On Austin's License Plate Reader Policies

I don't love automated license-plate readers (ALPRs) for a lot of reasons, but I thought the way Austin, Texas is approaching the use of this technology (with Flock Safety) was worth highlighting.

Context & Criticism: ALPRs are generally considered “mass surveillance” by many, especially if they have long retention windows and (as many may have) opaque data sharing policies. When Austin relaunched its 40-camera ALPR pilot in March 2024, it confronted those objections head-on rather than abandoning the technology.

Transparency: Austin publishes near-real-time program metrics on an open Flock Safety portal—no login required (Austin, TX transparency page). As of late May 2025 the dashboard shows a seven-day retention clock, 40 owned cameras, 628k vehicles detected, 2,351 hot-list hits, 2,204 user searches in the last 30 days, and “External Organizations with Access: None.”

Ultra-Short Retention: By ordinance and contract, ALPR images and metadata are purged after seven days, the shortest window among Austin’s peer cities; any investigatory hold requires a formal preservation request and supervisory sign-off. Independent auditors have repeatedly highlighted this deletion rule as a best-practice differentiator.

Purpose & Use Limitation: Austin’s General Orders restrict automated alerts to stolen vehicles, felony-level warrants, AMBER/SILVER alerts, and designated hate or sex crimes—explicitly barring revenue collection, minor-offense round-ups, or immigration/reproductive-health inquiries. Any outside agency must sign the city’s ALPR Information-Sharing & Non-Disclosure Agreement, which hard-codes those same limits, prohibits First-Amendment targeting, and compels certified data destruction within a year or case closure.

Why This Matters: By combining public dashboards, a default-delete policy, and enforceable contractual guardrails, Austin transforms an often-criticized investigative tool into a narrowly scoped, auditable asset. The model directly addresses the three biggest ALPR concerns—indefinite storage, mission creep, and uncontrolled data sharing—without forfeiting the crime-reduction benefits residents expect.

Lessons for Other Jurisdictions: Publish your numbers so the community can judge scale; make “delete” the default so investigators must act promptly; and put purpose limits in a binding NDA so partner agencies play by the same rules.

Another example is Piedmont, CA's Transparency Page (which has the disclaimer that it is 'transitioning all of its cameras to Flock Safety and so the ALPR data reflected in the Transparency Portal is not reflective of all the data the Department is collecting') that has a CSV audit file available as well.

I'll remain skeptical and vigilant, but want to give Austin some credit here as well.