Know Thyself
Do I have a bigger soul than you?
Within his ethical treatise The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle begins his catalog of virtues with those virtues that are called moral. These virtues deal with the bodily pleasures, pains and actions of man. He moves through virtues that regulate passions and money: courage, moderation, liberality, magnificence. The crowning jewel of the moral virtues is μεγαλοψυχια, which is translated as magnanimity, or Greatness of Soul. A man who possesses this virtue is truly great among men and is placed in high honor by Aristotle, at least in Book 4. However, his discourse and examples of μεγαλοψυχια show a man who seems to be unpleasant at the best of times and in many instances down right sociopathic. Such a man is repulsive upon first encounter, and Christians have one greater sin to place upon his head: he lacks humility. St. Thomas Aquinas takes on the project that will allow Aristotle to exist within a Christian world. More than that, he will salvage what he can from book 4 of the Nicomachean Ethics and produce a treatise on the virtue he calls magnanimitas. He is able to take the ideas of the Philosopher, place them within the cleansing fire of doctrine and faith and forge the great crown that Aristotle imagined the virtue to be. In order to distinguish between the two technical terms which in English are both translated as magnanimity, the original languages will be used within this aritcle (i.e. Aristotles’ μεγαλοψυχια and Aquinas’ magnanimitas).
Aristotle begins chapter three of book four by talking about great deeds. Stated simply, some are worthy of achieving great things, like the Homeric heroes of Achilles and Odysseus, and some are not. The man who has obtained μεγαλοψυχια is the man “who deems himself worthy of great things and is worthy of them”. The man who is only worthy of achieving small things and does so is called moderate or sensible (σώφρον), and the man who thinks he can achieve great things but is mistaken is clearly called vain. It also follows, according to Aristotle, that because such a man is best, he would have what is best. Therefore, he “must be good, and what is great in each virtue would seem to belong to the great-souled man”. What is being talked about here is a small elite of men that can fully achieve the virtues and lay in waiting for great actions to present themselves. When such actions show themselves, the great souled man “will hazard great dangers, and…throws away his life, on the grounds that living is not at all worthwhile”.
He does not care for low gifts that could be given to him, but only the highest gift that his community can give him: honor. While this is the highest thing that he can be given, the great-souled man knows that even these honors are beneath him. He “justly looks down on others (since he holds a true opinion of himself), whereas the many do so in a random fashion” and “is necessarily open in both hate and love, for counseling these things is the mark of a fearful person, as is caring less for the truth than for people’s opinion”. This man pursues honor and dishonor, but not in the way the ambitious man does. He does not take pleasure in them because he wants to. The great souled man “will take pleasure in a measured way in great honors…on the grounds that he obtains what is proper to him or even less”. He enjoys these things because it is right that he does so. Therefore it seems to be said that a man who possesses μεγαλοψυχια has the fullness of the moral virtues, pursues honor because it is the best thing that other men can give him, and pursues the Good and True with little to no regard to his place in his own city. That is not to say that he is one who does not add to or protect the regime he belongs to. Remember that he lies in waiting for the great course of action to reveal itself. Until then he is like a lion napping on his great sun-warmed rock, not wishing to stir himself.
Now, one may see many things that are improper or even vicious when he beholds μεγαλοψυχια, especially from a Christian perspective. One could say that a man who possesses such a “virtue” does not look up, he does not acknowledge his dependence on God, he cannot serve his fellow man without counting the cost. Even Aristotle says that such a man “is idle and a procrastinator”. It seems that this man cannot look up because he sees himself as the greatest of men, and does not see anything that is higher than man in the created order. “The great-souled man is also not given to admiration [or wonder] since nothing is great to him”. This lack of wonder is most concerning since “we feel wonder most powerfully when we directly experience what seems more than man, what is grand” and “the sense that we are on top, with nowhere to ascend, vanishes like the morning mist”. He cannot recognize the spiritual realm that is very much present within his humanity. The Christian man, on the other hand, recognizes his dependence on the goodness and greatness of God. The man who possesses μεγαλοψυχια is displeased when he owes another man any kind of favor and wants to put other men in his own debt, since this seems most fitting to him and his position. This again goes against the very idea of Christian spirituality, which never ceases to profess that God has given each man gifts, not least among them being life.The responsibility of each Christian man is to put his gifts at the service of others, laying them at the foot of the altar. It seems the great-souled man would never be able to accept such a reality, for that would mean accepting an infinitely valuable gift which he is incapable of repaying. The ultimate reason that a man who possesses μεγαλοψυχια is not a virtuous man, however, is that he does nothing for the sake of love. Paul does not stop preaching that the people of God should always do things with love, but the great-souled man does things merely because it is right for him to do so. He is “eager to be of service, and to be great in the presence of people of worth and good fortune, but measured toward those of a middling rank” rather than being eager to serve the sinners and poor, that is, those lower than him. There is a sense within book four of Nicomachean Ethics that the great-souled man does not deal with those lower than him, except with contempt. In all of his actions, it seems the great-souled man lacks the ability to see something greater than himself, and because of this, cannot receive or produce the level of Christian Charity necessary for virtue.
Aquinas takes on what Aristotle says about magnanimitas in his Summa Theologica. He confirms that the object of magnanimitas is honor. He then deviates from what Aristotle says by claiming that magnanimitas has to do with one's actions and not with the quality of one's soul per se. He says that “a man is said to be magnanimous in respect of thing that are great absolutely and simply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of things that are difficult simply”. In this he is taking the aristocratic idea of Aristotle that states there are some who are just by their nature better than others, and says that is not so. Instead it is by one’s actions that he is seen as better or worse. The regulation, attainment and enjoyment of honor is the scope of magnanimitas. Therefore it is not necessary for the great-souled man to see the spiritual realities through this virtue itself. Through higher virtues, such as faith, man understands his place in God’s creation.
This is then where magnanimitas is placed next to humility. Each is a virtue that relates to who man is. The first relates to who man is next to his fellow man and in the light of the gifts which he has received from God. The second, humility, relates man to God. With humility, man can see those things “defective which accrues through the weakness of nature”. On first looking at humility and magnanimitas together, it seems they are contraries: one says “Look how great I am” and the other says “Be gracious to me, O Lord, for I am a poor sinner”. But this is a mere surface level distinction.
Each of these virtues relates the man to something exterior. A man who is in possession of magnanimitas can see the honors he has received and the honors he is capable of achieving and takes satisfaction in doing these things. The level of his magnanimity can be seen from the outside by the level of difficult things that he takes on because “the perfection of a power is not perceived in every operation of that power, but in such operations as are great or difficult”. As a side bar, that does not mean that an action is magnanimous because of its difficulty. The difficulty of an action helps an observer determine if the action participates in magnanimitas and does not contribute value per se to the action. Humility is not concerned with such things as honor or glory, but instead with how man relates to God. It is humility that allows man to look at the greater, spiritual mysteries that are ever present in his life and wonder as he aught.
On one hand, Aristotle sees the greatness that man is capable of and desires that he be able to achieve those perfections. On the other, Aquinas sees the state in which man finds himself after the Fall, and more primarily, the dependence man has as a creature towards his Creator. In the ancient city of Delphi, there was an oracle consecrated to Apollo. This fount of wisdom for the Greeks was known for having three things inscribed for all to see on its mantle: “Give a pledge and trouble is at hand”, “Nothing too much” and “Know thyself”. This last maxim is of special note when applied to the subject of general virtue. It seems that the city of Delphi is pointing towards a generous middle. Found within “Know thyself” (γνθι σεαυτον) are the ideas of the Philosopher and the Theologian. “Know thyself” to be a creature born out of dust and who will one day return to that very selfsame dust. “Know thyself” to be the child of God, heir to a kingdom, and higher than all other beasts found on the earth and under it. It seems fitting that this idea comes from a pagan source, only to be fulfilled when put under the brilliant candle light of Christianity.
The man Aristotle imagined in Book Four of his Nicomachean Ethics is an incomplete picture. Without explicit mention of the intellectual virtues, he is a seemingly irreverent man who does not concern himself with the higher mysteries of the universe and his place in it. Instead he works at achieving what is a middling reward for his efforts, that is to say honor, and does not even enjoy these things per se, but merely because they are supposed to be enjoyed by him. Aquinas expounds on the importance of humility in a man, and softens the idea of magnanimity within his Summa. Both of these things are incredibly important to keep in mind while trying to construct the singular virtue these men are trying to explain. Such a virtue can be found within the Delphic maxim “Know thyself”, as this deals with the totality of man as he is in relation to many different things, namely God and Creation.



