *LISA*, 2003.
- [42] E. Kiciman and Y.-M. Wang, "Discovering Correctness Constraints for Self-Management of System Configuration," in *ICAC*, 2004.
- [43] M. Santolucito, E. Zhai, and R. Piskac, "Probabilistic Automated Language Learning for Configuration Files," in *CAV*, 2016.
- [44] M. Santolucito, E. Zhai, R. Dhodapkar, A. Shim, and R. Piskac, "Synthesizing Configuration File Specifications with Association Rule Learning," in *OOPSLA*, 2017.
- [45] Q. Huang, H. J. Wang, and N. Borisov, "Privacy-Preserving Friends Troubleshooting Network," in *NDSS*, 2005.
- [46] "ChatGPT," <https://openai.com/blog/chatgpt>, 2022.
- [47] "Codex," <https://openai.com/blog/openai-codex>, 2022.
- [48] J. Wei, X. Wang, D. Schuurmans, M. Bosma, B. Ichter, F. Xia, E. Chi, Q. Le, and D. Zhou, "Chain-of-Thought Prompting Elicits Reasoning in Large Language Models," *arXiv:2201.11903*, 2023.
- [49] J. Huang and K. C.-C. Chang, "Towards Reasoning in Large Language Models: A Survey," in *Findings of ACL*, 2023.
- [50] Y. Bang, S. Cahyawijaya, N. Lee, W. Dai, D. Su, B. Wilie, H. Lovenia, Z. Ji, T. Yu, W. Chung *et al.*, "A Multitask, Multilingual, Multimodal Evaluation of ChatGPT on Reasoning, Hallucination, and Interactivity," *arXiv:2302.04023*, 2023.
- [51] Y. Zhang, Y. Li, L. Cui, D. Cai, L. Liu, T. Fu, X. Huang, E. Zhao, Y. Zhang, Y. Chen *et al.*, "Siren's Song in the AI Ocean: A Survey on Hallucination in Large Language Models," *arXiv:2309.01219*, 2023.
- [52] Anthropic, "Introducing 100K Context Windows," <https://www.anthropic.com/index/100k-context-windows>, 2023.
- [53] R. Nakano, J. Hilton, S. Balaji, J. Wu, L. Ouyang, C. Kim, C. Hesse, S. Jain, V. Kosaraju, W. Saunders, X. Jiang, K. Cobbe, T. Eloundou, G. Krueger, K. Button, M. Knight, B. Chess, and J. Schulman, "WebGPT: Browser-Assisted Question-Answering With Human Feedback," *arXiv:2112.09332*, 2022.
- [54] X. Wang, J. Wei, D. Schuurmans, Q. Le, E. Chi, S. Narang, A. Chowdhery, and D. Zhou, "Self-Consistency Improves Chain of Thought Reasoning in Language Models," *arXiv:2203.11171*, 2023.
- [55] Y. Liu, Y. Yao, J.-F. Ton, X. Zhang, R. Guo, H. Cheng, Y. Klovchov, M. F. Taufiq, and H. Li, "Trustworthy LLMs: a Survey and Guideline for Evaluating Large Language Models' Alignment," *arXiv:2308.05374*, 2023.
- [56] P. Manakul, A. Liusie, and M. J. F. Gales, "SelfCheckGPT: Zero-Resource Black-Box Hallucination Detection for Generative Large Language Models," *arXiv:2303.08896*, 2023.

- [57] D. M. Ziegler, N. Stiennon, J. Wu, T. B. Brown, A. Radford, D. Amodei, P. Christiano, and G. Irving, "Fine-tuning language models from human preferences," *arXiv:1909.08593*, 2019.
- [58] Q. Chen, T. Wang, O. Legunsen, S. Li, and T. Xu, "Understanding and Discovering Software Configuration Dependencies in Cloud and Datacenter Systems," in *ESEC/FSE*, 2020.
- [59] T. Brown, B. Mann, N. Ryder, M. Subbiah, J. D. Kaplan, P. Dhariwal, A. Neelakantan, P. Shyam, G. Sastry, A. Askell *et al.*, "Language Models Are Few-Shot Learners," *arXiv:2005.14165*, 2020.
- [60] OpenAI, "GPT-4 Technical Report," *arXiv:2303.08774*, 2023.
- [61] B. Rozière, J. Gehring, F. Gloeckle, S. Sootla, I. Gat, X. E. Tan, Y. Adi, J. Liu, R. Sauvestre, T. Remez, J. Rapin, A. Kozhevnikov, I. Evtimov, J. Bitton, M. Bhatt, C. C. Ferrer, A. Grattafiori, W. Xiong, A. Défossez, J. Copet, F. Azhar, H. Touvron, L. Martin, N. Usunier, T. Scialom, and G. Synnaeve, "Code Llama: Open Foundation Models for Code," 2024.
- [62] P. Lewis, E. Perez, A. Piktus, F. Petroni, V. Karpukhin, N. Goyal, H. Küttler, M. Lewis, W. tau Yih, T. Rocktäschel, S. Riedel, and D. Kiela, "Retrieval-Augmented Generation for Knowledge-Intensive NLP Tasks," *arXiv:2005.11401*, 2021.
- [63] K. Guu, K. Lee, Z. Tung, P. Pasupat, and M.-W. Chang, "REALM: Retrieval-Augmented Language Model Pre-Training," *arXiv:2002.08909*, 2020.
- [64] "Openctest," <https://github.com/xlab-uiuc/openctest>, 2020.
- [65] T. Xu, H. M. Naing, L. Lu, and Y. Zhou, "How Do System Administrators Resolve Access-Denied Issues in the Real World?" in *CHI*, 2017.
- [66] T. Xu, V. Pandey, and S. Klemmer, "An HCI View of Configuration Problems," *arXiv:1601.01747*, 2016.
- [67] D. Adiwardana, M.-T. Luong, D. R. So, J. Hall, N. Fiedel, R. Thoppilan, Z. Yang, A. Kulshreshtha, G. Nemade, Y. Lu *et al.*, "Towards a Human-Like Open-Domain Chatbot," *arXiv:2001.09977*, 2020.
- [68] O.-M. Camburu, B. Shillingford, P. Minervini, T. Lukasiewicz, and P. Blunsom, "Make Up Your Mind! Adversarial Generation of Inconsistent Natural Language Explanations," *arXiv:1910.03065*, 2019.
- [69] Y. Elazar, N. Kassner, S. Ravfogel, A. Ravichander, E. Hovy, H. Schütze, and Y. Goldberg, "Measuring and Improving Consistency in Pretrained Language Models," *arXiv:2102.01017*, 2021.
- [70] Wikipedia, "Tf-idf," <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tf%2E%80%93idf>, 2024.
- [71] R. Cheng, L. Zhang, D. Marinov, and T. Xu, "Test-Case Prioritization for Configuration Testing," in *ISSTA*, 2021.
- [72] S. Wang, X. Lian, D. Marinov, and T. Xu, "Test Selection for Unified Regression Testing," in *ICSE*, 2023.
- [73] T. Xu and D. Marinov, "Mining Container Image Repositories for Software Configurations and Beyond," in *ICSE-NIER*, 2018.
- [74] S. Min, X. Lyu, A. Holtzman, M. Artetxe, M. Lewis, H. Hajishirzi, and L. Zettlemoyer, "Rethinking the Role of Demonstrations: What Makes In-Context Learning Work?" *arXiv:2202.12837*, 2022.
- [75] J. Meinicke, C.-P. Wong, C. Kästner, T. Thüm, and G. Saake, "On Essential Configuration Complexity: Measuring Interactions in Highly-Configurable Systems," in *ASE*, 2016.
- [76] A. Rabkin and R. Katz, "Static Extraction of Program Configuration Options," in *ICSE*, 2011.
- [77] —, "Precomputing Possible Configuration Error Diagnosis," in *ASE*, 2011.
- [78] Z. Zhang, A. Zhang, M. Li, and A. Smola, "Automatic Chain of Thought Prompting in Large Language Models," *arXiv:2210.03493*, 2022.
- [79] "Langchain," <https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain>, 2022.
- [80] Q. Wu, G. Bansal, J. Zhang, Y. Wu, B. Li, E. Zhu, L. Jiang, X. Zhang, S. Zhang, J. Liu, A. H. Awadallah, R. W. White, D. Burger, and C. Wang, "AutoGen: Enabling Next-Gen LLM Applications via Multi-Agent Conversation," *arXiv:2308.08155*, 2023.
- [81] J. T. Gu, X. Sun, W. Zhang, Y. Jiang, C. Wang, M. Vaziri, O. Legunsen, and T. Xu, "Acto: Automatic End-to-End Testing for Operation Correctness of Cloud System Management," in *SOSP*, 2023.
- [82] M. Attariyan and J. Flinn, "Automating Configuration Troubleshooting With Dynamic Information Flow Analysis," in *OSDI*, 2010.
- [83] H.-C. Kuo, J. Chen, S. Mohan, and T. Xu, "Set the Configuration for the Heart of the OS: On the Practicality of Operating System Kernel Debloating," in *Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGMETRICS Conference (SIGMETRICS'20)*, June 2020.
- [84] J. Meinicke, C.-P. Wong, B. Vasilescu, and C. Kästner, "Exploring Differences and Commonalities between Feature Flags and Configuration Options," in *ICSE SEIP*, 2020.
- [85] C. Xiang, Y. Wu, B. Shen, M. Shen, H. Huang, T. Xu, Y. Zhou, C. Moore, X. Jin, and T. Sheng, "Towards Continuous Access Control Validation and Forensics," in *CCS*, 2019.
- [86] M. A. Inam, W. U. Hassan, A. Ahad, A. Bates, R. Tahir, T. Xu, and F. Zaffar, "Forensic Analysis of Configuration-based Attacks," in *NDSS*, 2022.
- [87] J. Jia, Y. Zhu, D. Williams, A. Arcangeli, C. Canella, H. Franke, T. Feldman-Fitzthum, D. Skarlatos, D. Gruss, and T. Xu, "Programmable System Call Security with eBPF," *arXiv:2302.10366*, 2023.
- [88] T. Benson, A. Akella, and D. Maltz, "Unraveling the Complexity of Network Management," in *NSDI*, 2009.
- [89] R. Mahajan, D. Wetherall, and T. Anderson, "Understanding BGP Misconfiguration," in *SIGCOMM'02*, 2002.
- [90] T. Benson, A. Akella, and A. Shaikh, "Demystifying Configuration Challenges and Trade-Offs in Network-based ISP Services," in *SIGCOMM*, 2011.
- [91] A. Fogel, S. Fung, L. Pedrosa, M. Walraed-Sullivan, R. Govindan, R. Mahajan, and T. Millstein, "A General Approach to Network Configuration Analysis," in *NSDI*, 2015.
- [92] Attariyan, Mona and Chow, Michael and Flinn, Jason, "X-ray: Automating Root-Cause Diagnosis of Performance Anomalies in Production Software," in *OSDI*, 2012.
- [93] X. J. Ren, S. Wang, Z. Jin, D. Lion, A. Chiu, T. Xu, and D. Yuan, "Relational Debugging — Pinpointing Root Causes of Performance Problems," in *OSDI*, 2023.
- [94] S. Zhang and M. D. Ernst, "Automated Diagnosis of Software Configuration Errors," in *ICSE*, 2013.
- [95] —, "Proactive Detection of Inadequate Diagnostic Messages for Software Configuration Errors," in *ISSTA*, 2015.
- [96] A. Whitaker, R. S. Cox, and S. D. Gribble, "Configuration Debugging as Search: Finding the Needle in the Haystack," in *OSDI*, 2004.
- [97] Y.-Y. Su, M. Attariyan, and J. Flinn, "AutoBash: Improving Configuration Management with Operating System Causality Analysis," in *SOSP*, 2007.
- [98] C. Yuan, N. Lao, J.-R. Wen, J. Li, Z. Zhang, Y.-M. Wang, and W.-Y. Ma, "Automated Known Problem Diagnosis with Event Traces," in *EuroSys*, 2006.
- [99] Y.-M. Wang, C. Verbowski, and D. R. Simon, "Persistent-state Checkpoint Comparison for Troubleshooting Configuration Failures," 2003.
- [100] Y. Chen, H. Xie, M. Ma, Y. Kang, X. Gao, L. Shi, Y. Cao, X. Gao, H. Fan, M. Wen, J. Zeng, S. Ghosh, X. Zhang, C. Zhang, Q. Lin, S. Rajmohan, D. Zhang, and T. Xu, "Automatic Root Cause Analysis Via Large Language Models for Cloud Incidents," in *EuroSys*, 2024.
- [101] X. Zhang, S. Ghosh, C. Bansal, R. Wang, M. Ma, Y. Kang, and S. Rajmohan, "Automated Root Causing of Cloud Incidents using In-Context Learning with GPT-4," in *FSE Companion*, 2024.
- [102] D. Zhang, X. Zhang, C. Bansal, P. Las-Casas, R. Fonseca, and S. Rajmohan, "LM-PACE: Confidence Estimation by Large Language Models for Effective Root Causing of Cloud Incidents," in *FSE Companion*, 2024.
- [103] T. Ahmed, S. Ghosh, C. Bansal, T. Zimmermann, X. Zhang, and S. Rajmohan, "Recommending Root-Cause and Mitigation Steps for Cloud Incidents Using Large Language Models," in *ICSE*, 2023.
- [104] S. Shan, Y. Huo, Y. Su, Y. Li, D. Li, and Z. Zheng, "Face It Yourselves: An LLM-Based Two-Stage Strategy to Localize Configuration Errors via Logs," in *ISSTA*, 2024.