Social Ties and the Selection of China's Political Elite

Raymond Fisman[a] Jing Shi [b] Yongxiang Wang[c] Weixing Wu[c]

[a]Boston University

[b]Macquarie University

[c]University of Southern California and Shanghai Jiaotong University

[d]University of International Business and Economics

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

Content

- **Politburo**'s members are selected **every 5 years** from the members of the **Central Committee** of Chinese Communist Party.
- Central Committee's membership in turn is drawn from the top ranks of **provincial officers**, **top military leaders**, and **central government ministers**.
- While the Central Committee is **nominally** responsible for electing the Politburo, **in practice the Politburo itself is thought to have a decisive role** selecting new members.



Figure II

The Power Pyramid of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (2012–2017)

Content

- **Why shared backgrounds** may provide a leg up in the Politburo selection process?
  1. **Networks of loyalty** between senior political figures.
  2. Officials who have **worked with them**, are from the **same region** or studied at the **same university**.
  3. Officials who have **risen through the ranks** with their **patrons**.



Figure II

The Power Pyramid of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (2012–2017)

Content

- **Examine**: Whether Central Committee members who **share a hometown or college connection with an incumbent Politburo member** are **more likely to be elected to the next Politburo**, using data from the **postwar period**.
- **"Connections penalty"** : **In specifications that include fixed effects** to absorb quality differences across cities and colleges, we find that **hometown and college connections** are each associated with **5–9 percentage point reductions** in selection probability.
- **Examine the heterogeneity** in this "connections penalty" : This "connections penalty" is equally strong for retiring Politburo members, **arguing against quota-based explanations**, and it is much stronger for junior Politburo members, **consistent with a role for intra-factional competition**.

Content

- Our findings **differ from earlier work** because of our emphasis on **within-group variation**, and our **focus on shared hometown and college**, rather than shared workplace, connections.
- **Innovations**:
  1. Our work suggests a somewhat **different view** of the internal organization and promotion of China's leadership——"connections penalty" suggests the presence of forces within the government to **balance representation** in the Politburo.
  2. **Challenges in estimating** the effect of shared background on promotion, as well as **the range of potential interpretations**——far more complex than simply higher-level officials helping their friends climb the bureaucracy.

Overview

Background and Data

I. Background and Data

A. The Organization of the Chinese Polity

- **Central Committee** is a political body that comprises the **top leaders** of the Communist Party.
  - The **number** of Central Committee members fluctuates from term to term, it has had approximately 200 members in each term since the early 1970s.
  - **Membership**: **national leaders**, **chief officers**(e.g., the Organization Department and the Propaganda Department), **heads of ministries**, **provincial governors** and **party secretaries**, **chief military officers**, and **leaders from eight "People' s Organizations"** .
    - **Alternate members**: **lack voting rights**, serve as **replacements** for full members of the Central Committee who **die or are otherwise removed** from office during the term, themselves generally high-ranking provincial or city officials, are promoted to full membership at **relatively high rates**.
    - **Full members**: **eligible for Central Committee election** is **not well defined**, nor is the candidate list made public.

I. Background and Data

A. The Organization of the Chinese Polity

- **Politburo members**: 25 top leaders **selected from the membership of the Central Committee** at its first convening.
  - A small number of additional members are also elected during later Central Committee meetings to **replace Politburo members lost to death, removed due to corruption, or purged for political reasons** (especially during the Cultural Revolution).
  - we will **include all Politburo members selected at any point during a term as new members**, and will **code their connections** based on the composition of the Politburo at the time of selection.

I. Background and Data

A. The Organization of the Chinese Polity

- **Politburo selection follows a "single candidate election rule"**
  - **Nominally speaking**, the Central Committee is elected by the National Congress and the Politburo elected by the Central Committee.
  - **In practice**, the composition of both bodies is determined before any ballots are cast.
  - The process is **driven by the Politburo** (in particular the Standing Committee).
- **Central Committee from alternate to full membership.**
  - In the **early part** of our sample, the Central Committee "election" followed a **single candidate rule**.
  - While in 1987 the candidate list **expanded relative to the number of positions**, the "inner party democracy" that this introduced.
  - The process is conducted and controlled by the Politburo (Politburo Standing Committee forms a set of **search groups** which are sent across the country to identify promising candidates. **Winnowed down to a shorter "primary list"** that goes forward to **final selection**).

I. Background and Data

A. The Organization of the Chinese Polity

- **Summarize**:
  - The selection of the slate of formal Politburo nominees is **secretive**.
  - The incumbent Politburo **controls** the process.
  - **Similarly** controls the generation of the Central Committee candidate list.

I. Background and Data

B. Data

- Our analysis requires **background information** on the **full set of Central Committee members** (including the **small subset that are Politburo members**).
- **Database**: People's Daily Online list of Central Committee members.
  - **Information going back to** the **7th** term (1945-1956).
  - place of birth, year of birth, and detailed education and work history.
  - **Via** *Political Elites of the Communist Party of China*.
  - A few candidates from the **9th and 10th** term election cycles(1969-1973 and 1973-1977) **not contained** in the database, **instead** lower-level officials elected to the Central Committee.

I. Background and Data

B. Data

- **Main outcome measure**
  - **Elected** $_{it}$——an indicator variable denoting that candidate i was selected for term t of the Politburo.
  - **Elected** $_{it} = 1$——for all individuals elected during term t **regardless of when** during the term they are selected.
  - Politburo members at term t-1 are eligible for membership also at term t, we **omit** them from our analysis, as they are generally **reelected unless of retirement age**.

I. Background and Data

B. Data

- **Measure shared backgrounds between Central Committee members(full set) and incumbent Politburo members**
  - **CityTie=1**——candidate i for Politburo term t to be hometown-connected if there exists at least one Politburo member at term t-1. From the eighth term(1956-1969) onward (**lagged** observations of the Politburo), end with the nineteenth term(2017–2022).
  - **CollegeTie**——Central Committee and Politburo members' undergraduate institutions, for the 8th through 9th terms. Candidates **without** a college degree——CollegeTie = 0(highest level of education).
  - **Shared work background**——both worked in the same organization/department in the same prefecture.

I. Background and Data

B. Data

- **Controls**
  - **Military**——whether a Central Committee member is a military officer.
  - **4_Leaders**——an individual is the party secretary of one of the directly controlled municipalities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, or is the party secretary of Guangdong.
  - **Province**——provincial governors and party secretaries.
  - **Princeling**——whether any of the candidate's parents or parents-in-law ever served in the Politburo.
  - **Princeling**——whether any of the candidate's parents or parents-in-law ever served in the Politburo.
  - **hometown, workplace, and college fixed effects**—— capture average differences in the rate of Politburo selection **as a function of these background characteristics**.

I. Background and Data

B. Data

- **Sample——1,273 distinct candidates**
  - 654（appear only once），409（twice），210（three or more times）.
  - **PriorCandidacies——the number of previous terms an individual appeared as a (non-Politburo) member** of the Central Committee.
  - Longer tenured Central Committee members，higher likelihood of success.

Table 1—Summary Statistics

Varible name	Mean	SD	Observations
Elected to Politburo ①	0.070	0.256	2,176
CityTie	0.173	0.378	2,176
CollegeTie	0.113 ②	0.316	2,176
WorkTie	0.559	0.497	2,176
CityorCollegeTie	0.260	0.439	2,176
log(Age)	4.052	0.142	2,176
PriorCandidacies	0.601	0.871	2,176
Provincial	0.226	0.418	2,176
Military	0.201	0.401	2,176
4_Leaders	0.012	0.111	2,176
Princeling	0.016	0.126	2,176
Male	0.942	0.234	2,176
College	0.720 ②	0.449	2,176
Master	0.210	0.407	2,176
Doctor	0.067	0.250	2,176

I. Background and Data

B. Data

- **Some patterns in the data**
  - **College attendance**. e.g. Tsinghua University: Politburo members(12.2%). Central Committee candidates(5%). **Positive selection** on education as one rises through the bureaucracy.
  - **Work histories**. e.g. Xi. Individuals on a fast track through the bureaucracy **will be assigned to more prestigious postings in expectation of rapid promotion**.
  - **Hierarchical ranking of birthplace prefectures**. e.g. Huang Gang prefecture, Changsha, Shanghai.

Table 2—Difference in Mean Politburo Election Rates by Connection Status

	Fraction elected to Politburo						
	Tie = 1			Tie = 0			
	Observations	Mean	SD	Observations	Mean	SD	Difference
CityTie	376	0.0798	0.2713	1,800	0.0683	0.2524	0.0115 (0.0145)
CollegeTie	245	0.0898	0.2865	1,279	0.0696	0.2545	0.0202 (0.0181)
WorkTie	1,217	0.0945	0.2926	959	0.0396	0.1952	0.0549*** (0.0110)

Results

II. Results

$$\text{Elected}_{it} = \beta \times \text{Connection}_{it}^{c} + \gamma_c + \omega_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

- Connection $_{\text{it}}^{c}$ ——candidate i was connected to at least one incumbent Politburo member via connection type. $c \in \{$ CityTie, CollegeTie, WorkTie $\}$.
- 219 hometown fixed effects. 264 college fixed effects. 305 workplace fixed effects.
- ω_t——term fixed effect.
- ϵ_{it}——an error term clustered at the candidate-level.

II. Results

- Column 1: 6.20% points less likely.
- Column 2: 10.90% points less likely.
- Column 3: Reject. As a result of the very common career trajectories of leading politicians. Relative unimportance of shared work background.

Table 3—Politburo Ties and Candidate Election Probability

	Elected to Politburo							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
CityTie	−0.062***				−0.051***			
	(0.021)				(0.019)			
CollegeTie		−0.109***				−0.093***		
		(0.038)				(0.034)		
WorkTie			−0.003				−0.004	
			(0.013)				(0.013)	
CityorCollegeTie				−0.074***				−0.069***
				(0.023)				(0.022)
Individual controls					Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Term fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hometown fixed effects	Yes			Yes	Yes			Yes
College fixed effects		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Workplace fixed effects			Yes				Yes	
Observations	2,118	1,357	2,176	1,954	2,118	1,357	2,176	1,954
R^2	0.109	0.209	0.305	0.234	0.212	0.327	0.386	0.311

II. Results

- Column 4: CityorCollegeTie——either CityTie = 1 or CollegeTie = 1. 0.074.
- Columns 5–8: Include additional candidate-level controls.

Table 3—Politburo Ties and Candidate Election Probability

	Elected to Politburo							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
CityTie	−0.062***				−0.051***			
	(0.021)				(0.019)			
CollegeTie		−0.109***				−0.093***		
		(0.038)				(0.034)		
WorkTie			−0.003				−0.004	
			(0.013)				(0.013)	
CityorCollegeTie				−0.074***				−0.069***
				(0.023)				(0.022)
Individual controls					Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Term fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hometown fixed effects	Yes			Yes	Yes			Yes
College fixed effects		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Workplace fixed effects			Yes				Yes	
Observations	2,118	1,357	2,176	1,954	2,118	1,357	2,176	1,954
R^2	0.109	0.209	0.305	0.234	0.212	0.327	0.386	0.311

II. Results

- **One concern** is that the **inclusion of group fixed effects** may create a **mechanical negative relationship between connections and selection**.
- A group: term t—no connections ==> term t+1—connections.
- **This bias may be exacerbated** by the fixed effects, which emphasize the within-group variation in connections.
- Analyze a **subsample of the data** that includes only the candidate-term observations when an individual **first appears** in the Central Committee.

II. Results

- The connections penalty for hometown and college ties are somewhat diminished.

Table 4—Politburo Ties and First-Time Candidate Election Probability

	Elected to Politburo							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
CityTie	−0.036**				−0.040**			
	(0.017)				(0.016)			
CollegeTie		−0.054*				−0.050*		
		(0.028)				(0.026)		
WorkTie			0.020				0.013	
			(0.013)				(0.012)	
CityorCollegeTie				−0.063***				−0.063***
				(0.021)				(0.021)
Individual controls					Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Term fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hometown fixed effects	Yes			Yes	Yes			Yes
College fixed effects		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Workplace fixed effects			Yes				Yes	
Observations	1,166	582	1,270	839	1,166	582	1,270	839
R^2	0.196	0.251	0.494	0.328	0.291	0.366	0.594	0.352

Heterogeneity in the Connections Penalty

III. Heterogeneity in the Connections Penalty

A. Potential Explanations for the Connections Penalty

- Describe **three main classes of explanations** for the connections penalty:
  - **1. Anti-Factionalist Ideology**: Given Mao's particularly strong anti-factionalist writings, variation in the strength of the connections penalty over time.
  - **2. Intra-Group Competition**:
    - Politburo members with shared backgrounds may compete for status and resources.
    - Competition is **more intense** among individuals within a group at more comparable levels of **seniority**. **Less concerned** with the promotion.
    - A **stronger connection penalty** for **non-PSC connections** relative to PSC connections.

III. Heterogeneity in the Connections Penalty

A. Potential Explanations for the Connections Penalty

- Describe **three main classes of explanations** for the connections penalty:
  - **3. Quotas or Inter-Group Competition**
    - **Limit any individual faction** within the government from gaining **too much power**.
    - **Already-prevalent groups** should have a **higher connections penalty**.
    - Look at **heterogeneity based on the prevalence of groups**: whether a group has more than one member, or is the largest group.
    - **Compare** the penalty from connections to **incumbents who remain in the new Politburo**, versus **members who retire**(not affect quotas or between-group power-sharing) when the new Politburo is formed.

III. Heterogeneity in the Connections Penalty

B. Heterogeneity in the Connections Penalty: Results

- Examining how the connections penalty varies as a function of the **seniority** of incumbent Politburo members.
- The larger penalty for connections to more junior Politburo members ——officials **within a group** viewing others at a comparable level as potential **competitors**.

Table 5—PSC and nonPSC Ties and Candidate Election Probability

	Elected to Politburo					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CityorCollegeTie_PSC	0.006			0.009		
	(0.039)			(0.035)		
CityorCollegeTie_nonPSC	−0.077***			−0.075***		
	(0.024)			(0.023)		
CityTie_PSC		0.008			−0.001	
		(0.046)			(0.034)	
CityTie_nonPSC		−0.082**			−0.060***	
		(0.028)			(0.021)	
CollegeTie_PSC			−0.064			−0.055
			(0.051)			(0.042)
CollegeTie_nonPSC			−0.099***			−0.080**
			(0.038)			(0.035)
Individual controls				Yes	Yes	Yes
Term fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hometown fixed effects	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
College fixed effects	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes
PSC = nonPSC (p-value)	0.071	0.105	0.606	0.044	0.147	0.667
Observations	1,954	1,954	1,357	1,954	2,118	1,357

III. Heterogeneity in the Connections Penalty

B. Heterogeneity in the Connections Penalty: Results

- **Quota-based explanations** for the connections penalty:
  - 1. A group's **prevalence** among Politburo incumbents.
  - column 1-3: Hometowns and colleges with two or more ties in a given term.
  - column 4-6: Candidates who **share their hometown with the most commonly represented hometown among Politburo incumbents** in a given term.

Table 6—Politburo Ties and Candidate Election Probability by Group Size

	Elected to Politburo					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CityorCollegeTie	−0.060***			−0.067***		
	(0.023)			(0.022)		
I(CityTies ≥ 2 ∪ CollegeTies ≥ 2)	−0.046					
	(0.043)					
CityTie		−0.046**			−0.051**	
		(0.020)			(0.020)	
I(CityTies ≥ 2)		−0.031				
		(0.052)				
CollegeTie			−0.085*			−0.087**
			(0.039)			(0.036)
I(CollegeTies ≥ 2)			−0.030			
			(0.049)			
LargestCityorCollegeTie				−0.017		
				(0.049)		
LargestCityTie					−0.004	
					(0.062)	
LargestCollegeTie						−0.032
						(0.056)
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Term fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hometown fixed effects	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
College fixed effects	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes
Observations	1,954	2,118	1,357	1,954	2,118	1,357

III. Heterogeneity in the Connections Penalty

B. Heterogeneity in the Connections Penalty: Results

- **Quota-based explanations** for the connections penalty:
  - 2. Whether incumbent Politburo member retires in the next term
  - Similar negative coef.cients for both retiring and non-retiring Politburo members

Table 7—Ties to Retiring versus Non-Retiring Politburo Members and Candidate Election Probability

	Elected to Politburo		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
CityorCollegeTie_Retire	−0.069**		
	(0.029)		
CityorCollegeTie_nonRetire	−0.069***		
	(0.025)		
CityTie_Retire		−0.064**	
		(0.025)	
CityTie_nonRetire		−0.038	
		(0.024)	
CollegeTie_Retire			−0.092**
			(0.042)
CollegeTie_nonRetire			−0.094**
			(0.037)
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Term fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hometown fixed effects	Yes	Yes	
College fixed effects	Yes		Yes
Observations	1,954	2,118	1,357
R^2	0.311	0.213	0.327

III. Heterogeneity in the Connections Penalty

B. Heterogeneity in the Connections Penalty: Results

- **Explore how the connections penalty varies over time**:
  - Column1-2: three (roughly equal) time periods: Mao (terms 7–11), Deng (terms 12–14), and postDeng (terms 15–19).
  - Column4-5: Jiang (terms 15 and 16), Hu (terms 17 and 18), and Xi (term 19).
  - The patterns over time indicate that the connections penalty was far stronger under Mao.

Table 8—Politburo Ties and Candidate Election Probability by Periods

	Elected to Politburo				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
CityorCollegeTie × Mao	−0.134***	−0.127***	−0.112***	−0.134***	−0.126**
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)
CityorCollegeTie × Deng	−0.034	−0.044	−0.049	−0.034	−0.044
	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.041)
CityorCollegeTie × postDeng	−0.063**	−0.050*	−0.051*		
	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.029)		
CityorCollegeTie × Jiang				−0.067	−0.057
				(0.048)	(0.045)
CityorCollegeTie × Hu				−0.065	−0.055
				(0.046)	(0.042)
CityorCollegeTie × Xi				−0.050	−0.020
				(0.068)	(0.064)
Individual controls		Yes	Yes		Yes
Individual controls × periods			Yes		
Term fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hometown fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
College fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mao = Deng (p-value)	0.038**	0.073*	0.220	0.039**	0.076*
Mao = postDeng (p-value)	0.113	0.071*	0.173		
Mao = (postDeng + Deng)/2 (p-value)	0.030**	0.035**	0.136		
Observations	1,954	1,954	1,954	1,954	1,954

Comparison to Earlier Estimates on Shared Background and Promotion

IV. Comparison to Earlier Estimates on Shared Background and Promotion

- Our results **stand in sharp contrast** to the connections benefit documented in **earlier work**.
- **Reproducing** the central result of earlier papers in our data.

Table 9—Summary of Previous Studies of Connection Benefits

	Francois et al. (2016)	Shih et al. (2012)	Jia et al. (2015)	Our paper
Sample and data				
Time period	13th–18th Congresses	12th–16th congress	1993–2009 (14th–17th)	8th–19th
Candidate sample	ACC through Politburo	ACC through PSC	Provincial leaders	CC (and ACC)
Variable construction				
Connection to	General secretary	General secretary	PSC	Politburo
Connected via	Shanghai and Youth League "gangs"	Hometown, college, and workplace overlap (aggregated)	Workplace overlap, college, and home province	Hometown and college
Promotions	ACC-CC-Politburo-PSC	ACC-CC-Politburo-PSC-GS	Politburo, Vice-Premier, State councilor	Politburo membership
Empirical approach				
Methodology	Reduced-form and model-based	Reduced-form and model-based	Reduced form	Reduced form
Identification of Social Tie effect	Difference-in-differences (based on GS turnover)	Cross-sectional	Cross-sectional	Within-group

Notes: We employ the following abbreviations in the table: ACC is Alternates of the Central Committee; CC is Central Committee; PSC is Politburo Standing Committee; GS is General Secretary. See the text for more details.

IV. Comparison to Earlier Estimates on Shared Background and Promotion

- Relative to shared city and college background, there is **a more positive pairwise association** between overlapping **work experiences** and Politburo selection.
- Workplace assignments are endogenous, and the result of an official's career potential.

Table A2—Politburo Ties and Candidate Election Probability: Further Worktie-Focused Specifications

	Elected to Politburo					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
WorkTie	0.071***		0.051***		−0.004	
	(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.013)	
WorkTie_PSC		0.084***		0.066***		0.007
		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.015)
Individual controls			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Term fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Workplace fixed effects					Yes	Yes
Observations	2,176	2,176	2,176	2,176	2,176	2,176
R^2	0.0221	0.0285	0.139	0.144	0.386	0.386

Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is an indicator variable denoting that the member of the Central Committee was elected to the Politburo. *WorkTie* is an indicator variable denoting that the candidate's worked at the same department in the same city at the same time as at least one Politburo member. The suffix PSC denotes connections to the Standing Committee.

IV. Comparison to Earlier Estimates on Shared Background and Promotion

- WorkTie , CityTie , or CollegeTie is equal to 1
- Relative to shared city and college background, there is **a more positive pairwise association** between overlapping **work experiences** and Politburo selection.
- Workplace assignments are endogenous, and the result of an official's career potential.

Table A3—Politburo Ties and Candidate Election Probability, Incorporating Work, College, and Hometown Ties

	Elected to Politburo					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
AnyTie	0.059***		0.042***		−0.022	
	(0.011)		(0.010)		(0.017)	
AnyTie_PSC		0.073***		0.060***		0.009
		(0.013)		(0.012)		(0.022)
Individual controls			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Term fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Workplace fixed effects					Yes	Yes
College fixed effects					Yes	Yes
Hometown fixed effects					Yes	Yes
Observations	2,176	2,176	2,176	2,176	1,954	1,954
R^2	0.0177	0.0243	0.137	0.142	0.534	0.534

IV. Comparison to Earlier Estimates on Shared Background and Promotion

- Further **isolate the role that group fixed effects** play in our estimated connections penalty.
- The extent to which our results differ because we **throw out between-group variation** entirely.

Table 10—Politburo Ties and Candidate Election Probability, Understanding the Role of Group Fixed Effects

	Elected to Politburo		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
CityorCollegeTie	0.007	−0.005	−0.063***
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.023)
Never-connected groups excluded		Yes	Yes
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Term fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hometown fixed effects			Yes
College fixed effects			Yes
Observations	2,176	1,456	1,324
R^2	0.132	0.129	0.308

IV. Comparison to Earlier Estimates on Shared Background and Promotion

- Further **isolate the role that group fixed effects** play in our estimated connections penalty.
- The extent to which our results differ because we **throw out between-group variation** entirely.

Table A4—Understanding the Role of Fixed Effects, Disaggregating City and College Ties

	Elected to Politburo					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CityTie	0.008		−0.025		−0.047**	
	(0.014)		(0.017)		(0.019)	
CollegeTie		0.011		0.013		−0.083**
		(0.018)		(0.021)		(0.035)
Never-connected groups excluded			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Term fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hometown fixed effects					Yes	
College fixed effects						Yes
Observations	2,176	1,524	1,174	873	1,174	839
R^2	0.132	0.17	0.133	0.158	0.172	0.277

IV. Comparison to Earlier Estimates on Shared Background and Promotion

- Consider whether **the level of candidates in the Party hierarchy** also affects our estimated connections penalty.
- Examine the role of shared background in the promotion of Central Committee **alternates** to **full membership in the Central Committee**.

Table A5—Politburo Ties and Promotion from Alternate to Full Central Committee Membership

	Promotion next term					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CityTie	0.034	−0.017				
	(0.027)	(0.034)				
CollegeTie			0.124	0.027		
			(0.044)	(0.074)		
CityorCollegeTie					0.065	−0.031
					(0.025)	(0.042)
Past terms					−0.043	0.051
					(0.015)	(0.021)
College	0.041	0.022			0.034	0.075
	(0.023)	(0.028)			(0.023)	(0.112)
Military	−0.268	−0.293	−0.302	−0.342	−0.263	−0.278
	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.058)	(0.016)	(0.039)
Master	−0.092	−0.081	−0.067	−0.110	−0.089	−0.100
	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.056)	(0.030)	(0.062)
Doctor	−0.036	−0.057	−0.047	−0.042	−0.036	0.014
	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.053)	(0.027)	(0.061)
Rank of popularity	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Term fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hometown fixed effects		Yes				Yes

IV. Comparison to Earlier Estimates on Shared Background and Promotion

- **Less systematic data available** on Central Committee alternates.
- Able to provide a direct measure of candidate popularity, based on **the number of votes** received during the Central Committee election.
- Central Committee alternates come from a somewhat **wider range of educational backgrounds** than those with full membership.

Table A5—Politburo Ties and Promotion from Alternate to Full Central Committee Membership

	Promotion next term					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CityTie	0.034	−0.017				
	(0.027)	(0.034)				
CollegeTie			0.124	0.027		
			(0.044)	(0.074)		
CityorCollegeTie					0.065	−0.031
					(0.025)	(0.042)
Past terms					−0.043	0.051
					(0.015)	(0.021)
College	0.041	0.022			0.034	0.075
	(0.023)	(0.028)			(0.023)	(0.112)
Military	−0.268	−0.293	−0.302	−0.342	−0.263	−0.278
	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.058)	(0.016)	(0.039)
Master	−0.092	−0.081	−0.067	−0.110	−0.089	−0.100
	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.056)	(0.030)	(0.062)
Doctor	−0.036	−0.057	−0.047	−0.042	−0.036	0.014
	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.053)	(0.027)	(0.061)
Rank of popularity	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Term fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Conclusion

V. Conclusion

- Among candidates for China's Politburo, those **with hometown or college ties to incumbent Politburo** members are less likely to be elected.
- We examine **heterogeneity** in the connections penalty, and observe that it is much **stronger** for ties to **more junior Politburo members**, which suggests that competition among officials with shared backgrounds may at least partly explain our main results.
- Observe a similar connections penalty for ties to **retiring and non-retiring Politburo members** argues against quota-based explanations.
- Contrast with those of **earlier papers**, use of **within-versus between-group variation**, can help to explain our findings of a connections penalty.