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- 1. There are existing possible existents (i.e. actualised contingents)
- 2. There is either an explanation for existing possible existents, or there is not an explanation for existing possible existents
- 3. If there is not an explanation for existing possible existents, then nothing prevents the emergence of possible existents
- 4. There are possible existents which are not existing/emergent (i.e. non-actualised contingents)
- 5. Therefore, something prevents the emergence of possible existents; there must be an explanation for existents to be as they are
- 6. The PSR, if true, states that there must be an explanation for existents to be as they are
- 7. Therefore, the PSR is true
- 1. God necessarily exists.
- 2. From God’s infinite nature there necessarily follows everything conceivable by an infinite intellect (i.e. God's intellect is unlimited in its ability).
- 3. Possible existents are conceivable by an infinite intellect.
- 4. There are existing possible existents (i.e. actualised contingents)
- 5. Therefore possible existents, that are conceivable by an infinite intellect, are actualised.
- 6. There is either an explanation for existing possible existents, or there is not an explanation for existing possible existents [PSR or ~PSR by LEM]
- 7. If there is not an explanation for existing possible existents, then nothing prevents the emergence of possible existents
- 8. There are possible existents which are not existing/emergent (i.e. non-actualised contingents, conceivable by an infinite intellect)
- 9. Therefore, something prevents the emergence of possible existents conceivable by an infinite intellect; there must be an explanation for existents to be as they are
- 10. The PSR, if true, states that there must be an explanation for existents to be as they are.
- 11. The PSR is true.
- 12. Possible existents conceivable by an infinite intellect as actualised, or as prevented from emergence, must have an explanation to be as they are
- 13. Therefore, possible existents conceivable by an infinite intellect cannot be the sufficient explanation, whether actualised or as prevented from emergence, for either the actualised or the prevented
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