ship of theseus vs nominalism

in the case of the Ship of Theseus, for the nominalist, the object itself, regardless of its physical changes, is the only real and existing entity in the external world, while the idea or concept of "ship" is a separate mental entity. the physical changes to the ship do not affect the universal concept of "ship," but they do affect the particular, empirical object that is the ship. therefore, nominalism separates the ontological reality of an object from its mental meaning.

the nominalist would maintain that the Ship of Theseus is the same entity even if it is physically changed completely, because the entity that exists in the external world is the discrete, empirical object, not the universal concept; each existing member of a given species (in this case, "ship,") – in fact each existing entity period – is qualified by a separate existence unique to it and in which nothing else shares (ontologically speaking) in any way.

so, you'd still be you even if you changed physically, completely, several times over 😄

 

do these terms exist, literally? it is that these universal notions—for mentally abstracting as to what accepts existence (i.e. empirical, in the "external", objective reality) and how knowledge is known that is acquired—relates to entities comparatively similarly to common nouns. for example, the noun "horse" relates to existing entities that share some common notion, a notion that is existing only in the mind. although there does exist among externally existing objects a measure of resemblance and similarity, and a measure of difference and contrariety, the perception of this resemblance and difference is a judgment of the mind after it has abstracted the qualities of each thing, then compared and contrasted them for the purpose of classification. what is existing in "externally" is perceptible in some way and although some of that is only perceptible to us now (which can be known as the realm of aisthesis, and what is not now perceptible is known as the realm of the unseen). the basic rules of logic and the innate axioms of reason being axiomatic and a priori, therefore, neither derive from nor are dependent on empirical experience and, partly for this reason, are not confined to our realm of empirical reality. by their nature, logical principles hold true universally and without exception; we apply them analogically to both of the realms, as abstractions (that exist mentally) of existence in reality.

 

the rationalisation of the foundations of rationality is something different than the foundations. their being rationalised, or as some might put it "the words 'laws of logic' were invented", doesn't change their being foundational—it's just a giving of descriptive understanding to the prescriptive epistemology of reality. they are necessary truths about reality that exist independently of human thought or language. the process of rationalisation or articulation of these laws does not change their fundamental status as the foundation of rationality and knowledge. instead, it helps us to understand and articulate the ways in which these principles are necessary for us to make sense of the world, and communicate about it.